The Illinois Constitution of 1870 prohibited the State legislature from enacting local or special laws incorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city, or village. In 1872 an act was passed, providing for the government of all cities in the State of Illinois. In 1875 Chicago abandoned its special charter, and accepted the provisions of the general law of 1872. This law, with a series of amendments, has continued for a generation as the fundamental law of the city of Chicago. The very rapid growth of the city, however, in territory, in population, and in the complexity of its municipal interests has rendered the law of 1872 wholly inadequate for the present needs of the great metropolis. Widespread agitation in regard to this subject led to the initiation, in 1903, of a constitutional amendment authorizing the State legislature to enact special laws regarding the government of Chicago, providing that such laws should not go into effect until approved by the voters of Chicago. This amendment was adopted by the people of Illinois in November, 1904, after a vigorous campaign had been carried on in its favor by the citizens of Chicago. The legislature of 1905 met very shortly after the adoption of this act, so that a complete charter could not be presented to them. A bill providing for a new system of municipal courts, and abolishing the old “justice shops,” was prepared, however, by a citizens' committee; was presented to the legislature, and passed. A committee of the city council also drew up a proposed charter for the city, which was introduced into the State legislature, but of which only a small fragment was finally enacted. The term of the mayor was extended from two years to four; provisions were made enabling the city to secure the interest on its public deposits; and some other minor powers were contained in this rump charter. These acts were voted upon in November, 1905, and approved by the people. So far, however, as comprehensive legislation was concerned, very little had been accomplished, except the establishment of the new courts.

Contemporary with the recent and very rapid industrial development of the United States has been observed an unexampled liberality of juristic thought. Especially has the process of settlement and industrialization of the West been pervaded by certain unusual social and economic influences, and likewise has been comparatively free from that judicial conservatism prevalent during the periods of colonization and settlement of the eastern and central portions of the country. Extremely dynamic forces, finding their origin in the manner of settlement, the physical characteristics of the country, and the personal attributes of the population, readily developed what may be termed specialized forms of social and legal institutions. As economic and political factors have become adjusted and a stable social poise has been approached, some of the diverging branches of the new sociopolitical life of the West have been pruned back to antecedent form, but others have become component parts of a permanent organization. Incident to the perpetuation of an unusual industrial structure, there have come about the development of new legal concepts which have assumed special relation to property rights in natural resources. This was possible only upon the abrogation of common law precedents and the renunciation of doctrines formerly conceded to be fundamental in American practice.

To make representative government more representative is the problem of today. The gradual process of social evolution has changed the industrial basis upon which our political institutions rest, and the increased complexity of our social organization has made the expression of the popular will more difficult. As readjustment to changing conditions is the requisite for any advancing type of life, so political progress becomes impossible unless new agencies are developed to be retained or discarded as experience may warrant.

Among the agencies for political expression, few have made more remarkable progress in the history of recent legislation than the initiative, the referendum, and the recall. State wide referendums for the adoption of State constitutional, and local referendums for local affairs, are familiar institutions in the United States, but it is only within recent years that our States have begun to adopt the initiative and the referendum for State legislation.

The question of majority nominations in primary elections has been before the Wisconsin legislature during the last two sessions. (1905, Special Session, Bill 11A, and 1907, Bill 350A). Both times the proposition of securing majority nominations by means of the “second choice” has met defeat.

This is written with the hope of making plain the basic principle upon which the second choice amendment to the primary rests. It is the principle that the nominee of a political party should represent the party principles or policy of the majority of the voters of the party. It prevents the possibility of a man representing the principles of only one-fourth of the voting strength of the party being nominated as the candidate of the party, and in direct conflict with the views of three-fourths of the voters of the party. It was the recognition of this principle that caused the conventions to nominate by majority vote of the delegates instead of by plurality. The present Wisconsin primary law prevents a number of candidates representing the majority sentiment as to party principles from coming into the field as candidates for the nomination for fear the candidate of a minority may be named by receiving a higher vote than any one candidate among the majority candidates. The present primary is, in effect, a convention to which every voter is a delegate and in which the candidate receiving the most votes on the first ballot is the nominee. The remedy lies either in the adoption of the second choice amendment (derisively known as the Mary Ann law), or by return to the convention system.