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2 - Theory of Prioritarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 June 2022

By
Matthew D. Adler
Edited by
Matthew D. Adler  and
Ole F. Norheim
Matthew D. Adler
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Ole F. Norheim
Affiliation:
Universitetet i Bergen, Norway
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Summary

This chapter provides theoretical foundations for the Prioritarianism in Practice volume, by clarifying the features of prioritarian social welfare functions (SWFs). A prioritarian SWF sums up individuals’ well-being numbers plugged into a strictly increasing and strictly increasing transformation function. Prioritarian SWFs, like the utilitarian SWF, fall within the “generalized-utilitarian” class of SWFs.Generalized-utilitarian SWFs are additive and, hence, especially tractable for purposes of policy analysis.The chapter reviews the axiomatic properties of generalized-utilitarian SWFs and, specifically, of prioritarian SWFs. Prioritarianism satisfies the Pigou-Dalton axiom (a pure, gap-diminishing transfer of well-being from a better-off to a worse-off person is an ethical improvement), while utilitarianism does not. Pigou-Dalton is the axiomatic expression of the fact that a prioritarian SWF gives extra weight (priority) to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals. The chapter also discusses the informational requirements of prioritarian SWFs (as regards interpersonal well-being comparisons).It reviews the various methodologies for applying a prioritarian SWF under uncertainty. And it describes the two main subfamilies of prioritarian SWFs, namely Atkinson and Kolm-Pollak SWFs.

Keywords

prioritarianismutilitarianismsocial welfare function (SWF)Pigou-DaltonSeparabilityinterpersonal comparisons of well-beinggeneralized-utilitarian SWFsAtkinson SWFsKolm-Pollak SWFs
Type
Chapter
Information
Prioritarianism in Practice , pp. 37 - 127
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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