A relatively well-known medieval Latin innovation is the doctrine of distributive supposition. This notion came to be used in syllogistic theory in the late medieval and early modern periods, as Latin logicians sought to establish general rules for syllogistic productivity across the various figures. It is much less well-known that some logicians in the medieval Arabic tradition also attempted to establish general rules for the syllogism, appealing to what they called “subject generality.” In the present article, I introduce this use of “subject generality” in some influential Arabic works on logic from the thirteenth century to the sixteenth, specifically Al-ǧumal by Afḍal al-Dīn al-Ḫūnaǧī (d. 1248) and Tahḏīb al-manṭiq by Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390) and some of their commentators. I also compare this concept of “subject generality” to the Latin concept of “distribution.”

The Letter on the Soul is interesting and significant; it attempts to tackle fundamental problems that fall on the borderlines of psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and logic. The consensus among Avicenna scholars is that The Letter is Avicenna’s. In this paper, I will argue against this consensus. I will examine the philosophical and logical content of The Letter, as well as Avicenna’s view on the impossible forms in his authentic works, and construct a content-based argument against the authenticity of The Letter. This study, I hope, sheds some light on Avicenna’s view on the impossibilia, what they are, and how they can be apprehended.

Cet article démontre que la théorie de l’expérience (taǧriba) d’Ibn Sīnā nécessite une référence croisée entre la logique et la psychologie. Suivant la tradition linguistique basrane, il paraphrase les noms dérivés (ism muštaqq) dans la formule li-x y (« y appartient à x ») : par exemple, ʿālim (« savoir ») est paraphrasé en lahu ʿilm (« un acte de savoir lui appartient »). Sa théorie de l’expérience emploie cette formule pour arranger les phénomènes observés dans une certaine forme de syllogisme et décrire les fonctions des sens internes du cerveau. Ibn Sīnā arrange les phénomènes observés dans la formule li-x y ou la proposition dont un prédicat est un nom dérivé de y. En même temps, il soutient que le sens du souvenir est impliqué dans le processus de l’expérience. Le souvenir est un sens interne du cerveau, qui préserve maʿnā perçue par le sens de l’estimation. L’estimation consiste à percevoir maʿnā (y) qui est inhérente à un sujet (x), et à porter un jugement sur x en fonction de y. Ainsi, dans ce processus, l’analyse des noms dérivés range les phénomènes observés dans un ordre rationnel, et le sens interne établit la causalité entre l’appréhension et l’affirmation logique. L’article se termine par une discussion sur la relation de cette philosophie avec la médecine.

This paper deals with a solution to the infamous liar paradox, usually known in the Arabic literature as Maġlaṭat al-ǧaḏr al-aṣamm. The solution is raised by a fifteenth-century Ottoman treatise that is attributed, among others, to Ḫaṭībzāde Muḥyiddīn Efendī. The paper also compares it with the solution by the contemporary Persian philosopher, Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī. The short treatise devoted to the paradox is one of the few works by Ottomans on the subject and it comprehensively addresses the paradox in its two forms. An analysis of the solution offered by the treatise to the paradox, the paper aims to bring Ottoman discussions of the liar to the attention of contemporary scholarship and contribute to filling the obvious gap in the literature on the paradox in Islamic thought.

Kitāb muḫtaṣar waǧīz fī l-usṭuqussāt § 1, 1 p. 63, l. 6ff. Bos-Langermann: