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6 - Curbing one's appetites in Plato's Republic

from Part II - Moral psychology in the Republic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2012

By
James Wilberding
Edited by
Rachel Barney ,
Tad Brennan  and
Charles Brittain
Rachel Barney
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
Tad Brennan
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Charles Brittain
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

This chapter presents a brief account about what it means for the appetitive part of soul to have an opinion or belief. It distinguishes between two varieties of cognition: conceptualization and reasoning. In light of Plato's repeated characterizations of the appetitive part as alogiston, it seems difficult to maintain that it has the capacity to reason. Plato's Republic makes clear that there are two aspects that correspond to the two components of the appetitive part's beliefs, namely intensity and object. Prima facie Proclus' account of the effects of moral education on the tripartite soul flies in the face of Plato's own statements on the matter. It is best to understand the rational part of the soul as the philosophical part of soul in adults who have become rational, whereas the philosophical part of soul in children is pre-rational.
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Plato and the Divided Self , pp. 128 - 149
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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