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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 August 2020

John Greco
John Greco
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Georgetown University, Washington DC
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The Transmission of Knowledge , pp. 200 - 210
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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  • Bibliography
  • John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC
  • Book: The Transmission of Knowledge
  • Online publication: 21 August 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108560818.012
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  • Bibliography
  • John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC
  • Book: The Transmission of Knowledge
  • Online publication: 21 August 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108560818.012
Available formats
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  • Bibliography
  • John Greco, Georgetown University, Washington DC
  • Book: The Transmission of Knowledge
  • Online publication: 21 August 2020
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108560818.012
Available formats
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