The American founders were distrustful of the masses and concerned about controlling their political influence. Might the greater threat, however, emanate not from the “have-nots” but from the “haves”–as symbolized by our cover photo of the fabulously wealthy J. P. Morgan being restrained by a peace officer while angrily swinging his cane at one of his social lessers? In the lead article in this issue, “Contain the Wealthy and Patrol the Magistrates: Restoring Elite Accountability to Popular Government,” John P. McCormick argues that the long-standing preoccupation with controlling the masses is misdirected. Looking beyond the American founders to ancient constitutions for guidance about present-day problems, McCormick provides a typology of measures meant to curb undue elite influence. Along the way, he offers evidence that modern republics are in far greater danger from the excessive influence of political and economic elites than from the discontents and passions of the masses. This is important food for thought for all, regardless of one's bank balance.

This issue completes the one-hundredth volume of the Review, the inaugural issue of which was published in November 1906. To mark this occasion, two years ago we began planning a centennial observance on the theme of “the evolution of political science.” My collaborator in this project, as the Co-Editor of what evolved into an entire issue of the Review, has been Editorial Board member M. Elizabeth Sanders, who joined me in overseeing the review and selection processes.

Our cover photo of Hannah Arendt offers respect not only to Arendt in the year of the one-hundredth anniversary of her birth, but also to the first of the trio of political theory articles that lead this issue of the APSR, Patchen Markell's “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and Democracy.” Markell uses the writings of Arendt, arguably one of the foremost political theorists of the twentieth century, as a window on the debate about what the people “do” to exert power either as rule or against rule in a democracy. Markell proposes a new definition of democratic rule, not as something people “do” but as “an ongoing process of responsiveness to events.” His essay moves beyond providing a fresh interpretation of Arendt's thought to undertake the broader task of presenting a new conceptualization of democratic rule that warrants the attention of anyone interested in the nature and operation of democracy.

Conflicting clichés about money abound. Everybody “knows” that “Money can't buy happiness,” but in the 1970s the Swedish pop group ABBA sold millions of records celebrating the eternal sunniness of “the rich man's world.”

Modern republics neglect to establish formal institutions that prevent wealthy citizens from exerting excessive political influence and they abandon extra-electoral techniques traditionally employed to keep office-holders accountable. Inspired by Guicciardini's and Machiavelli's reflections on the Roman, Venetian, and Florentine constitutions, this article highlights three forgotten practices that facilitate popular control of both economic and political elites: magistrate appointment procedures combining lottery and election, offices or assemblies excluding the wealthy from eligibility, and political trials enlisting the entire citizenry in prosecutions and appeals. I present a typology of regimes that evaluates the wealth containment potential of various magistrate selection methods, and propose a hypothetical reform supplying the U.S. Constitution with a “Tribunate” reminiscent of elite-accountability institutions in pre-eighteenth-century popular governments.

Adam Smith is almost certainly history's most famous advocate of commercial society, but he frankly admits that the relentless pursuit of wealth is a major obstacle to tranquility and contentment and hence that, at first glance, the higher living standards that people “enjoy” in commercial society seem to come only at the cost of their happiness. I argue that the solution to this apparent paradox can be found in Smith's account of the positive political effects of commerce: dependence and insecurity are the chief obstacles to happiness and have been the hallmarks of most of human history, and so the alleviation of these ills in commercial society constitutes a great step forward. Money really cannot buy happiness, but the liberty and security that commercial societies tend to provide help to assuage the greatest sources of misery.

In November of 1906, the 3-year-old American Political Science Association, boasting a membership of “nearly four hundred” (Shaw 1907, 185), launched a journal devoted to scholarship, reviews, and news of the profession. The fledgling American Political Science Review was not the first political science journal, having been preceded by Political Science Quarterly (founded in 1886) and the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (1890). Nor, at first, was it even the foremost political science journal. Its founding editor, W. W. Willoughby of Johns Hopkins (1906–1916), and his immediate successor, John A. Fairlie of the University of Illinois (1917–1925), faced numerous challenges, not least that of finding enough papers to fill each issue; even after two decades the Review was still publishing “nearly all of the papers which have come to the editor…as well as articles from other sources” (Fairlie 1926, 182). For some time thereafter, Fairlie's successor, Frederic A. Ogg of the University of Wisconsin, handled just three dozen or so manuscripts per year (Patterson 1994, 6).

This article presents a novel critical account of a key concept in democratic theory, “rule,” via an unorthodox interpretation of Hannah Arendt's work. Many theorists treat democracy as one type of regime; others, stressing the importance of unruliness to democratic politics, challenge the reduction of democracy to a form of rule. Although this debate remains caught within conventional oppositions between order, closure, and continuity; and interruption, openness, and novelty, Arendt shows this whole matrix of oppositions to be an artifact of the dominance of a hierarchical understanding of rule. Her unusual critique of rule and her distinctive account of the meaning of “beginning” draw attention to an important dimension of political activity that lies off these axes of opposition, shedding new light on democratic agency and the forces that obstruct it.

John Stuart Mill's writings on religion, a neglected topic in the secondary literature, deserve careful examination because they challenge the long-standing view that liberalism opposes conceptions of the best life. Mill himself considers religion responsible for perfecting the individual and a crucial dimension of his moral theory. In his view, developing a conception of the best life will be difficult in England because it requires broaching a sensitive issue that the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment did not comprehend: namely, that the Enlightenment's reformed Christianity is too great a compromise with traditional or revealed Christianity. If English liberalism is to generate a comprehensive morality for the future, argues Mill, reformed Christianity must be further reformed to create a culture that fosters human flourishing. A comparison of Mill's views of Christianity with those of Kant and Hegel provides a window for viewing their different visions of the morality of the future. The contrast provides further evidence that liberalism, in Mill's view, is not nearly as narrow a moral outlook as many commentators on liberalism, whether admirers or critics, believe.

In the evolution of the social sciences, disciplines (forms of research, training, and instruction) preceded professions (distinct occupational identities). Although professionalism has often been viewed as a conservative force, what was arguably the most prominent transformation in the history of political science was the result of a professional challenge to the discipline. The founding of the American Political Science Association represented not only an ideological break with some of the principal voices in the discipline but a reformulation of the reigning vision of the relationship between political science and politics. Despite the markedly different circumstances, the dissenting claims emanating from the subfield of political theory during the behavioral era reflected, in many respects, a similar form of confrontation.

In his final two surviving plays, Assemblywomen and Wealth, Aristophanes turns his comic art toward a consideration of the possibilities of radical economic change. His presentation of those possibilities has been read as either indulging in fantasy or as ironically reinforcing the economic status quo. This essay argues that the two plays in fact work to instill in their audience a complex and challenging sensibility that holds fantasy and irony in tension with one another. Drawing on recent arguments about the relationship and relative priority of economic redistribution and cultural recognition as political goals, I suggest that this sensibility provides an attractive model for theorists and ordinary citizens alike as they grapple with issues of economic and social justice.

Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

We propose and test a theory of opportunities that explains the conditions in which economic status affects support for racial and ethnic group interests among African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. Using data from a 2001 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard University national survey, our analysis finds that, for all minority groups, the effect of economic status on support for group interests is mediated by the socioeconomic experiences of individuals. Intergroup differences therefore result from varying experiences and perceptions of discrimination among minority groups rather than from group-specific theoretical processes. Compared to Latinos and Asian Americans, African Americans are least responsive to changes in economic circumstances because they are on the whole more pessimistic about their life prospects and more likely to encounter discrimination. But we find in general that, among those minority individuals who perceive equal opportunity and experience less discrimination, higher economic status often leads to a reduced emphasis on race and ethnicity. These results demonstrate that the incorporation of a minority group into American society depends not only on the actions of group members but also on the fair treatment of that group by the majority population.

Understood within an economic framework as a form of trade, incentives appear inherently ethical; understood as a form of power, incentives seem ethically suspect. Incentives, along with coercion and persuasion, are among the ways in which some people get others to do what they want them to do. This paper analyzes incentives as a form of power in order to develop criteria for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate uses of them. Whereas an economic approach focuses on voluntariness as the sole criterion in judging incentives, this political approach yields three standards: purpose, voluntariness, and effect on the character of the parties involved. The paper explores issues that arise in applying these standards. Framing the problem of incentives as a problem of power reveals the ethical issues with greater depth and complexity than placing incentives in an economic frame of reference.

American political science is a congenitally unsettled discipline, witnessing a number of movements designed to reorient its fundamental character. Four prominent movements are compared here: the statism accompanying the discipline's early professionalization, the pluralism of the late 1910s and early 1920s, behavioralism, and the Caucus for a New Political Science (with a brief glance at the more recent Perestroika). Of these movements, only the first and third clearly succeeded. The discipline has proven very hard to shift. Despite the rhetoric that accompanied behavioralism, both it and statism were revolutions without enemies within the discipline (other than those appearing after they succeeded), and therein lies the key to their success.

I argue that comparative politics has been shaped by two “Great Punctuations” that, on each occasion, transformed our conceptions of what the subfield is and what we do. Just before a punctuation occurs, the subfield seems especially coherent, united by a set of common assumptions, methods, theories, and so on, which are then punctuated by a series of events that destroys faith in them. The subfield then reconstitutes itself around new assumptions, until, just as coherence is achieved, the next punctuation occurs. To demonstrate why the sub-field has evolved in this way, I draw on probability theory to argue that the desire to be a predictive science causes us to imagine the world to be far more predictable than it actually is. This results in the development of theories that are surprised by events; hence the peculiar trajectory of the subfield.

This paper examines the impact of the form of government—presidential or parliamentary—on fiscal outcomes in democratic systems. Based on data for democracies in 98 countries between 1970 and 2002, it shows that the gross domestic product ratio of the central government budget balance is higher in presidential than in parliamentary democracies. It also shows that this impact is not due to the fact that presidential systems are not subject to the “costs of coalition” that allegedly afflict parliamentary democracies: the coalition and status of the government are of no consequence for budget balances in either presidential or parliamentary systems. Presidential systems matter for budget balances because they generate relatively high incentives for governments to keep budgets under control. They do so because in presidential systems, unlike in parliamentary systems, voters are by design able to identify and punish those responsible for economic policies. Presidents, however, vary in their capacity to affect budget policies. This paper demonstrates that presidential systems in which presidents are constitutionally able to dominate the budget process or to effectively veto legislation tend to have higher budget balances than those in which the budget process is dominated by the legislature or the president is unable to exercise existing veto powers.

We present a model where groups attempt to influence policies using both bribes (plata, Spanish for silver) and the threat of punishment (plomo, Spanish for lead). We then use it to make predictions about the quality of a country's public officials and to understand the role of institutions granting politicians with immunity from legal prosecution. The use of punishment lowers the returns from public office and reduces the incentives of high-ability citizens to enter public life. Cheaper plomo and more resources subject to official discretion are associated with more frequent corruption and less able politicians. This predicts that violence in a country will typically go together with corruption and worse politicians. Moreover, the possibility of punishment changes the nature of the influence game, so that even cheaper plata can lower the ability of public officials. Protecting officials from accusations of corruption (immunity) will decrease the frequency of corruption if the judiciary is weak and may increase the quality of politicians. These predictions cannot emerge from a traditional model where only bribes are used.

The health of any democratic system depends on political ambition to generate a steady supply of quality candidates for office. Because most models of candidate entry assume ambition rather than model it, previous research fails to understand its roots in individual and institutional characteristics. We develop a two-stage model of progressive behavior that distinguishes between the formation of ambition for higher office and the decision to enter a particular race. Using data from a survey of state legislators, we demonstrate that the intrinsic costs and benefits associated with running for and holding higher office shape ambitions but do not influence the decision to run. For progressively ambitious legislators, the second-stage decision is a strategic choice about when to run rather than whether to run. Our research highlights how institutional characteristics that foster progressive ambition also increase the likelihood that national or local political conditions will be translated into meaningful choices at the ballot box.