This Article explores the antitrust and other implications of private credentialing and accrediting programs in the health care industry. Although such programs are usually sponsored by powerful competitor groups, they serve the procompetitive purpose of providing useful information and authoritative advice to independent decision makers. Part One examines the risk that credentialing will sometimes be unfair to competitors and deceive consumers. Its survey of common-law, antitrust, and regulatory interventions to correct such unfairness and deception seeks to determine the degree of oversight to which credentialing and similar activities have been and should be subjected. In recommending that judicial or regulatory scrutiny should be limited to discovering whether standards and practices have a rational relation to a procompetitive purpose, the Article argues that greater intrusion into credentialing schemes would be inconsistent with market theory and first amendment values and would discourage line-drawing efforts that stimulate competition and facilitate consumer choice. By emphasizing throughout that personnel certification and institutional accreditation embody ideology and opinion as well as factual information, Part One sets the stage for the argument in Part Two that antitrust law can and should be used to contest the dominance of a single ideology of health care and to facilitate the development of alternative sources of consumer information. The Article’s overall thesis is that, whereas the quality of advice given to the public about health care personnel and similar matters should not be closely regulated, neither should the supply of competing information and opinion be artificially curtailed.

For almost forty years, legislators have advocated comprehensive measures designed to assure Americans quality health care. Instead of implementing an integrated health care plan, Congress has intermittently enacted statutes which address specific health care delivery problems. At times the judiciary has stretched the ambit of existing health legislation in response to particular plaintiffs’ urgent claims. This Case Comment examines the dilemma of piecemeal legislation and judicial policymaking as exemplified by Presbyterian Hospital of Dallas v. Harris, a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals health care financing decision whose outcome Congress has flatly rejected.

Although cocaine is pharmacologically not a narcotic, federal and state drug control laws have classified it as one from 1922 through the present. In many states and under federal law, the classification is part of a statutory scheme that imposes substantially more severe penalties for offenses involving cocaine than for offenses involving other nonnarcotic drugs.

This Note examines the circumstances surrounding the adoption and maintenance of the legal classification of cocaine as a narcotic. It then reviews two of the many cases that have rejected claims that the classification is unconstitutional. The Note concludes that, despite its constitutionality, the inaccurate classification is not only illogical and unnecessary to a legislative goal of strictly penalizing cocaine offenses, but is counterproductive as well.