Book contents
- Rebels and Conflict Escalation
- Rebels and Conflict Escalation
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Tables
- Vignettes
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Rebels and Escalation
- 2 Escalation and De-Escalation
- 3 Political Opportunity and Rebel Violence
- 4 Political Will
- 5 Capabilities
- 6 Capabilities
- 7 Political Will
- 8 Legitimacy and Support
- 9 De-Escalation
- 10 The Escalation and De-Escalation of Rebel Violence
- References
- Index
8 - Legitimacy and Support
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2021
Book contents
- Rebels and Conflict Escalation
- Rebels and Conflict Escalation
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Tables
- Vignettes
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Rebels and Escalation
- 2 Escalation and De-Escalation
- 3 Political Opportunity and Rebel Violence
- 4 Political Will
- 5 Capabilities
- 6 Capabilities
- 7 Political Will
- 8 Legitimacy and Support
- 9 De-Escalation
- 10 The Escalation and De-Escalation of Rebel Violence
- References
- Index
Summary
Chapter eight tackles the question of legitimacy and public support. The cases of the Front de Libération de Québec in Canada and the Colombian M-19 demonstrate the detrimental effect of losing public support, especially when the loss is caused by strategic mistakes of the group itself. The Canadian case points to the idea, important for policy and practice in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, that sometimes group legitimacy is beyond the control of any wilful action but the result of coincidence and (bad) luck. This also forms the first hypothesis on de-escalation.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rebels and Conflict EscalationExplaining the Rise and Decline in Violence, pp. 157 - 173Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021