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References and Further Reading

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2022

Kevin McCain
Kevin McCain
Affiliation:
University of Alabama, Birmingham
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Understanding How Science Explains the World , pp. 107 - 114
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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References

Primary Sources

On understanding: de Regt, H. (2017). Understanding Scientific Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On evidence for evolution: Kampourakis, K. (2020). Understanding Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On the nature of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19: Rabadan, R. (2020). Understanding Coronavirus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On uncertainty in science: Kampourakis, K. and McCain, K. (2019). Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On the aims of science: McCain, K. (2015). Explanation and the nature of scientific knowledge. Science & Education 24: 827–854.Google Scholar
On explanation in science: McCain, K. (2019). How do explanations lead to scientific knowledge? In McCain, K. and Kampourakis, K. (Eds.). What Is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science. New York: Routledge, 52–65; McCain, K. (2020). What is biological knowledge? In K. Kampourakis and T. Uller (Eds.). Philosophy of Science for Biologists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 36–54.Google Scholar

Secondary Sources

On how-possibly explanations: Brainard, L. (2020). How to explain how-possibly. Philosophers’ Imprint 20: 1–23.Google Scholar
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On the role of seeking and giving explanations in learning: Gopnik, A., Walker, C. M., Lombrozo, T., Williams, J. J., and Rafferty, A. N. (2017). Explaining constrains causal learning in childhood. Child Development 88: 229–246; Liquin, E. G. and Lombrozo, T. (2020). Explanation-seeking curiosity in childhood. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 35: 14–20.Google Scholar
On explanations as “because” answers to particular questions: Kampourakis, K. and Niebert, K. (2018). Explanation in biology education. In Kampourakis, K. and Reiss, M. (Eds.). Teaching Biology in Schools: Global Research, Issues and Trends. New York: Routledge, 236–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On the ubiquity of generating and evaluating explanations: Lombrozo, T. (2006). The structure and function of explanations. Trends in Cognitive Science 10: 464–470.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
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On equilibrium explanations as non-causal: Sober, E. (1983). Equilibrium explanation. Philosophical Studies 43: 201–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On the challenges for I-S explanations: Sober, E. (2020). A theory of contrastive causal explanation and its implications concerning the explanatoriness of deterministic and probabilistic hypotheses. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10: 34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On what-if-things-had-been-different questions: Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On the covering law model and other important accounts of scientific explanation: Woodward, J. (2021). Scientific Explanation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/scientific-explanation.Google Scholar
On the role of speculation in science: Achinstein, P. (2019). Speculation: Within and About Science. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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On skepticism concerning whether historical explanations are scientific: Gee, H. (2000). In Search of Deep Time. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
On the inescapability of uncertainty in science: Kampourakis, K. and McCain, K. (2019). Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
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On grounds for thinking that we have good reasons to reject philosophical skepticism without experiments: McCain, K. (2014). Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
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On likelihood of a cancer diagnosis in one’s lifetime: Cancer Treatment Centers of America (n.d.) Women and cancer. Available at: www.cancercenter.com/women-and-cancer#:~:text=The%20National%20Cancer%20Institute%20estimates,disease%20more%20often%20than%20men (accessed May 10, 2021).Google Scholar
On the close relationship between scientific explanation and prediction: de Regt, H. (2017). Understanding Scientific Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Douglas, H. E. (2009). Reintroducing prediction to explanation. Philosophy of Science 76: 444–463.Google Scholar
On the challenges of trying to understand the world: Kampourakis, K. and McCain, K. (2019). Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance. New York: Oxford University Press; Potochnik, A. (2017). Idealization and the Aims of Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
On simplicity and its role in science: Achinstein, P. (2019). Speculation: Within and About Science. New York: Oxford University Press; Martens, R. (2009). Harmony and simplicity: Aesthetic virtues and the rise of testability. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 40: 258–266.Google Scholar
On the possibility that infants use explanatory reasoning: Baillargeon, R., Li, J., Gertner, Y., and Wu, D. (2011). How do infants reason about physical events. In Goswami, U. (Ed.). The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development Vol. 2. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 11–48.Google Scholar
On the role of exemplars in evaluating explanatory quality: Bird, A. (2022). Knowing Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On the explanatory quality of evolutionary theory: Kampourakis, K. (2020). Understanding Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; McCain, K. and Weslake, B. (2013). Evolutionary theory and the epistemology of science. In K. Kampourakis (Ed.). The Philosophy of Biology: A Companion for Educators. Cham: Springer, 101–119.Google Scholar
On the ubiquity of generating and evaluating explanations: Lombrozo, T. (2006). The structure and function of explanations. Trends in Cognitive Science 10: 464–470; Lombrozo, T. (2016). Explanatory preferences shape learning and inference. Trends in Cognitive Science 20: 748–759.Google Scholar
On the role of beauty in science and its relation to simplicity: Glynn, I. (2010). Elegance in Science: The Beauty of Simplicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press; McAllister, J. W. (1996). Beauty and Revolution in Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Weinberg, S. (1994). Dreams of a Final Theory: The Scientist’s Search for the Ultimate Laws of Nature. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
On the theoretical virtues: Schindler, S. (2018). Theoretical Virtues in Science: Uncovering Reality through Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
On the rules of scientific debate: Strevens, M. (2020). The Knowledge Machine: How Irrationality Created Modern Science. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
On the role of theoretical virtues in the success of science: Trout, J. D. (2016). Wondrous Truths: The Improbable Triumph of Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On young children’s preference for simpler theories: Walker, C. M., Williams, J. J., Lombrozo, T., Rafferty, A. N., and Gopnik, A. (2017). Explaining constrains causal learning in childhood. Child Development 88: 229–246.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
On scientific understanding: de Regt, H. (2017). Understanding Scientific Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Elgin, C. Z. (2017). True Enough. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Kampourakis, K. and McCain, K. (2019). Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On the prevalence of cognitive biases: Gilovich, T. (1991). How We Know What Isn’t So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life. New York: Free Press.Google Scholar
On the possibility that studies purporting to show cognitive errors are mistaken: Hertwig, R. and Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The “conjunction fallacy” revisited: How intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 12: 275–305; Mousavi, S. and Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Revisiting the “error” in studies of cognitive errors. In D. A. Hofmann and M. Frese (Eds.). Error in Organizations. New York: Taylor & Francis, 97–112.Google Scholar
On what makes an explanation the best: Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
On the inherent uncertainty of science: Rovelli, C. (2014). Science is not about certainty. In Brockman, J. (Ed.). The Universe: Leading Scientists Explore the Origin, Mysteries, and Future of the Cosmos. New York: Harper Perennial, 214–228; Kampourakis, K. and McCain, K. (2019). Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On reasons to be skeptical of felt understanding: Trout, J. D. (2016). Wondrous Truths: The Improbable Triumph of Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On understanding generated from idealizations: de Regt, H. (2017). Understanding Scientific Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Elgin, C. Z. (2017). True Enough. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
On the nature of scientific models: Giere, R. N. (2010). Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
On uncertainty resulting from idealizations: Kampourakis, K. and McCain, K. (2019). Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance. New York: Oxford University Press; Rovelli, C. (2014). Science is not about certainty. In J. Brockman (Ed.), The Universe: Leading Scientists Explore the Origin, Mysteries, and Future of the Cosmos. New York: Harper Perennial, 214–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On idealizations in biology: Sober, E. (2000). Philosophy of Biology, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
On the nature of idealizations: Strevens, M. (2008). Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
On the inescapability of idealizing models in science: Potochnik, A. (2017). Idealization and the Aims of Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; Trout, J. D. (2016). Wondrous Truths: The Improbable Triumph of Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On possible explanations for the origin of life on Earth: Bernhardt, H. S. (2012). The RNA world hypothesis: The worst theory of the early evolution of life (except for all of the others). Biology Direct 7: 23.Google Scholar
On the idea that knowledge only comes by inference to the only explanation: Bird, A. (2022). Knowing Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On the requirement that inferred explanations must not only be the best, but also “good enough”: Dellsén, F. (2021). Explanatory consolidation: From “best” to “good enough”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; Lipton, P. (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge; McCain, K. and Poston, T. (2019). Dispelling the disjunction objection to explanatory inference. Philosophers’ Imprint 19: 1–8.Google Scholar
On successes of IBE in science: Douven, I. (2017). Abduction. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.). Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction; Trout, J. D. (2016). Wondrous Truths: The Improbable Triumph of Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
On the relation of scientific and everyday thinking: Einstein, A. (1936). Physics and reality. Journal of the Franklin Institute 221: 349–382.Google Scholar
On the explanatory power of the double-helix structure of DNA: Kampourakis, K. (2017). Making Sense of Genes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
On how scientific explanations lead to scientific knowledge: Kampourakis, K. and McCain, K. (2019). Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance. New York: Oxford University Press; McCain, K. (2019). How do explanations lead to scientific knowledge? In K. McCain and K. Kampourakis (Eds.). What Is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science. New York: Routledge, 52–65; McCain, K. (2020). What is biological knowledge? In K. Kampourakis and T. Uller (Eds.). Philosophy of Science for Biologists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 36–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
On how the changes in our scientific practices make our best hypotheses likely to be true: Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
On the Best of a Bad Lot and unconceived rival hypotheses objections to IBE: van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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  • References and Further Reading
  • Kevin McCain, University of Alabama, Birmingham
  • Book: Understanding How Science Explains the World
  • Online publication: 17 June 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108997027.013
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  • References and Further Reading
  • Kevin McCain, University of Alabama, Birmingham
  • Book: Understanding How Science Explains the World
  • Online publication: 17 June 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108997027.013
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • References and Further Reading
  • Kevin McCain, University of Alabama, Birmingham
  • Book: Understanding How Science Explains the World
  • Online publication: 17 June 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108997027.013
Available formats
×