Book contents
- State of Emergency
- State of Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions
- 3 The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions
- 4 Why Do Governments Call a State of Emergency?
- 5 The Effectiveness of Emergency Constitutions after Natural Disasters
- 6 When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects?
- 7 States of Emergency after Domestic Turmoil
- 8 Dealing with Disaster
- 9 Keeping up the Balance between the Federation and the States
- 10 Constitutionalized Media Freedom during Emergencies
- 11 Unconstitutional States of Emergency
- 12 The COVID-19 Pandemic, States of Emergency, and Reliance on Executive Decrees
- 13 Returning to the Status Quo Ante?
- 14 Contracting for Catastrophe
- 15 The Future of States of Emergency
- References
- Index
4 - Why Do Governments Call a State of Emergency?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 November 2024
- State of Emergency
- State of Emergency
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Architecture of Emergency Constitutions
- 3 The Determinants of Emergency Constitutions
- 4 Why Do Governments Call a State of Emergency?
- 5 The Effectiveness of Emergency Constitutions after Natural Disasters
- 6 When Does Terror Induce a State of Emergency? And What Are the Effects?
- 7 States of Emergency after Domestic Turmoil
- 8 Dealing with Disaster
- 9 Keeping up the Balance between the Federation and the States
- 10 Constitutionalized Media Freedom during Emergencies
- 11 Unconstitutional States of Emergency
- 12 The COVID-19 Pandemic, States of Emergency, and Reliance on Executive Decrees
- 13 Returning to the Status Quo Ante?
- 14 Contracting for Catastrophe
- 15 The Future of States of Emergency
- References
- Index
Summary
States of emergency do not only imply a significant change in the balance of powers between the three branches of government, they are also very frequently declared: between 1985 and 2014, at least 137 countries were subject to at least one such event. Our analysis shows that it is crucial to distinguish between states of emergency declared as a consequence of a natural disaster from those declared as a consequence of political turmoil. Distinguishing between the costs of declaring an emergency and its benefits, we find that the less costly it is to declare an emergency, the more emergencies will be called on the grounds of natural disasters but not on the grounds of political turmoil. This is, hence, more evidence that constitutions matter. Finally, emergencies based on political turmoil are more likely to be declared if an economic crisis is hitting the country, large natural disasters are more likely to lead to a state of emergency when more powers are allocated to the legislature, and results suggest that even military coup governments are subject to constitutional constraints.
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- Information
- State of EmergencyAn Economic Analysis, pp. 67 - 101Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024