Thailand in 2013: Haunted by the History of a Perilous Tomorrow
from THAILAND
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 May 2017
Summary
Raw Wounds
Thailand in 2013 once again faced the ghosts of its recent and turbulent past. As Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra sought to further consolidate the political control her Pheua Thai Party achieved at the 2011 election, struggles to determine the distribution of power among the country's social, political and economic elite intensified. In the long-running battle to define the future of Thailand — and the role of popular electoral mandates in the country's governance — the aggressive tactics of anti-government forces broke an uneasy and unstable stalemate. It was the mobilization of large-scale anti-government protests in November and December 2013 that left the country in a difficult position at year's end. The aim of toppling the “Thaksin regime” remained unfulfilled while many of the most powerful forces in the kingdom have made clear their discomfort with the deposed Prime Minister's continued popularity and perceived political meddling. Thaksin's use of the Pheua Thai government as a vehicle for his ambitions to return to Thailand and undo the damage of the 2006 coup remain central to a power struggle that will soon enter its second decade. As the end of King Bhumibol Adulyadej's reign looms, the expectations of further violence and instability are sparking new flashpoints. At the same time significant violence continues in the southern-most provinces, with no signs of immediate diminution.
Uprising Redux
The catalyst for the anti-government uprising in Bangkok towards the end of 2013 may well have been accidental, or at least the result of clumsy miscalculation. The Pheua Thai government introduced legislation to grant amnesties to a wide variety of figures implicated in the past decade's political turbulence with the knowledge that, as before, Thaksin's inclusion among those to be exonerated would be contentious. This deal was the product of some negotiation between the government and other powerful forces, particularly the army. It would have significant advantages for Thaksin but others would similarly benefit. However, a number of different groups, including “yellow” and “red” street forces, made the determination, for their own reasons, that the amnesty was inappropriate. In November 2013, The Economistreported that “[t]he government's latest attempt to get Thaksin Shinawatra back has united almost everyone against it”.
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- Information
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2014 , pp. 305 - 318Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2014