Book contents
- Reviews
- Regulating Public Services
- Regulating Public Services
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Boxes
- Foreword
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Symbols
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Defining a Theoretical Normative Benchmark
- 3 Thinking Like a Monopoly about Price and Output
- 4 Regulating a Monopoly with Full Information
- 5 Regulating under Informational Constraints
- 6 Regulatory Rules to Set the Average Price
- 7 Linking Regulatory Theory to Practice through Finance
- 8 Non-Linear Pricing in Regulation
- 9 Social Concerns in Regulatory Design
- 10 Regulating Quality
- 11 On the Regulation of Investment
- 12 Regulating Multi-Product Oligopolies
- 13 Abuse of Market Power in (De)Regulated Industries
- 14 On the Relevance of Institutional Quality
- 15 Emerging Regulatory Challenges
- Bibliography
- Index
2 - Defining a Theoretical Normative Benchmark
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2022
- Reviews
- Regulating Public Services
- Regulating Public Services
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Boxes
- Foreword
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Symbols
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Defining a Theoretical Normative Benchmark
- 3 Thinking Like a Monopoly about Price and Output
- 4 Regulating a Monopoly with Full Information
- 5 Regulating under Informational Constraints
- 6 Regulatory Rules to Set the Average Price
- 7 Linking Regulatory Theory to Practice through Finance
- 8 Non-Linear Pricing in Regulation
- 9 Social Concerns in Regulatory Design
- 10 Regulating Quality
- 11 On the Regulation of Investment
- 12 Regulating Multi-Product Oligopolies
- 13 Abuse of Market Power in (De)Regulated Industries
- 14 On the Relevance of Institutional Quality
- 15 Emerging Regulatory Challenges
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The common economist’s benchmark to assess the efficiency impact of a regulatory decision is to compare the output and price outcomes of this decision to those that would be achieved under marginal cost pricing. The chapter explains that the efficiency payoff of marginal cost pricing in public service industries has to be balanced against the financial losses from this pricing strategy. It is because the average cost of production is usually declining over a substantial range of output and the marginal cost is below the average costs that marginal cost pricing leads to financial losses. It is this existence of increasing return to scale that explains why public service operators are often labelled as natural monopolies. The associated market power is what makes regulation necessary to ensure that these monopolies do not under-provide the services and/or overcharge. The chapter explains that to minimize the risk of abuses, regulators need to get precise assessments of the elasticity of demand to prices and income and of cost functions since these are needed to be able to measure efficiency outcomes.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Regulating Public ServicesBridging the Gap between Theory and Practice, pp. 32 - 58Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021