Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Map
- 1 The Big Three and Poland: July 1943–July 1944
- 2 The Genesis of the Polish Resistance Movement
- 3 Attempts to Unify the Polish Resistance Movement
- 4 The Polish Grand Strategy, 1941–1943
- 5 The ‘Tempest’ Plan
- 6 The London Poles and ‘Tempest’
- 7 The ‘Tempest’ East of Warsaw
- 8 The Fate of Warsaw
- 9 Why Warsaw Rose
- 10 Warsaw and the Émigré Leaders
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Warsaw and the Émigré Leaders
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Map
- 1 The Big Three and Poland: July 1943–July 1944
- 2 The Genesis of the Polish Resistance Movement
- 3 Attempts to Unify the Polish Resistance Movement
- 4 The Polish Grand Strategy, 1941–1943
- 5 The ‘Tempest’ Plan
- 6 The London Poles and ‘Tempest’
- 7 The ‘Tempest’ East of Warsaw
- 8 The Fate of Warsaw
- 9 Why Warsaw Rose
- 10 Warsaw and the Émigré Leaders
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
To fully understand the attitude of the leading émigré political and military leaders to the Warsaw Rising, it is necessary to examine the directives they sent to Jankowski and Bor-Komorowski in July 1944; only by this means is it possible to determine to what extent, if any, they were responsible for the outbreak of the insurrection and how far it fulfilled their intentions.
From the beginning of July 1944 Polish authorities in London were acting under the impact of two important events: the launching of the Red Army's summer offensive on the Eastern Front and the breakdown of the informal Russo–Polish diplomatic talks in London in June 1944. These developments influenced the directives sent to Poland during the last few weeks before the outbreak of the insurrection.
On 3 July the Polish Premier, the C-in-C and the Minister of National Defence attended a working dinner in London to review the recent strategic and diplomatic developments and, if necessary, to issue additional instructions to the underground. This high-level meeting was arranged by Kukiel, who considered it was essential to bring Mikolajczyk and Sosnkowski together to discuss again the role of the resistance during the approaching months. Relations between the two were strained because Sosnkowski suspected that the Premier was about to capitulate to Soviet demands. Sosnkowski intended to leave for Italy soon to inspect the Polish troops fighting there.
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Warsaw Rising of 1944 , pp. 281 - 311Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1974