The penal legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan includes a number of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Among these are most of the traditional “core” crimes under international law—genocide, war crimes, and the crime of aggression—as well as some other crimes. Crimes against humanity are not included in the Criminal Code so far but some of their definitional features are shared by so-called “extremist crimes”. In addition to other customary crimes against the peace and security of mankind—such as deliberately attacking internationally protected persons and organizations and abusing internationally protected emblems—the Code also includes more novel crimes, such as participation in foreign armed conflicts. This paper analyses the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code of Kazakhstan in the light of corresponding treaty-based and customary rules of international law, and suggests further improvements to be made to the Code.

“Draft conclusion 3” of the first ILC report on the “general principles of law” expounds on two categories: general principles of law derived from national jurisdictions and those formed within the international legal system. This paper explores the drafting history of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ's Statute to investigate whether the Advisory Committee of Jurists, entrusted to frame a statute for the international court, had conceived the idea that, apart from domestic legal systems, the international legal framework could form general principles of law, or whether they were reluctant to endorse such an open-ended formulation which would give more liberty to judges to apply these principles as per their whims and fancies. The paper argues that the dual categorization of the general principles of law by the ILC has no substantive roots in the preparatory history of the ICJ's Statute and therefore it is purely an innovation by the ILC.

The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice [ICJ] on the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 has been hailed as a major victory by the government of Mauritius and by representatives of the Chagossians who were forcibly removed from the islands to make way for the establishment of an American military facility on the island of Diego Garcia at the height of the Cold War. The opinion was categorical: the process of decolonization of Mauritius was not lawfully completed when that country acceded to independence in 1968. The UK lost on every single argument it made before the Court and is under an obligation to bring its administration of the Chagos Archipelago to an end “as rapidly as possible”. This comment focuses on what the ICJ said about self-determination, and whether the Advisory Opinion could have consequences for future cases at the Court.

The classification of seafloor highs as submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin is the core exercise in the application of Article 76 of UNCLOS. Its outcome determines whether the outer limits are necessarily constrained by a 350 nautical mile distance line from the baselines, or, alternatively, whether the outer limits may extend far beyond that constraint where the outer edge of the continental margin goes beyond that distance. This paper examines in depth the constitutive criteria that govern the classification of seafloor highs as submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin. It is concluded that the interpretation of Article 76(6) of UNCLOS is necessarily dictated by a textual approach.

This paper examines the changing trend in the final form of International Law Commission [ILC] outcomes, and implications vis-à-vis the role of the ILC in the development of international law. To this end, the paper considers changes in the form of ILC outcomes and recommendations, the reasons for such changes, and finally, implications for the development of international law. It argues that, in opting for various forms appropriate for dealing with a wider scope of topics, the ILC is providing for its continuing role in the development of international law by ensuring the flexibility and efficacy of its deliberations.

This interdisciplinary paper examines the influence and interpretation of international law in the use of force by an important but understudied country, Britain, during one of the most significant conflicts since 1945: the Korean War of 1950–53. Through innovative application of sociological theories in International Law [IL] and International Relations [IR], and rigorous qualitative analysis of declassified documents, I advance a two-pronged argument. First, contrary to what some dominant IR perspectives might predict, Britain's involvement in the war suggests that international law can play four underappreciated roles when states use force: (1) it helps constitute the identity of actors; (2) it helps regulate their conduct; (3) it permits and legitimates certain actions; and (4) it structures the process by which agents seek to develop new rules. However, contrary to what many IL approaches might predict, it is unclear whether these effects are ultimately attributable to an obligatory quality in law.

The decision of the Office of the Prosecutor to seek a ruling in the “Bangladesh/Myanmar Situation” on jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Rome Statute was lauded for its drafting. The ICC granted the request in a very controversial judgment. This paper focuses on self-invocation and misinterpretation of Article 119(1) of the Statute (paragraph one disputes). The Court thus created and lost a unique chance to explain one of the untouched provisions of the Statute. The two paragraphs of the Article envisage different types of disputes. The Chamber was divided on the meaning of the very term “dispute”. However, what is noteworthy is that nowhere in her request had the Prosecutor accepted that there exists a dispute in this situation. In fact, the term “dispute” was not mentioned even once in her request. Why then did the Court delve into it?

The study of uti possidetis in international law has proceeded without any detailed examination of its application to South Asian borders. Yet, the consequences of uti possidetis in the Indian subcontinent offer critical insight into the legal and functional critique levied against the doctrine. The South Asian experience provides evidence that uti possidetis cannot be considered a norm of regional customary international law, confined to Latin America and Africa. Simultaneously, it provides compelling proof of this doctrine's ruinous impact on self-determination, pointing to its potential for identity-alteration and intrastate violence: consequences that have received scarce attention in legal scholarship. By undertaking a detailed study of the Radcliffe Line in Punjab, this paper makes a prudent attempt to commence filling this gap in the literature by re-centring South Asia in the debate on uti possidetis.

The concept of semi-sovereignty, a now obsolete category of international entities possessing limited sovereignty, remains hazily understood. However, the historical examination of how semi-sovereignty was defined and practised during the long nineteenth century can provide insights on the interplay between authority and control within the hierarchies of international relations. This paper examines one specific type of semi-sovereignty—namely, suzerainty—which is often used to describe China's traditional authority in Tibet and Mongolia. By examining the events that led to the acceptance of suzerainty as the legal framing for the China-Tibet and China-Mongolia relationships, I argue that suzerainty was a deliberately vague concept that could be used to create liminal international legal spaces to the advantage of Western states, and to mediate between competing claims of political authority. Finally, I point to the importance of semi-sovereignty as an arena of legal contestation between the Western and non-Western members of the “Family of Nations”.

The rule of law bears a special meaning in the context of the international legal order, where there is no clear vertical hierarchy or sovereign. The international rule of law strives to curb the excess autonomy of individual states for the common good. Although there is considerable scepticism about whether the international rule of law actually exists, states largely do behave as if international law is truly “law”, and international obligations are also more enforceable now than ever before. But there have been and will be moments when the international rule of law is interrupted by major powers. In an interdependent world that is both capable of and prone to inflicting unimaginable destruction, the strategy for small states unable to defend themselves directly is to create the conditions that will best promote their survival, and that is accomplished by pursuing and promoting the rule of law both domestically and internationally.

This paper relies on archival research to rediscover Chen Tiqiang's study of public international law at Tsinghua University and Oxford University with James Brierly. Particular attention is directed to Brierly's profound influence on Chen's approach to researching the doctrine of recognition and his remarkable performance at his oral examination before Humphrey Waldock and Robert Y. Jennings. In addition to providing an abbreviated overview of the international legal community's overwhelmingly favourable reactions to the publication of Chen's dissertation in 1951, it argues that Chen's experience and accomplishments provide some evidence that China's teaching and scholarship of international law attained an unprecedented milestone in the late 1930s and 1940s.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive legal analysis, reminding the reader of the missing roles and potential of the the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]. Interstate disputes threaten the very existence of the GCC. Moreover, they call into question the GGC's mechanisms for co-operation and for ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes. For instance, the GCC's Charter, commercial arbitration rules, and the Basic Law of the Economic Judiciary Commission all provide provisions for peacefully settling disputes between GCC Member States and their citizens. GCC states are also members of the League of Arab States [Arab League], another important regional organization with dispute settlement procedures. However, GCC and Arab League judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms have not been invoked to date, arguably because the states prefer a diplomatic settlement. This paper reviews the GCC's mechanisms for co-operation and dispute settlement, referencing public international law to formulate recommendations to reform the GCC.

The dispute settlement mechanism [DSM] under preferential trade agreements [PTAs] is crucial to ensure adequate implementation and enforcement of commitments among contracting parties. The DSM has evolved from political/diplomatic styles with a low level of legalism to judicial styles with a high level of legalism. Indonesia has also experienced this evolution process in its PTAs. This paper aims to show the evolution of the DSM in Indonesian PTAs, analyzing several related factors behind this trend. The paper argues that the evolution of the DSM from the GATT to WTO, Indonesia's participation in regional trade agreement, that is, ASEAN, the influence of trade partners, the existence of domestic factors, and the ongoing WTO dispute encourage the evolution of the DSM in Indonesian PTAs from political styles to more judicial styles with a high level of legalism.

The Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire case is the first time that an ITLOS ad hoc chamber has addressed the lawfulness of unilateral hydrocarbon activities in a disputed maritime area. This paper analyzes the Chamber's ruling on Côte d'Ivoire's submission no. 2, which covers several important issues: the jurisdiction of the Chamber to decide on submission no. 2, the alleged violation of sovereign rights, and the alleged violation of Article 83(3) of UNCLOS. The paper argues that the Chamber's jurisdictional basis of forum prorogatum is questionable, and that there are inconsistent approaches between the Judgment and the Order of the provisional measures. Additionally, there are not only inconsistent understandings of the “Ivorian maritime area” within the same submission no. 2 by the Chamber, but also a logical gap in the Chamber's reasoning with regard to submission no. 2(iii). Consequently, the Chamber's inconsistent approaches may jeopardize the persuasiveness of its judgment.

The politically sensitive nature of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka has made investment protection by the China-Sri Lanka BIT highly relevant. However, the treaty has a pro-state orientation, with limited protection for investors. This gives rise to a modern paradox in which China has become the top investor in Sri Lanka, despite the absence of an international protective framework for their activities. Chinese investors are apparently managing this paradox mainly through commercial diplomacy. As an alternative to a rights-based approach, this may signal a return to a power-based approach to settling investment disputes, with the Chinese government a leading actor therein. This will be particularly prominent in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative. While win-win co-operation is a stated principle of Chinese investment policy, whether mutually beneficial outcomes can be sustained with the asymmetrical power dynamics between China and BRI states remains to be seen.

Indonesia has been burning or sinking foreign vessels in its efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in its exclusive economic zone. Opinions on how much longer this measure should continue are manifold. While political issues may easily mask the situation, the underlying legal question remains: whether burning or sinking foreign vessels is a legal and necessary enforcement measure for Indonesia. Even though Article 73(1) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea does not make any reference to this type of measure, it allows coastal states to take measures that are “necessary to ensure compliance with their laws and regulations”. This paper examines the meaning of the term “necessary” within the ambit of Article 73(1) to evaluate whether Indonesia's measure to burn or sink foreign vessels is necessary.

Data localization is a phenomenon that is of increasing global significance, as a growing number of countries impose data localization requirements on data controllers. This paper discusses data localization in the ASEAN context. It proposes a schema of data localization laws which comprises two categories of data localization requirements. This schema is used to examine data localization laws within ASEAN, and it will be shown that there is presently a moderate level of data localization among ASEAN Member States. The paper then discusses how data localization is dealt with in the EU and in ASEAN, addressing some recent developments in the two regimes. It concludes with recommendations for ASEAN's approach to data localization, drawing from the EU regime.