This paper argues that beliefs about human nature are central for animal ethics as beliefs about animal nature ground human treatment of animals. It shows that what constitutes animal nature is a contested question, and that animals have long been considered inferior to humans in Western thought. In Judaeo-Christian ethics, God gave humans dominion over animals. This exacerbated the long-established prejudice in Western culture in favour of rationality as the defining characteristic of human beings. Rene Descartes was influential in arguing that animals were but machines that moved and made sounds but had no feelings. In such a context it was easy to portray animals as quasi-clockwork animated robots — ‘furry clocks’. Jeremy Bentham first advocated the direct inclusion of animals in our ethical thinking, introducing the concept of sentience, or the capacity to feel pleasure and pain, as the central criterion. Peter Singer's work is in this tradition. He also popularised the notion of speciesism — a bias in favour of one's own species. Now, Martha Nussbaum has introduced a new approach, the capabilities approach, a Quality of Life approach which lists ten capabilities, nine of which apply to animals as part of their nature. It applies to the whole range of animals (and throughout this paper the term ‘animals’ refers to sentient animals unless otherwise specified) — companion animals, farm production animals, animals in zoos, rodeos, museums and laboratories. Her work is the main focus of this paper. It is argued, therefore, that the capabilities approach contributes to understanding the relation of notions of animal nature to animal welfare, and what a good life for animals entails.

Understanding how consumers’ concerns affect the consumer decision-making process is important for developing a market for animal-friendly products. This paper presents a synthesis of research on the role of animal welfare in consumer decision-making. Drawing on basic models and concepts from consumer behaviour literature, we present the findings along the lines of five phases of the consumer decision-making process: (i) need recognition; (ii) information search; (iii) information evaluation; (iv) purchase decision; and (v) post-purchase evaluation. Consumer decision-making about animal-based food products is routine, situational and sometimes irrational, instead of based on complete information. Consumers associate animal welfare with a higher quality perception and labels and high prices further increase the perception of quality. The findings have implications for stakeholders that aim to develop a market for animal-friendly products, like (coalitions of) governments, animal interest groups, retailers and brand manufacturers.

Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot tell us that we live in a plural world in which actions are justified in multiple ways. Moreover, Anne Marie Mol argues that things, certainly including animals, are always multiple, their very existence dependent on the particular practices in which they are implicated. Thus, animal welfare policies must be understood in light of both the ways in which animals are ‘practiced’ and the particular justifications provided for these practices. Such policies make claims based on the practices involved in animal-human interactions and are justified based on appeals to the scientific (industrial), civic, market, and domestic worlds, among others. Thus, animal welfare policies must necessarily involve compromises among both the multiple ways in which animals are ‘practiced’ and the multiple ways in which those policies may be justified.

Zoo- and anthropomorphism may both be scientific heresies but both may serve as a basis for thought (and real) experiments designed to explore our ability to assess quality of life as perceived by another sentient animal. Sentience, a major contributor to evolutionary fitness in a complex environment, implies ‘feelings that matter’. Strength of motivation is a measure of how much they matter. Since humans and most domestic animals share the property of sentience, it follows that some aspects of feeling may be similar, and where we differ, the differences may be of degree rather than absolute. One of the assumed absolutes that I shall challenge is the concept that non-human animals live only in the present. I explore how domestic animals may experience the feelings of hunger, pain, fear and hope. Hunger is indisputably a primitive sensation. Pain and fear are primitive sensations with emotional overtones. The problem is to discover how they may affect quality of life. Acute pain and fear are positive signals for action to avoid harm. These actions and their consequences (‘how well did I cope?’) will be committed to memory and affect how an animal feels when they recur, or it fears they may recur. Hope (and its antithesis, despair) are considered by many philosophers (who do not own dogs) as emotions restricted to humans since only we can imagine the future. However, by application of zoomorphism we may classify hope with hunger as a primitive feeling of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Either may lead to action directed towards the goal of feeling better or encourage the belief that things will get better (food will arrive). Both are feelings of expectation for the future modulated in the light of past experience. With all these four emotions quality of life may be expressed in terms of how well the animal feels it can cope, both in the present and in the future. When it feels it cannot cope, then it will suffer.

Throughout the world, male chicks from layer breeds are killed just after hatching, as they are not profitable as regards the production of meat. The Dutch and European parliaments have insisted on research into possible alternatives to the killing of day-old chicks. In the present study we have investigated Dutch public opinion on the acceptability of these alternatives by means of discussions in so-called focus groups and via a public survey through computer-aided personal interviews (CAPI). To inform the participants about the subject, a film was made to explain the current practice and introduce a number of technological alternatives that would prevent development of male embryos, as well as the possibility of creating a ‘dual-purpose chicken’ that would allow male chicks to be used for meat production. The topics addressed in the study included the willingness of participants to pay a premium for eggs and chicken meat, were it necessary to prevent killing of male chicks. Focus-group discussions showed that many participants were unaware of the current practice of killing male chicks, and were shocked by this practice. However, once informed, the participants seemed able to take various considerations into account and rank the alternatives. The alternatives ‘looking into the fresh egg (to determine sex of the egg and not incubate male eggs)’, and ‘dual-purpose chickens’ scored best out of all the possible alternatives, and higher than maintaining the current practice. ‘Influencing the laying hens such that they produce fewer male eggs’ scored the same as maintaining the current practice. The use of ‘genetic modification to facilitate looking into the fresh egg’ scored only slightly lower than maintaining the current practice. Alternatives whereby developing male embryos die, or are killed, scored lower than maintaining the current practice.

Emotions are now largely recognised as a core element in animal welfare issues. However, convenient indicators to reliably infer emotions are still needed. As such, the availability of behavioural postures analogous to facial expressions in humans would be extremely valuable for animal studies of emotions. The purpose of this paper is to find out stable expressive postures in sheep and to relate these expressive postures with specific emotional contexts. In an initial experiment, we identified discrete ear postures from a comprehensive approach which integrates all theoretically distinguishable ear postures. Four main ear postures were identified: horizontal ears (P posture); ears risen up (R posture); ears pointed backward (B posture); and asymmetric posture (A posture). In a second experiment, we studied how these ear postures were affected by specific emotional states elicited by exposing sheep to experimental situations in which elementary characteristics (ie suddenness and unfamiliarity, negative contrast and controllability) were manipulated. We found that: i) the horizontal P posture corresponds to a neutral state; ii) sheep point their ears backward (B posture) when they face unfamiliar and unpleasant uncontrollable situations, hence likely to elicit fear; iii) they point their ears up (R posture) when facing similar negative situations but controllable, hence likely to elicit anger; and iv) they expressed the asymmetric A posture in very sudden situations, likely to elicit surprise. By cross-fostering psychological and ethological approaches, we are able to propose an interpretation of ear postures in sheep relative to their emotions.

In many countries, including the UK, the majority of domestic sows are housed in farrowing crates during the farrowing and lactation periods. Such systems raise welfare problems due to the close confinement of the sow. Despite the fact that many alternative housing systems have been developed, no commercially viable/feasible option has emerged for large scale units. Current scientific and practical knowledge of farrowing systems were reviewed in this study to identify alternative systems, their welfare and production potential. The aim was to establish acceptable trade-offs between profit and welfare within alternative farrowing systems. Linear programming (LP) was used to examine possible trade-offs and to support the design of welfare-friendly yet commercially viable alternatives. The objective of the LP was to optimise the economic performance of conventional crates, simple pens and designed pens subject to both managerial and animal welfare constraints. Quantitative values for constraints were derived from the literature. The potential effects of each welfare component on productivity were assessed by a group of animal welfare scientists and used in the model. The modelled welfare components (inputs) were extra space, substrate and temperature. Results showed that, when using piglet survival rate in the LP based on data drawn from the literature and incorporating costs of extra inputs in the model, the crates obtained the highest annual net margin and the designed pens and the pens were in second and third place, respectively. The designed pens and the pens were able to improve their annual net margin once alternative reference points, following expert-derived production functions, were used to adjust piglet survival rates in response to extra space, extra substrate and modified pen heating. The non-crate systems then provided higher welfare and higher net margin for sows and piglets than crates, implying the possibility of a win-win situation.

This paper argues that the current drive towards greater use of animal-based measures for welfare assessment raises important issues for how farm visits by welfare assessors are performed. As social scientists, we employ a number of contemporary social science ideas to offer a new approach to examining the practice and performance of farm animal assessment. We identify key findings from a recent study of contemporary farm assessment and speculate upon what some of the challenges of introducing animal-based measures may be. We conclude by arguing for a greater awareness of how sets of knowledge are made, circulated, practiced and become an integral component of the procedures, practices and discourses around farm animal welfare assessment in farm assurance.

In response to an increased public awareness regarding how livestock are reared, animal welfare scientists have attempted to develop new methods of welfare assessment at the farm level. Furthermore, in recent years they have increasingly moved away from the conventional approach of evaluating the provision of resources necessary to ensure good welfare, and have instead focused on the use of animal-based measures of welfare. In contrast, it is believed that farmers use mostly resource-based and management-based measures (eg the provision of food, water and housing) when assessing the welfare of their animals. They also seem to be driven more by economic and financial concerns than by the welfare of the animals per se, when it comes to the provision of animal welfare. Different approaches to the definition and assessment of farm animal welfare were explored in work carried out at Newcastle University as part of the Welfare Quality® project by both social and welfare scientists. Social scientists explored farmers’ perceptions and understanding of animal welfare, whilst welfare scientists developed animal-based measures of welfare for use in a prototype on-farm welfare monitoring system. Based on two separate surveys, this paper focuses on UK farmers’ perception and understanding of animal welfare and their criteria of assessment in contrast with those employed by welfare scientists, using a specific case study of pigs. Results show that, despite scientists being unaware of the findings from the farmer survey, they produced a set of measures to assess welfare which were very similar to those used by farmers. However, ‘instinctive’ terms used by farmers to describe (positive or negative) animal behaviour did not bear any relation to more objective welfare measures. Compared with conventional monitoring systems which focus more on the provision of resources to promote good welfare than on the animal itself, the prototype monitoring system may be more acceptable to farmers given that it uses similar animal-based measures to assess welfare to those they use themselves, and furthermore, the focus is on the animal.

All systems of scoring animal units (groups, farms, slaughter plants, etc) according to the level of the animals’ welfare are based inevitably on normative decisions. Similarly, all methods of labelling, in terms of acceptability, are based on choices reflecting ethical values. The evaluative dimension of scoring and labelling does not mean that we should reject them, but it does mean that we need to make the normative and ethical background explicit. The Welfare Quality® scoring system is used as a case study in order to highlight the role of underlying value-based decisions. In this scoring system, which was designed in accordance with assessments and judgments from experts in animal and social sciences and stakeholders, we identify value-based decisions at the following five levels. First, there are several definitions of animal welfare (eg hedonist, perfectionist, and preferentialist), and any welfare scoring system will reflect a focus upon one or other definition. In Welfare Quality®, 12 welfare criteria were defined, and the entire list of criteria was intended to cover relevant definitions of animal welfare. Second, two dimensions can structure an overall evaluation of animal welfare: the individual animals and the welfare criteria (here 12). Hence, a choice needs to be made between the aggregation of information at the individual level (which results in a proportion of animals from the unit in a good vs bad state) and the aggregation at criterion level (which results in a proportion of criteria to which the unit complies vs does not comply). Welfare Quality® opted for the second alternative to facilitate the provision of advice to farmers on solving the welfare problems associated with their farms. Third, one has to decide whether the overall welfare assessment should reflect the average state of the animals or give priority to worse-off animals. In the Welfare Quality® scoring system the worse-off animals are treated as much more important than the others, but all welfare problems, major or minor, count. Fourth, one has to decide whether good scores on certain criteria can compensate for bad scores on others. In the opinion of most people, welfare scores do not compensate each other. This was taken into account in the Welfare Quality® scoring system by using a specific operator instead of mere weighted sums. Finally, a scoring system may either reflect societal demands for high levels of welfare or be based on what can be achieved in practice — in other words, an absolute assessment or a relative one may be proposed. Welfare Quality® adopted an intermediate strategy: absolute limits between welfare categories (Not classified, Acceptable, Enhanced, or Excellent level of welfare) were set, but the rules governing the assignment of an animal unit to a category take into account what had been observed on European farms. The scientists behind Welfare Quality® are keen to make the value-based choices underlying assessments of animal welfare transparent. This is essential to allow stakeholder groups to understand the extent to which their views are acknowledged and acted upon.

Farm animal welfare has become an important issue for the European public, especially in the last two decades when a number of crises (eg Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Avian Influenza) have affected farm animal populations. Public concern about this issue led the European Union to fund the Welfare Quality® project. This project aimed to develop a protocol for assessing animal welfare on farms and at slaughter plants, to identify the main animal welfare problems, and to address possible welfare improvement strategies. In fulfilling these aims, the Welfare Quality® project incorporated inputs from both science and society. This was crucial, as the public perception of what constitutes ‘animal welfare’ sometimes differs from animal science-based definitions. Furthermore, these differences are often interwoven with broader variations in ethical- and value-based understandings about human/non-human animal relationships. This paper presents the steps that we adopted to establish a dialogue between science and society during the construction of the Welfare Quality® assessment protocols. This dialogue involved numerous interactions between animal scientists, social scientists and members of the public. These interactions took several forms, including: meetings, conferences, workshops, websites, newsletters, interviews, focus groups, and citizen and farmers juries. Here, we address four key moments within this dialogue: the development of the initial list of twelve welfare criteria; the consumer focus groups; the development of the Welfare Quality® scoring system; and the citizen juries. In particular, we focus on the results of the focus groups and citizen juries. The focus groups were conducted in France, Italy, Sweden, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Hungary and the citizen juries were carried out in Italy, the United Kingdom, and Norway. Drawing on this research, we highlight the similarities and differences between societal understandings of farm animal welfare and the views of scientific experts. Furthermore, and crucially, we outline how the animal scientists took account of societal opinion when developing their farm animal welfare assessment tools.