The system of multiple advocacy attempts to convert intraorganizational conflicts over policy into a balanced system of policy analysis and debate. This requires the executive to (1) structure and manage the policy-making system to ensure that there are advocates to cover the range of interesting policy options on a given issue; (2) equalize or compensate for disparities among the actors in the resources needed for effective advocacy; (3) identify and correct possible “malfunctions” in the policy-making process before they can have a harmful effect on the executive's choice of policy. Nine types of malfunctions are identified in this paper via critical diagnosis of U.S. foreign policy making in cases in which the executive had to decide questions of commitment, intervention, or escalation. Responsibility for identifying and correcting such malfunctions and for managing multiple advocacy effectively should be clearly fixed with the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. However, the Special Assistant should not combine the role of “custodian-manager” of the policy-making system with the additional tasks of (a) policy adviser to the President; (b) public spokesman for existing policies; (c) “watch-dog” of the President's personal power stakes; or (d) implementer of policy decisions already taken. The attempt to do so invites serious role conflicts that can undermine the Special Assistant's performance of the all-important task of custodian.

The present controversy between “behavioral” and “postbehavioral” views of political inquiry reflects a larger dispute between two opposing theories of knowledge. Whereas the behavioral movement has its epistemological roots in positivism and, ultimately, in classical British empiricism, the most recent protest against behavioralism draws upon the theory of knowledge that has been the principal foe of empiricism over the past century. This theory of knowledge, which received the name “historicism” shortly after its emergence, had become the dominant epistemological position by the mid-twentieth century. This essay considers the general nature of historicism and its influence on the recent revolt against positivism in the philosophy of science. Finally, it examines the use that political scientists have made of historicist principles in opposing positivistic models of political inquiry. It argues that an epistemological relativism becomes unavoidable once certain premises of historicism are embraced.

Certain institutional changes in the advanced industrial societies are said to be leading toward postindustrial, if not postmodern, forms of sociopolitical organization. Scientific and technological developments are usually seen as the generating forces of such change, a major dimension of which is thought to be a growing pre-occupation with goods and services which are produced and/or purchased communally.

There exists a parallel phenomenon in the modern interstate system, namely, a growing incidence of joint production and joint regulation by states, much of it in scientific and technological fields. Factors both leading to and limiting such joint activities, and some consequences of different kinds of collective decision making and administrative arrangements for the interstate system, are here explored.

It is an explicit aim of this inquiry, in addition, to avoid the evolutionary or functionalist assumptions informing much of the contemporary study of international organization. Instead, I argue that the processes of international organization are generated by how and why states choose from among alternate modes of performing tasks, both national and international, under varying conditions of possibilities and constraints. The bulk of the article develops and illustrates permutations of this basic posture.

The analysis suggests a number of future modifications of the modern interstate system, and of the modern state as an actor in that system. But these modifications share little with the kinds of international arrangements and structures past theories have led us to expect.

Averroës is primarily known for his numerous commentaries on Aristotle, yet his most explicitly political writing was presented in the form of a commentary on Plato's Republic. Consequently, the major dispute in scholarly literature has been whether he was more of a Platonist or an Aristotelian, a dispute of concern only because it reflects the important political question of what Averroës thought about the relation between theory and practice. This essay seeks to answer that question by studying the numerous editions and translations of his writings made available by contemporary scholarship. His commentaries on the logical arts concerned with public speech and common opinion are first examined, and the teaching set forth there is then contrasted with the kind of ideas Averroës expounded in his explicitly public works.

In the commentaries on the logical arts, Averroës stretched Aristotle's arguments in order to suggest that unexamined opinion was an insufficient guide for the practical arts dependent on such opinion. Although Averroës did not claim that such arts could be guided only by theoretical knowledge, he did insist that they could be best used only by those aware of the limits of opinion. This opening for the guidance of philosophy was carried further in the public writings where the need for philosophy to direct sound practice was defended against religiously motivated attacks on philosophy. Thus, the correct understanding of Averroës's views about the relation between theory and practice is closely related to an appreciation of his views about the role peculiar to philosophy and philosophers in his own religious community.

This paper discusses the construction of a formal model of national political development derived from theories of political integration and instability, and reports the results of tests of the model based on data descriptive of contemporary black African nations. Political integration is conceptually elaborated in terms of processes of horizontal, vertical, and value integration, and political centralization. Political instability is conceptualized in terms of elite, communal, and mass instability. These dimensions of integration and instability are operationalized, and the analysis evaluates the hypothesis that integration decreases the likelihood of political instability in African nations, and that political centralization, in particular, decreases the likelihood of political instability by modifying, or reinforcing, the effects of other processes of integration. Methodologically, the analysis is based on the assessment of convergent validation for hypotheses tested with multiple indicators, regression, and path-analytic techniques.

Potential for political violence is defined by a summated scale built from two cumulative scales measuring approval of and readiness to engage in behaviors which constitute progressively greater challenge to a political regime. A prevalent explanation of potential for political violence proposes that the major direct antecedent is relative deprivation. The partial theory proposed here does not assign a central role to relative deprivation; rather, diffuse support for the political authority structure, and belief that political violence has led to goal attainment in the past, are proposed as major direct antecedents. Relative deprivation is denned by position on the Cantril Self-Anchoring scale with respect to three welfare values. The measure of diffuse affect for the political authority structure is a weighted summation of items measuring the degree to which political authorities are believed to wield power honestly, benevolently, and justly. Belief that political violence has led to goal attainment is denned as a summation of items measuring the degree to which the use of political violence by dissident groups is thought to have been helpful. The data base is a sample of a population in which instances of political violence have been frequent in the past. A linear additive model of Potential for Political Violence, with Trust in Political Authorities and Efficacy of Past Violence as describing variables, shows an accuracy of prediction which is satisfactory and superior to that yielded by a multiplicative model.

Recent studies of public opinion on Vietnam reveal a surprising positive association between socioeconomic status (SES) and support for “tougher” military policies. In an effort to extend and understand such findings, this study reanalyzes several public opinion surveys conducted during the Korean War. The demographic correlates of military policy preferences are found to be similar to those reported for the Vietnamese War, but the Korean data qualify the proposition that higher SES is associated with support for “tougher” policies in two respects: (1) policy preferences of the Korean public did not appear to be organized on a simple “soft-to-tough” dimension—those who supported escalation were only slightly more likely than average to oppose disengagement; (2) while SES was positively associated with opposing disengagement, it was not associated with supporting escalation. Factor analyses of several surveys reveal two distinct, orthogonal dimensions that underlay military policy preferences: an “isolationist-to-interventionist” dimension associated with opposition to disengagement; and a “trust-to-distrust of the Truman Administration” dimension associated with support for escalation. Respondents are subdivided into four types in accordance with their positions on these dimensions. The demographic characteristics and military preferences of the four types are analyzed, and the overall findings arc discussed with reference to Vietnam as well as public opinion on military policy more generally.

The infrequency of issue voting in American presidential elections is usually attributed to a lack of policy rationality among voters. An examination of the Vietnam war issue in 1968 suggests, however, that much of the explanation may lie instead with the electoral process itself, and with the kinds of choices which are offered to citizens.

Policy preferences concerning Vietnam were only weakly related to the two-party vote. Less than 2 per cent of the variance in voting choices between Nixon and Humphrey could be accounted for by opinions on Vietnam. Yet the absence of issue voting could not be fully explained by voters' failings. Most people had strong opinions about Vietnam. The public was generally able to perceive where prenomination candidates stood on the issue. People were able and willing to take account of Vietnam in evaluating other candidates.

Voters did not bring their Vietnam preferences to bear upon the choice between Nixon and Humphrey because they saw little difference between the positions of the two, and because they were not certain precisely where either one stood. These perceptions, in turn, were rooted in reality. Humphrey's and Nixon's campaign speeches show that they did differ rather little on specific proposals about Vietnam. Further, both candidates indulged in so much ambiguity about Vietnam that public confusion over their positions was understandable.

There are theoretical reasons for believing that candidates in a two-party system often have an incentive to converge at similar policy positions, and to be vague. If they generally do so, their behavior may contribute significantly to the apparent nonrationality of voters. In addition, it may have important implications for questions of collective rationality and social choice.

Two students of the committee assignment process, Nicholas Masters and Charles Clapp, as well as some congressmen, assert that the most crucial factor in filling committee vacancies is whether the appointment will enhance the recipient's chance of re-election. This statement is tested using data for Republican and Northern Democratic freshmen elected to the House between 1947 and 1967.

The freshmen are grouped on the basis of assumptions about which assignment or assignments should help them win re-election. When narrowly elected and safe freshmen are compared, there is no evidence that the former more frequently receive assignments likely to facilitate re-election. Thus there is no support for the Masters-Clapp proposition.

Investigation further reveals that even those freshmen from marginal districts who are awarded “good” appointments are not re-elected significantly more often than are comparable newcomers having less favorable assignments. Committee assignments therefore seem relatively unimportant in determining whether a congressman wins a sophomore term. Indeed, more than 70 per cent of the freshmen who triumphed in hotly contested races to reach the House are returned. When these incumbents are defeated it is typically as a result of nation-wide forces over which they exercise little if any control.

The implications of this research are that congressmen have a greater range of alternatives than is often thought. Even the narrowly elected novice is relatively free to seek appointment to committees for reasons other than constituency service or promotion. Largely symbolic activities are available through which concern for the district and its problems and needs can be demonstrated, thereby freeing much of the congressman's time and attention to pursue other less parochial goals.