We moderns attack no new problem when we set out again on the quest for responsibility. We merely use new terms for old ideas. Hundreds of generations have tried to reconcile liberty and law, authority and freedom. These same problems are posed on the oldest Egyptian tablets. Recall also that requirement in an old Greek city that whosoever desired to propose a new law should come into the place of assembly with a rope about his neck. Responsibility, you see! Justinian declared that the affairs which concern all should be decided by all. Such illustrations may be found throughout the pages of history. Calvin and Arminius posed the problem in theological language, using the terms “sovereignty of God” and “free will.” Plantagenets, Tudors, and Stuarts all grappled with the implications of the responsible crown, and with the difficulties of getting taxes without debate in Parliament. Magna Carta, the Declaration of Right, ship money, the Instrument of Government of Cromwell's day, habeas corpus, the Bill of Rights—these are all tokens of a long English struggle for responsibility in government.

This is a study of the factors that are at work in the determination of British legislative policy. With a tendency to generalize and over-simplify, various authorities have located this function in Parliament, in the cabinet, or in the civil service. Occasionally, mention is made also of the influence of the king or of pressure groups. Each authority is able to cite examples in support of his views, at least when his views have been challenged and mere assertions fail to satisfy. As a matter of law, it is easy to determine where the function lies; but the British constitution has never found in law the measure of its reality.

Contemptuous critics of democracy have been no less confused in properly locating this function than have been many of its supporters. Some defenders of the “democratic process” see the parliamentarian as one who translates the will of the electorate into public policy; and they see Parliament in turn delegating to technicians the duty of preparing the detailed rules that will effectuate that policy.

The proposal in 1937 to “pack” the Supreme Court may have been an adventitious attempt directed at particular persons under displeasure, open to every criticism based upon principle. But it at least skirted part of the border of a serious problem which did not disappear when that particular scheme was repulsed. No matter whether one held with the President in his contention, or abhorred the device—no matter how little one thought the ages of the justices then sitting had to do with the complaints lodged against them—one knows that senility has in the past overtaken and may again overtake justices of that Court and impair their faculties, and that it may do so before they reach the age of seventyfive, by the same token as one knows that it has failed to overtake others who sat on the Court long past the age of four score.

The constitutional clause governing the approval of bills after the adjournment of Congress is as follows: “If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.” The power of the President to sign after adjournment was not specifically established until 1932, in the case of Edwards v. United States (286 U. S. 482), and the failure of a bill unless signed within ten days after adjournment was not finally passed upon until 1929, in the Pocket Veto Case (279 U. S. 655).

It is no mere coincidence that greater reliance on government for social stewardship in a decade of economic stress has been accompanied by a reconsideration of public personnel problems. Foremost in the new orientation of thought is a deeper appreciation of administrative leadership within the civil service. As a result, considerable emphasis is being placed upon the demand for “upward extension” of the merit principle. In reality, the term “extension” appears to be a misnomer. If the leading staff positions in the administrative hierarchy are to be filled on a basis of competency and permanency, far-reaching questions of recruitment, promotion, and general grouping present themselves which can be answered only in relation to a revised conception of the entire service.

The preliminary report of the select committee of the United States Senate appointed to investigate the executive agencies of the government with a view to coordination, under authority of Senate Resolution 217, 74th Congress, passed February 24, 1936, was presented to the Senate by Senator Harry F. Byrd, chairman, on August 16, 1937. Except for a brief introduction by Senator Byrd, in which he states that his committee has reached no final conclusions and that it expects to continue its investigations, the document is given over entirely to the report prepared for the committee by the Brookings Institution. Dr. Moulton, president of the Institution, explains in a letter of transmittal the contractual arrangements under which the report was prepared and lists the staff members, regular and special, who participated in its preparation.

A special committee on research materials has been set up by the Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council. As the title indicates, this Committee is sponsoring a program for the “collection of data limited in time and place, including the statement of relevant facts involved in an administrative problem, the decision taken with reference thereto, and results arising therefrom.” This program is worthy of the backing and coöperation of all political scientists interested in the field of public administration, and having faith in the possibility of developing a science of public administration.

The labels that happen to become attached to things are of little consequence; the substance is what counts. Good government does not consist in getting any certain caption placed upon a municipal organization; it consists in the introduction into its daily functioning of practices and processes that guarantee responsiveness to public needs. Four main types of governmental structure have figured in the history of American cities: strong council, strong mayor, commission, and council-manager. Each of these has several features peculiar to itself, yet there are a number of principles and provisions, which, if not common to all four types, are at least not incompatible with any of them and are capable, as experience has shown, of being adopted or employed in connection with all.

During the depression years, many American municipalities were unable to engage in a program of local public works, with the aid of loan funds, because of legal limitations upon their borrowing power. In a number of states, there are constitutional limits to the incurring of local non-self-supporting indebtedness. For example, Pennsylvania limits the debt “of any county, city, borough, township, school district, or other municipality or incorporated district” to seven per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property therein. But the city of Philadelphia is permitted to incur non-self-supporting indebtedness up to ten per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property in the city.