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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
Introduction of the concept of an image
In the previous two chapters, we saw how inquiry focused on the concept of appearance in the course of defining the sophist. Through the New Attempt the sophist is characterised as one who appears to be wise but is not (cf. Passage 9: 233c1–11). In examining the sophist's appearing, we have also found out the significant role that appearance plays in philosophical inquiry. The inquirers have received many appearances of the sophist in the earlier inquiry; that, on the one hand, signifies their failure to define the sophist, but on the other, provides a clue to further investigation in the New Attempt. Facing this double role of appearance, it is necessary to distinguish between two ways of dealing with appearances: the sophist's use of appearance for deceiving others, and the inquirers' use of appearance in their philosophical inquiry (cf. 3.3 and 3.4).
It is at this point that Plato introduces the concept of ‘image’ (eidōlon). Just after the New Attempt, making images is introduced as a model for the sophist's appearing. This introduction of the concept of image has two main purposes. One is to illustrate and clarify some basic features of the concept of appearance. We shall examine in what respects the concept of image illustrates the concept of appearance. The other purpose is to show how the two ways of dealing with appearances can be distinguished.
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