Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 January 2020
Why do legislators sometimes reject compromises that seem within reach and are closer to their preferred policy? Chapter 3 tests various explanations for legislators’ rejection of compromise and presents evidence that the belief that voters are very likely to punish state legislators for compromising reduces legislators’ likelihood of voting for a given compromise proposal by 21 percent. We find a similar effect among local elected officials. This demonstrates the importance of legislators’ views of their constituents and the role that fear of voter punishment plays in the rejection of compromises.
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