The legal status of political parties in the United States is far from being clearly defined. On the one hand, we do not have a mass of legislation and court decisions clearly constituting the political party as a branch of the government, as in the leading fascist countries of Europe; and, on the other hand, we do not have a situation similar to that of Great Britain or France, where political parties are practically unregulated except for laws designed to control subversive groups. To gain a concept of the legal position of American political parties, a great deal of legislation which differs widely in many particulars among the forty-eight states must be surveyed, and certain categories of common and public law must be explored. Even when the many branches of the law that seem to impinge upon the subject have been brought into view, the legal position of our political parties still seems elusive and indefinite. Yet the subject is one of considerable practical importance, since the near future is likely to bring insistent demands for new and more drastic regulation of political parties. A consideration of the rights of American political parties, and the scope of the powers of the legislature to interfere with parties in the public interest, therefore seems appropriate at the present time.

In the literature of law, there has been comparatively little discussion as to the nature of political representation. A representative democracy has been defined as “a form of government where the powers of the sovereignty are delegated to a body of men, elected from time to time, who exercise them for the benefit of the whole nation.” And a representative form of government has been defined as “a government conducted and constituted by the agency of delegates, or deputies, chosen by the people.”

Judge Thomas M. Cooley, speaking for the Michigan supreme court, said: “A representative is one chosen by a principal to exercise for him a power or perform for him a trust. In that sense, the mayor of a city is a representative for some purposes, the members of the common council for others, and the members of the board of education for still others … the right to be represented implies a right, not merely to name the person, but also to designate the trust that shall be confided to him.” On this basis, it was held that a board of park commissioners established by the state legislature with certain powers, and recognized by the common council of the city, could not be vested afterwards by the legislature with additional powers previously exercised by the council.

Somewhat similar is the position of an English judge as to the authority of a representative in a legal proceeding. “A solicitor is the representative of his client, but counsel is not, for counsel has the whole conduct of the case, and can act even against the instructions of his client.” It was accordingly held that a solicitor is a representative within S. 17(4) Bankry Act, 1883, and must be “authorized in writing” to entitle him to question a debtor at a public hearing.

“As for democracy, why should we discuss acknowledged madness?” Today numerous clever writers and some serious students are asking the same question that Alcibiades asked some twenty-three centures ago. Yet at the very time when democracy is attacked from all sides, and when Mussolini can speak of trampling on the putrid corpse of liberty, Mussolini himself has the temerity to proclaim that Italian Fascism is the realization of “true democracy.” The Nazis, speaking through Herr Goebbels, present the National Socialist state as “the most ennobled form of a modern democratic state.” And, not to be outdone, Stalin announces that the Soviet constitution of 1936 is “the only constitution that is democratic to the limit.” Two points, then, appear very clear at the outset. First, a theoretical defense of democracy is made more complicated by the unscrupulous license with which the enemies and critics of democracy use the term; and second, “democracy” as a vague, meaningless symbol still has a propaganda value for those who repudiate or disdain any real meaning that the symbol may have.

It is not my purpose to examine in detail the criticisms of democracy, but rather to indicate which of the numerous criticisms are relevant to a discussion of democracy. What is it that is under attack? Is it the basic assumptions of democratic theory, or the machinery of democratic government, or both? To put such a question means, of course, to reopen the old question: What are the essential elements of democratic theory?

Consent is an essential element of democratic theory, but not a distinguishing element. The important test is not whether a major portion of the adult population accepts or approves a government or its policies, but the manner in which this consent is secured. Both Napoleon I and Napoleon III secured the consent of the French people to their imperial dictatorships, and Hitler secured the formal consent of the German people to his puppet parliament and to his own dictatorship. Schuschnigg was about to secure the consent of the Austrian people to the continuance of a non-Nazi, clerical, native dictatorship, but instead Hitler secured the consent of the Austrian people to a Nazi dictatorship.

The profusion of American statistics is a frequent source of astonishment to statisticians of other nations. Statistics are assembled and published by official agencies at all levels of government; by trade and industrial associations; by individual business concerns; by the church, universities, and the press; by professional research organizations; by a multitude of societies and associations with innumerable aims and programs; and sometimes by the plain citizen himself. Collectively, the statistical activities of the nation comprise a system in the same sense that the activities of four and one-half million business units comprise a national economic system.

There is, in fact, a functional relationship between the national statistical system and the socio-economic order of which it is a part. The primary functions of social and economic statistics are to illuminate practical problems, to assist in the determination of policies, and to aid in arriving at administrative decisions. No sharp line can be drawn in these respects between public and private affairs. Statistics find their raison d'etre as tools, to be used by public officials and by all manner of private interests, and in each case to make some part of the socio-economic system work more effectively.

In the year 1930, before the Great Depression had unleashed its full fury, federal aid to the states totaled approximately $135,000,000. The highway grants represented more than one-half of this amount, and National Guard payments accounted for another 22 per cent. The number of subsidies did not exceed 11, even if we treat as separate grants the payments for forest fire protection and distribution of nursery stock—both administered by the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture. Opposition to the principle of grants-in-aid was strong, and had compelled the abandonment of the grant for child hygiene. No uniform federal policy had been established concerning the purposes for which aid should be given, the bases on which it should be apportioned, or the extent to which the federal administering agencies should exercise supervision or control over state activities.

But 1940 marks the beginning of a new decade. The tragic thirties are past, and the full force of their impact on intergovernmental relations can now be observed. It is timely, therefore, to re-examine the system of federal grants-in-aid, and note the more important changes that have occurred. The most obvious fact is the increased use of the subsidy principle.

The passage of mandatory, state-wide, direct primary laws in Utah and New Mexico within the last four years leaves only two states which retain the convention method of making nominations for all state offices.

The Utah act of 1937 applies to all national, state, and local officers. Any party which polled two per cent of the total vote cast for representative in Congress at the last election, or which files a petition signed by at least 500 qualified electors, comes within its scope. The second Tuesday of September is fixed as the date of the primary, with a second, or “runoff,” primary in those cases in which no candidate receives a majority in the first primary. The primary is open, candidates for the nominations of all parties appearing in party columns on a “blanket” ballot with perforations between the columns. After marking his ballot, the voter detaches the used portion and deposits it in the ballot box. A separate box is provided for unused portions. Names may be placed upon the ballot by petition or declaration of candidacy, and are rotated. State committees and delegates to the national conventions are chosen at state conventions held on or before the last Saturday in June. The platform is drafted by a second convention meeting in September.

Of the 203 different proposals voted upon in 36 states during the 1938 elections, 154 were constitutional amendments. Ninety-seven amendments, or 63 per cent of the number submitted, were approved by the voters. Louisiana, with 28 amendments, led the states in the number of proposals submitted; Georgia followed closely with 23 and California with 19. Nearly one-half of the total number of amendments were considered by these three states. In the following description of amendments accepted, no attempt has been made to list the great variety of local municipal proposals on the ballots in Louisiana, Georgia, and South Carolina.

Pensions and Public Welfare. California adopted an amendment granting plenary power to the legislature to provide for administration of relief as well as authority to reimburse counties for aid given. New York approved a precedent-setting amendment permitting the use of state money and credit for social welfare, “including provision, by insurance or otherwise, against the hazards of unemployment, sickness, and old age”; while Missouri broadened its constitution by adopting an amendment authorizing its legislature to grant pensions or assistance to persons over 65 years of age.

As in previous lists, mention is here confined generally to units specifically authorized by law or established by the President by executive order or Reorganization Plans under general authority vested in him. Changes in units created by heads of departments or independent establishments are excluded unless of major importance.

A. Reorganization Plan No. III, under authority of the act of April 3, 1939 (53 Stat. L. 561), was transmitted to Congress on April 2, 1940; it will become effective 60 calendar days thereafter; a resolution disapproving the plan was adopted by the House of Representatives, but was rejected by the Senate. The changes made by this plan are as follows:

Administrator of Civil Aëronautics. The designation of the Administrator of the Civil Aëronautics Authority is changed to Administrator of Civil Aëronautics.

Out of an Irish dilemma has come one of the most striking legislative experiments in modern government. After a short life from 1922 to 1936, the first Irish upper house proved so inept as to be abolished. Then came an interval of unicameralism, and now under the constitution of 1937 another senate has been brought into existence, differing radically from the old. In the early days of her independence, Ireland was confronted with the problem of precisely how to constitute an upper house, how to differentiate it from the lower house, and whom to represent in it. Now, after a vicissitudinous history, she has embarked upon a course of advanced ideas in parliamentary practice—upon a plan which attempts to secure vocational representation.

Why has it been difficult to fit a second chamber into the structure of the Irish state? In feudal society, class cleavage produced assemblies of more than one house. Since democratization of the social order, this basis of separation, has lost significance, but the tradition persists in the bicameralism of such countries as England.

The classic definition of American isolation is that it is not a theory but a predicament. In all seriousness, isolation is not a theory of American foreign policy. Isolation is a theory about a theory of American foreign policy. Because this interpretation is a poor theory, misrepresentative even if taken only semi-literally, it has placed the discussion of American foreign policy in a sad predicament of obf uscation, not without its influence upon national decisions.

In relation to the two extremes of isolation and internationalism, America's present course is, in the words of Secretary Hull, a “middle course.” Washington's advice to have “as little political connection as possible,” which is definitive of early policy, is shown by its context to mean merely the avoidance of permanent alliances beyond the existing French treaty.