Change is the order of today, and the nightmare or the hope of tomorrow. For better or worse, the orbit of public policy is ever widening in all nations and in international organization as well. With its widening have come profound changes in the methods of policy formation; so much so that the normal vocabulary and thought patterns of the lawyer, and even of the political scientist, are among the chief obstacles to its understanding.

In the article that follows there are considered, first, the changes in the over-all culture of which public policy formation is a part; and, then, and only then, the more precise changes in policy formation itself.

Laws were once the typical expression of public policy. In this, their one-time characteristic rôle, they are now dying or dead, however reluctant many of our national leaders are to read the obituary column. Our so-called statesmen choose rather to live still in a world of dreams in which nostalgia for the days of a government of laws blinds them to the changed and paramount contemporary characteristic of government, which is organization to attain objectives. In the strict sense of the term, a law is a general rule of conduct. But today government consists largely, not of these general rules, but of continuous intervention—intervention by men in the relations between groups. The changing pattern of public policy formation is understandable only as change induced by this drastic alteration which lies at the very heart of the nature of government.

The United States Army officially defines military government as “that form of government which is established and maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory of the enemy and over the inhabitants thereof.” “It is a government imposed by force and the legality of its acts is determined by the laws of war.” An application of this definition in the formulation of an adequate and enlightened civil affairs policy brings many difficult problems in its train, and particularly is this true in the modern, complex organization of society and warfare.

Thrown into prominence by the war, such problems of military government at present occupy the attention not only of American political and military authorities, but also of numerous scholars and publicists. That the latter should display so keen an interest in what is apparently a strictly military matter is a sign of the growing realization that solution of the problems of military government is vital for the successful prosecution of the war and for establishing the conditions which will make possible an equitable peace settlement. American public opinion, to some extent led and moulded by scholars and publicists, is unmistakably concerned with civil affairs administration of allied occupied territories across the sea and with plans for those yet to be occupied.

Interestingly enough, in the extensive consideration given to War Department reorganization immediately after World War I, almost no attention was paid to the possible value of the S.O.S., A.E.F., experience. Three thousand miles behind the A.E.F., in Washington, it may have seemed that there was little to distinguish between the Services of Supply and the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the General Staff with its accumulation of hostile reaction.

In August, 1919, the General Staff of the War Department presented its version of desirable legislation for the reconstitution of a peace-time Army. The measure provided for a General Staff Corps to consist of a Chief of Staff with the rank of General, five assistants to be detailed from the general officers of the line, five Brigadier Generals, and 220 other officers. The bill provided that the Chief of Staff should have “supervision of all agencies and functions of the military establishment” under the direction of the President or the Secretary of War; and it went on to provide that “the Chief of Staff shall be the immediate adviser of the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the Military Establishment, and shall be charged by the Secretary of War with the planning, development, and execution of the war program.

The complaint about Congress which has been more or less chronic in this country's history became acute during the 77th Congress (1941–42). While some of the condemnation was abusive, personal, and partisan, much of it was a frank recognition of existing weaknesses emphasized by present responsibilities. Intelligent response to this criticism both inside and outside of Congress resulted in constructive suggestions intended to restore the representative branch to fullest prestige and usefulness. While far-reaching alterations in the working arrangements of Congress proposed by publicists and scholars may be completely sound, it would be naïve to assume that any reform could be imposed on Congress from without. Congressmen are notoriously jealous of their own prerogatives, and the only hope of modernizing the lawmaking branch rests with them. It is therefore highly significant that the members of the 78th Congress reacted to the criticism by introducing an unprecedented number of resolutions ranging from the smug suggestion for a committee to protect the integrity of Congress to two soul-searching recommendations for special committees to study all aspects of Congressional reorganization.

The wars which are now drawing to a close can be compared to the Thirty Years War (1618–48), the War of the Spanish Succession, which really began in 1688 and lasted until 1713, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1789–1815). Each of these wars lasted thirty years or slightly less, and if we begin the present war in 1914, it already has become a fourth thirty-years war.

All of these wars left problems which had aspects in common. In all, there was the problem of returning to the ways of peace, of settling boundaries and governments, of reconstruction, and of maintaining a stable international order. But in each successive war the area involved was larger, the number of participants in the peace was greater, their economic relationships were more pervasive, and a more intensive international political organization was attempted.

At Westphalia in 1648, the effort was rather to establish the independence of states than to organize their interdependence. The ancient structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the universal spiritual authority of the Papacy were crumbling. The national independence of Switzerland and of the Netherlands and the virtual independence of the states of Germany were recognized. The notion of the sovereign territorial state, so different from the conception of a feudal hierarchy which had dominated medieval thinking, took root in men's minds and was promoted by the administration of efficient governments beginning to realize the possibilities of building power upon national sentiment.

Any discussion of postwar problems in our relations with Latin America must begin with a consideration of the great changes which have taken place in hemisphere relations during the war period. Since 1939, the American Republics have achieved a degree of coöperation in international matters which would hardly have seemed possible a few years earlier, and today all but one of the nations of the Continent are helping the United States either as belligerents or as non-belligerents in the prosecution of the war.

On the military side, our neighbors have given us bases for our Naval and Air Forces and have strengthened their own armed forces, in most cases with the aid of missions from our Army and Navy. Some of them have taken an active part in anti-submarine operations, and Brazil is preparing to send forces abroad. On the political side, they have set up machinery for coöperation in dealing with fifth column and other hostile activities. The importance of their coöperation in these matters is inestimable. Of still more significance, perhaps, has been their economic aid.

For the purposes of my discussion, I am defining “educational function' broadly. I take it to comprehend not merely instruction of the youth who regularly resort to academic lecture halls and libraries, but also the impact of such special knowledge as we accumulate upon the adult population generally, and especially upon the officials in government, industry, commerce, agriculture, and labor with responsibility for policy, decision, and operation of our major political and economic institutions.

The entire burden of my remarks is a plea that in the years ahead we move together as a family of related intellectual workers to define more precisely the profession of social scientist. Especially, I urge that we consider together the broadening of the domain of our profession so that, although it remains based in academic life, it will penetrate, as a recognizable, self-disciplined group of investigators and staff advisers, the major extra-academic institutions of our national life.

The Committee on Research of the American Political Science Association was appointed by President William Anderson in 1942. A considerable number of sessions were held during 1942 and 1943 in Washington under the chairmanship of Ernest S. Griffith. Four different regions of research were assigned for more specific exploration through panels to four “conveners,” namely, International Relations (Walter R. Sharp, later Phillips Bradley); Political Theory (Benjamin Lippincott, later Francis G. Wilson); Public Law (Carl B. Swisher); Comparative Government (Karl Loewenstein).

In developing the panel on comparative government, the convener sent various circular letters and detailed questionnaires to some twenty-five members of the profession who, by their past performance, were believed to entertain active interest in the subject-matter. The original plan of having the group function as a round-table at the annual meeting of the Association in 1942 became a casualty of the war. But the sponsors were not easily discouraged, even though war duties limited their own and the participants' efforts. After an epistolary exchange of opinion extending over almost a year, a panel meeting was held in Washington on April 17 and 18, 1943, attended by twelve members coming from outside and six resident in Washington.