A cartoon published last year in a Boston newspaper showed two passengers on an aeroplane, one turning to the other to say, “Uh-oh, the stewardesses have changed into their Cuban costumes.” Seventy-five successful hijackings of aircraft of United States and foreign registration in the past nineteen months have dampened this light-hearted approach to the subject. In recent months a bantering remark to a member of a flight crew as to the prospects for a side trip to Cuba has earned more than one passenger a delayed flight, a conversation with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or an appearance in court on charges ranging from disturbing the peace to attempted aircraft piracy. For some passengers the hijacking of an aircraft may be a colorful interlude in the routine course of air travel; for the flight crew, the carrier, and the Federal Aviation Administration, it is a nightmare, a vicious form of Russian roulette in which the fate of the hijacker is inconsequential in comparison with the potential cost in lives of passengers and crew, not to speak of the value of the aircraft itself.

On March 13, 1969, the United States Senate by a vote of 83 to 15 consented to the ratification of a treaty described as “the most important international agreement brought before the U. S. Senate since the North Atlantic Pact” and “the most important international agreement limiting nuclear arms since the nuclear age began.” Assuming a timely entry into force, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons may delay incarnation of the specter which “haunted” John F. Kennedy:

The termination on January 31, 1968, of the Trusteeship Agreement on Nauru has given rise to a complex situation with regard to Article 86(1) of the United Nations Charter which lays down the rules governing the composition of the Trusteeship Council.

The material for this section is compiled by Stephen L. Gibson, attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State