Book contents
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- A Note on the Notes (da capo)
- Abbreviations Used for Works by Heidegger
- Part I Rethinking Death in Heidegger
- Part II Rethinking Death after Heidegger
- 5 White’s Time and Death
- 6 Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death
- 7 Critical Afterlives of Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Existential Death in Sartre, Beauvoir, Levinas, Agamben, and Derrida
- 8 Heidegger’s Mortal Phenomenology of Existential Death and the Postmetaphysical Politics of Ontological Pluralism
- 9 Why It Is Better for a Dasein Not to Live Forever, or Being Pro-Choice on the Immortality Question
- 10 Concluding Recapitulations
- References
- Index
9 - Why It Is Better for a Dasein Not to Live Forever, or Being Pro-Choice on the Immortality Question
from Part II - Rethinking Death after Heidegger
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2024
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- A Note on the Notes (da capo)
- Abbreviations Used for Works by Heidegger
- Part I Rethinking Death in Heidegger
- Part II Rethinking Death after Heidegger
- 5 White’s Time and Death
- 6 Rethinking Levinas on Heidegger on Death
- 7 Critical Afterlives of Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Existential Death in Sartre, Beauvoir, Levinas, Agamben, and Derrida
- 8 Heidegger’s Mortal Phenomenology of Existential Death and the Postmetaphysical Politics of Ontological Pluralism
- 9 Why It Is Better for a Dasein Not to Live Forever, or Being Pro-Choice on the Immortality Question
- 10 Concluding Recapitulations
- References
- Index
Summary
In this penultimate chapter, we take up the philosophical question of whether immortality is truly desirable, seeking to establish an important difference between existing for a finite and for an infinite stretch of time by introducing the following important consideration. If it remains possible for an event to occur, then even an extremely unlikely event is certain to occur, given infinite time. I shall suggest that this consideration leads to insuperable problems with the most popular scenarios currently being envisioned for achieving immortality by techno-scientific means. These problems, moreover, motivate us to think more deeply about death and thereby rethink the requirements of a genuinely meaningful human life. Drawing on Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and other existential thinkers, I suggest that human beings’ most abiding sources of meaningfulness come not from endlessly repeating certain profound experiences (which sometimes does wear out their appeal) but, instead, from our struggle to stay true to and so continue to creatively and responsibly disclose what such momentous events, often rare and singular, only partly reveal to us in the first place, as we often come to realize only in retrospect – much as Heidegger came only retrospectively to recognize and then spend his life creatively disclosing the seemingly inexhaustible ontological riches of that ambiguous “nothing” Being and Time first glimpsed in the momentous experience of existential death, but in a way that Heidegger only partly understood at that time.
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- Rethinking Death in and after Heidegger , pp. 267 - 285Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024