This is a report of data drawn from a study of personal injury actions in the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, and in the federal district court for Northern California, for the period 1880–1900. Tort actions, in this period, were relatively uncommon compared to the number of accidents. The most frequent type of action was against common carriers—railroads and street railways. Malpractice actions were rare. Most fired cases were settled or dropped out before full trial and jury verdict. Though plaintiffs won damages in most jury cases, the overall finding is that the system provided little compensation for most victims of accidents. Tort law and practice disfavored passengers less than employees or “trespassers.” Three types of barrier blocked the path to compensation: legal doctrines which made recovery difficult; an accident-compensation system which, especially for workers, discouraged enforcement of claims; and the legal culture, which was a culture of low expectations.

According to the general wisdom, legislatures lack both the power to “entrench” their enactments against alteration by their successors and the power to “retroactively” undo the efforts of their predecessors. The author argues that, rather than being in conflict, these principles share a common theme. Legislatures operate as agents of the people under constitutionally defined mandates that are limited in time as well as scope. Actions that transcend—either forward or backward in time—the temporal delegation of authority conferred by periodic elections do not bind the electorate. In the first half of the article the author suggests that an understanding of the rationale behind the entrenchment prohibition can help shed light on a diverse group of issues including congressional power to prescribe internal rules of operation, constitutional amendment procedures, and legislative impairment of contracts. In the second half of the article the author takes issue with the traditional objection to retroactivity grounded on vested rights and unfulfilled expectations. In its place he proposes a theory of retroactivity embodied in republican principles concerning the temporal relationship between the people and their legislative agents.

This case study of criminal process in a middle-sized western city in the United States employs quantitative data, interviews, and library research to explore the politics of criminal process and its impact on the operative policies of the criminal courts from I964 through 1980. The research reveals significant policy change but a very elusive relationship between politics and policy. Judges and prosecutors preserve a significant measure of autonomy for dealing with the bulk of their caseload by giving up much of their independence in those cases that are inescapably politicized. Both judges and prosecutors use this partial political insulation to advance their own versions of criminological wisdom. On the other hand, they are constrained by the prevailing ethos and by institutional limitations to operate well within conventional definitions of crime and criminality—even when those conventional views run counter to their own practical experience.