8 - Economic statecraft and nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula

Summary

Carrots and sticks

The conflict expectations model outperforms the existing theories of economic sanctions. This has been shown in a survey of previous empirical studies, new statistical tests, and Boolean analysis. Each of the tests has provided firm support for the model. To determine the causal mechanisms of a coercion attempt, a structured, focused comparison of case studies is needed. Case studies complement the previous analysis in two ways. First, cases permit a more thorough evaluation of different explanations. Statistical results can be spurious; a Boolean approach straightjackets the data into a world of absolute dichotomy. To determine whether the predicted independent variable actually causes the outcomes, it is necessary to trace the actor's decision-making process, and compare the conflict expectations approach with the possible alternatives. Second, cases provide theory illustration. Regardless of how many equations or regressions are used to demonstrate a hypothesis, there is always the need to understand the nuts and bolts of a model through case studies. To talk about conflict expectations and opportunity costs in the abstract is one thing; observing their effect in a narrative allows readers to see the theory through example.

This chapter will use congruence and process-tracing procedures to confirm the model's empirical support, and also to determine if the model can explain how the sender chooses among policy options. Until now, I have focused primarily on the dynamics of economic coercion and treated the other options in the policy-maker's tool kit with benign neglect.