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Chapter 6 - Virtue Epistemology, Two Kinds of Internalism, and the Intelligibility Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2020

By
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Edited by
Christoph Kelp  and
John Greco
Christoph Kelp
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
John Greco
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

This chapter compares virtue epistemology to two types of Internalisms, Statism and Propositionalism in light of the intelligibility problem first raised by Sellars. It explains the problem and argues that both virtue epistemology and Statism are subject to this problem. Even thoughPrropositionalism is designed to address the problem, the problem is much more difficult to solve than is recognized. I show why, and what a solution to the problem might look like.

Keywords

InternalismExternalismvirtue epistemologyPropositionalismStatismsafetysensitivitytruth-trackingintelligibility problem
Type
Chapter
Information
Virtue Theoretic Epistemology
New Methods and Approaches
 , pp. 147 - 165
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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