Few treaties have been the object of such different and contradictory constructions as the Pact for the Renunciation of War. For some writers, the Pact constitutes a mere gesture and has only a moral value. For others, it condemns any act of force whatever and imposes upon the contracting parties a positive obligation to settle all disputes by pacific means. There are still others who take a stand between these two extreme views, but they are far from reaching an agreement as to the exact meaning of the Pact. Such a divergence of opinion is largely due to the fact that this treaty has been generally contemplated from a political rather than from a legal point of view. While the opponents of the Pact have endeavored to minimize its importance, the supporters have been at pains to enlarge its scope by means of an extensive interpretation. Instead of attempting to examine carefully the legal issues involved and to arrive at a conclusion as a result of an objective investigation, both camps have striven to find arguments likely to support their preconceived opinions. Owing to the personal authority of certain writers who have taken a part in this discussion, some arguments which they have advanced have made considerable impression and have been adopted uncritically by a large body of opinion, although they lack any legal foundation.

It gave me real pleasure to accept your committee's invitation to address you. As a lay member of your Association, for years I have longed for opportunity to witness the rites of your priesthood. I have taken part in some of your round-table conferences of professors and politicians. The effort made in this series to crossfertilize the knowledge of the world of research and the experience of the world of action is admirable in conception and stimulating in results. The members of this Association, by their life devotion, give indorsement to the statement of Alexander Pope that the proper study of mankind is man. And surely it is a necessary study, one all the more essential in such a fast-moving world as that we know today.

Man is a timid, staring creature. He moves through life in a mist of ignorance and fear. In thinking about his problems and his perils, I am reminded of something that Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, wrote in his Letters on the Study of History: “We are not only passengers or sojourners in this world, but we are absolute strangers at the first steps we make in it. Our guides are often ignorant, often unfaithful … In our journey through it, we are beset on every side. We are besieged sometimes even in our strongest holds.

There is a kernel of truth in Chief Justice Hughes' remark that “we are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.” To realize its full significance, “constitution” must be written in the plural. We have forty-nine courts of last resort, each interpreting the fundamental law of its own jurisdiction. The essential similarity of our state constitutions, and of our state bills of rights to that of the national constitution, together with the tendency of common law courts to follow each other's decisions, lend an element of stability to American state constitutional law that otherwise would be lacking. At the same time, even within so short a period as a year, the interplay of personalities may be seen moulding new doctrines in particular jurisdictions, which doctrines take on added significance because of the realization that they may, in time, serve as a basis for redirecting the course of constitutional development in other jurisdictions as well.

Publicity of campaign funds spent for and against proposed constitutional amendments, initiative and referendum measures, and other propositions voted on by the electorate of the state is the object of a California statute adopted in 1921 and revised in 1923. This is one of the few statutes specially designed to deal with campaign funds on issues rather than candidates, and its operation is a matter of particular interest to students of campaign finance in that it represents a relatively successful effort to compel publicity of expenditures by non-party organizations. All reports under the act have been made by well established pressure groups, corporations, or temporary committees representing interest groups lacking permanent secretariats. The act is broad enough to apply to party committees, but no reports have been made by such agencies, presumably because of their inactivity in this type of campaign.

May 20,1936, was a date of importance in Cuban history. Not only was it the thirty-fourth anniversary of the birth of the Cuban Republic; it marked the first time in seven years (as many Cubans maintain) that a completely constitutional government had control of the island's political destinies. On May 20 of this year occurred the inauguration of Miguel Mariano Gómez y Arias, sixth “regularly elected” president of Cuba, son of the Republic's second president, and the man who, at least nominally, will be at the helm of the Cuban ship of state in the immediate future.

Among legal philosophers, the time-honored dispute between natural-law schools and legal positivists arouses ever new interest. On the side of the positivists, the “pure theory of law” gains more and more ground. This theory is mainly represented by Professor Hans Kelsen, formerly of Vienna, now of Geneva, and by Professor Alfred von Verdross, of Vienna. In America, systematic consideration was first devoted to it by Dr. Johannes Mattern, who analyzed Verdross's thinking; later, Dr. Josef L. Kunz, one of the foremost followers of Kelsen, took up the discussion, emphasizing the importance of the theory for a scientific basis of international law; and quite recently an article by Dr. Henry Janzen dealt with legal monism as the basis of the “pure theory of law.”

It is proposed in this article to consider the Draft Conventions adopted by the International Labor Conference at its Nineteenth Session primarily with a view to illustrating the nature of the contribution which the Conference is making to international legislation and the manner in which problems which have some general bearing upon the development of international law and organization arise for consideration in connection with International Labor Conventions. It is unnecessary for this purpose to recapitulate the composition, powers, and procedure of the International Labor Conference, or to review that part of the activities of its Nineteenth Session which did not lead to the immediate adoption of Draft Conventions. It is therefore necessary to warn the reader that this article is not an attempt to give him a general impression of the Conference. It does not attempt to review the general discussions of social policy based upon the director's report. It does not describe the Unemployment (Young Persons) Recommendation, 1935, an important pronouncement which is one of the most valuable results of the Conference, but which, being a Recommendation, is intended “to be submitted to the Members for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise,” and is therefore incapable of becoming by ratification the source of international obligations. This article, further, gives no account of the preliminary discussions which will probably lead to the adoption of Draft Conventions in future years; nor does it review the work of the Conference in supervising the application of existing Conventions. Its scope is limited strictly to a discussion of the five Draft Conventions actually adopted at the Nineteenth Session, i.e., the Forty-Hour Week Convention, 1935; the Reduction of Hours of Work (Glass-Bottle Works) Convention, 1935; the Maintenance of Migrants' Pension Rights Convention, 1935; the Underground Work (Women) Convention, 1935; and the Hours of Work (Coal Mines) Convention (Revised), 1935. Certain of these instruments raise far-reaching questions of economic and social policy; but discussion of such questions would not be appropriate in what is intended as a legal commentary.

On December 23, 1921, the Swiss Federal Council received a note from the French Embassy to the effect that the Council of the League of Nations had entrusted the French government with the transportation of the international troops called to supervise the plebiscite to be held in the contested area between Poland and Lithuania. It had been decided, the note stated, to transport the Belgian, British, and Spanish troops through Switzerland, and France now requested the Swiss government to grant them free passage. Although the contingents were not to participate in war, but only to watch over a plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the League, the Swiss government refused the permission sought. At the time of the plebiscite in the Saar territory, the Federal Council took a similar attitude. It refused to permit Italian troops to pass through Swiss territory on their way to the Saar Valley.