Book contents
- State of Emergency
- State of Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions
- 3 The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions
- 4 Why Do Governments Call a State of Emergency?
- 5 The Effectiveness of Emergency Constitutions after Natural Disasters
- 6 When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects?
- 7 States of Emergency after Domestic Turmoil
- 8 Dealing with Disaster
- 9 Keeping up the Balance between the Federation and the States
- 10 Constitutionalized Media Freedom during Emergencies
- 11 Unconstitutional States of Emergency
- 12 The COVID-19 Pandemic, States of Emergency, and Reliance on Executive Decrees
- 13 Returning to the Status Quo Ante?
- 14 Contracting for Catastrophe
- 15 The Future of States of Emergency
- References
- Index
5 - The Effectiveness of Emergency Constitutions after Natural Disasters
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 November 2024
- State of Emergency
- State of Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions
- 3 The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions
- 4 Why Do Governments Call a State of Emergency?
- 5 The Effectiveness of Emergency Constitutions after Natural Disasters
- 6 When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects?
- 7 States of Emergency after Domestic Turmoil
- 8 Dealing with Disaster
- 9 Keeping up the Balance between the Federation and the States
- 10 Constitutionalized Media Freedom during Emergencies
- 11 Unconstitutional States of Emergency
- 12 The COVID-19 Pandemic, States of Emergency, and Reliance on Executive Decrees
- 13 Returning to the Status Quo Ante?
- 14 Contracting for Catastrophe
- 15 The Future of States of Emergency
- References
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, we ask two questions: (1) Does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events? (2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unexpected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pretext to enhance their power. Furthermore, the easier it is to call a state of emergency, the larger the negative effects on basic human rights. Interestingly, presidential democracies are better able to cope with natural disasters than parliamentary ones in terms of lives saved, whereas autocracies do significantly worse in the sense that empowerment rights seriously suffer in the aftermath of a disaster.
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- State of EmergencyAn Economic Analysis, pp. 102 - 130Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024