Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Map
- 1 The Big Three and Poland: July 1943–July 1944
- 2 The Genesis of the Polish Resistance Movement
- 3 Attempts to Unify the Polish Resistance Movement
- 4 The Polish Grand Strategy, 1941–1943
- 5 The ‘Tempest’ Plan
- 6 The London Poles and ‘Tempest’
- 7 The ‘Tempest’ East of Warsaw
- 8 The Fate of Warsaw
- 9 Why Warsaw Rose
- 10 Warsaw and the Émigré Leaders
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Why Warsaw Rose
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Map
- 1 The Big Three and Poland: July 1943–July 1944
- 2 The Genesis of the Polish Resistance Movement
- 3 Attempts to Unify the Polish Resistance Movement
- 4 The Polish Grand Strategy, 1941–1943
- 5 The ‘Tempest’ Plan
- 6 The London Poles and ‘Tempest’
- 7 The ‘Tempest’ East of Warsaw
- 8 The Fate of Warsaw
- 9 Why Warsaw Rose
- 10 Warsaw and the Émigré Leaders
- Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The Home Army's attempt to free Warsaw before the entry of the Red Army was prompted mainly by political and ideological reasons. The authors of the insurrection decided to act because they were convinced that, if the claims of the London Government to govern and represent Poland were to be established in the eyes of the world, Warsaw must be liberated by forces loyal to that Government. By taking Warsaw the Home Army was to clear the ground for the final, decisive confrontation with Stalin, the outcome of which was to determine who would govern Poland – the London Poles or the Polish Communists and their sympathisers. To Jankowski and Bor-Komorowski, this was the crucial moment of the war for Poland; they believed that she stood at historic cross-roads, that her destiny was about to be decided.
Their assumption that the strategic situation in Poland favoured their political designs strengthened their determination to act; they believed that military developments on the eastern front afforded them a singular opportunity to wrest control of Warsaw from the collapsing Germans shortly before the entry of the victorious Red Army. Thus they would create the necessary conditions for their political demonstration.
Had Bor-Komorowski and his Staff made a more realistic analysis of the military situation, they would no doubt have abandoned their plan to free Warsaw during the first days of August 1944. They were well aware, even before the outbreak of the insurrection, that the success of their enterprise would depend on the outcome of the Red Army's offensive on Warsaw.
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- Chapter
- Information
- The Warsaw Rising of 1944 , pp. 243 - 280Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1974