20 - Strategic interaction and process preferences: games of reciprocity

Summary

Objects of preferences

Given possible motives and their relations with actions, there remains, to explain reciprocity, to consider the effects of the interaction of the participants that leads them to the choice of actions. In so choosing, participants often take into account their anticipation of others' reaction. Thus, they consider the thinking of others, and they may have to consider what others think they themselves think. This gives a game-theoretic form to the interaction leading to the choices of actions. In addition, people also often directly care about the nature of the intentions, attitudes, judgments and views of others, notably concerning themselves. And they also have judgments about their own intentions, attitudes, judgments, and views towards others. This is notably important for most genuine reciprocities. It is self-evident for reciprocities based on liking, but it also holds for the balance or fairness of balance reciprocity. Hence, the strategic game-theoretic dimension of the relation is not only present but also correspondingly enriched by these other concerns. Therefore, beyond the general properties of game theory, there will be major differences with other games, due to the type of motives and concerns. These specific properties of games of reciprocity influence both the preferences and the concepts of solution (in the sense of game theory) – as will shortly be seen.

These motives refer to social relations, which determine a type of process for the interaction such as, notably, a type of reciprocity, a purely self-interested exchange, or imposition by force.