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10 - Sufficiency re-examined

from Part II - Inclusiveness, Social and Individual Agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2024

By
Jay Drydyk
Edited by
Flavio Comim ,
P. B. Anand  and
Shailaja Fennell
Flavio Comim
Affiliation:
Universitat Ramon Llull
P. B. Anand
Affiliation:
University of Bradford
Shailaja Fennell
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

The idea that every society ought to ensure each of its citizens an adequate standard of living is widely accepted. Martha Nussbaum has argued that such a standard should be understood as a set of capabilities adequate for a life of human dignity, an ample minimum that can be ascertained through public reasoning in each society.In this chapter the author shows why public reasoning about capabilities can be expected to support a higher standard that is optimal rather than minimal: the highest capability levels that could be sustained for everyone by the productive capacity of their society. The argument rests on a conception of equal dignity among human beings striving to live well, each in his or her own way. The first and most urgent step towards reaching this social optimum consists, at a lower level, in overcoming hardships.

Keywords

capability approachsufficiencythresholdNussbaumdignityimpartiality
Type
Chapter
Information
Social Choice, Agency, Inclusiveness and Capabilities , pp. 222 - 239
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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