Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 July 2021
The aim of Part 3 is to make sense of Plato’s succinct ontological assertion that the sun-like good is source of the being and reality (or essence) of ‘the other’ forms. The text rules out equating this with the other forms’ participation in the form of the good. Two positive interpretations are put forward, one whereby ‘the other' forms are forms of virtues, the other whereby they are ethically neutral types such as returning a borrowed item to its owner. Both interpretations are closely grounded on Plato’s precise wording of his ontological claim. And, unlike various current interpretations, both allow for a measure of continuity between Socratic argument in earlier dialogues and dialectic in the Republic. Other interpretations are considered and rejected: the idea that the form generates the other forms by self-diffusion; the perfectionist approach that identifies the form of the good with the perfection or ideality as such common to all specific forms; and the approach that sees the form of the good as in some sense the system of other forms.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.