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Chapter 1 - Closed-Mindedness As an Intellectual Vice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2020

By
Heather Battaly
Edited by
Christoph Kelp  and
John Greco
Christoph Kelp
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
John Greco
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

What is closed-mindedness, and if it is an intellectual vice, what makes it so? This is the second in a series of three papers on closed-mindedness. It adopts a working analysis of closed-mindedness as an unwillingness or inability to engage seriously with relevant intellectual options. It distinguishes between three different kinds of intellectual vice – effects vice, responsibilist vice, and personalist vice – and argues that closed-mindedness can take each of these forms.

Keywords

intellectual viceintellectual virtuevirtue epistemologyvice epistemologydoxastic double-downepistemic pollutiondogmatismclosed-mindedness
Type
Chapter
Information
Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
New Methods and Approaches
 , pp. 15 - 41
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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