This article rethinks the hegemonic “sex-work” discourses—popular sex-work discourse and radical-feminist discourse—that associate Japanese night work with prostitution and consider young women workers in this industry as victims. These discourses reinforce sex-work oppression–empowerment paradigms, which limit workers’ experiences to either oppressive/empowering, good/bad, and positive/negative. This research draws on transnational feminism and a polymorphous approach to the complex nature of sex work. In doing so, this article addresses three aspects of Japanese night work, including young Japanese women’s motivation to go into night work, their conceptualization of work they engage in, and shakai-keiken (social experience) that they gain out of doing night work. This article encourages readers to step away from dominant Western discourses and look closely at the nuanced nature of Japanese night work in its own context.

Commercial sex has been a complex and controversial issue in Taiwan. It was banned several times and finally partially legalized in law when the Congress finally amended Article 80 of the Social Order Maintenance Law and authorized local governments to establish red-light districts. Unfortunately, in reality, until now, no local government has established a red-light district. Therefore, all commercial sex is still illegal in Taiwan. By reviewing this issue from gender, culture, and legal perspectives, this paper discusses the regulation of commercial sex in Taiwan in three parts. In the first part, this paper provides a historical view of the development of commercial sex and how the government regulated it in different periods. In the second part, this paper introduces the debate and various perspectives of feminist legal theories on this issue. Finally, compared with the regulation models of Japan and Singapore, this paper proposes an empowerment approach in response to the current Social Order Maintenance Law. Focusing on sex workers’ autonomy and subjectivity, the new approach hopes to balance the interests between the rights of sex workers and the needs of social order and public health.

There is no specific law in Nepal that directly criminalizes sex work. However, many sex workers have experienced arbitrary detention by law-enforcement authorities. The Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act, 2007 (HTTCA) criminalizes pimps and clients, but not sex workers directly. However, the Act was overinclusive and often criminalized women engaged in voluntary sex work. The new Criminal (Code) Act 2017 criminalizes advertising and providing facilities for sex work in the section concerning crimes against the public good. These laws are used to prosecute sex workers. Two identity-based associations (IBAs) emphasize the importance of decriminalization, but do not support the legalization of sex work. A licensing system, if introduced under legalization, may exclude the most vulnerable sex workers, including housewives, migrants, and sexual minorities, who are secretly engaged in the business. I conclude that ongoing advocacy of IBAs should seek to provide safe working environments for sex workers in Nepal.

Fintech risks have a special type of structure and formation mechanism; regular updates and a complete financial legal system are needed to implement an effective legal governance. China’s fintech development is leading the world, but its lagging legal development does not match its rank in the field. Due to the difficult co-ordination of regulatory goals, unclear allocation of regulatory power, insufficient risk identification, and incomplete regulation tools, China’s legal governance on fintech risks has been swinging between the paths of suppressive, indulging, and adaptive regulation. It is urgently necessary to follow the fintech-risk law and fully tap into the local resources and explore the intervening path with more proactivity, foresight, and refined characteristics, through specification of the legal status and governing power of the intervening entity, the institutional basis and legal effect of interventional means, and the governing key and constitutional rules of intervening objects, to establish a legal-governance system on fintech risks that is innovation-friendly, regulatorily effective, and safe at the bottom line, fully covering the whole process.

This article provides critical and analytical views on legal regulation to achieve a balance between FinTech innovation, risk prevention, and financial stability, by focusing on the trend of FinTech firms entering the financial-services industry and the associated regulatory and legal challenges that are already arising in China. It adopts a balanced approach as a theoretical-analysis perspective, weighing various considerations, and proposes the policy option of FinTech regulation under the principle of interest balance. The analysis aims to contribute new insights to an ongoing debate in China on the relationship between legal and regulatory reform, FinTech innovation, and risk prevention. This article argues that legal challenges, rather than technical problems, remain the key obstacles to effective FinTech regulation. Our proposed hypothesis seeks to explain how a legal regulation achieves balancing the competing interests between FinTech innovation, risk prevention, and financial stability in the booming of China’s FinTech. Finally, this article proposes the implementation of goal-oriented responsive regulation by improving the legal framework of FinTech regulatory regimes through policy option.

Mobile payment generally refers to transactions made through the applications of a portable electronic gadget without the transfer of cash. As one of the most disruptive technologies for finance, mobile payment has been rapidly transforming the traditional financial industry. While it brings important benefits, there are also various risks, in terms of liquidity, security, and data privacy, that call for adequate regulatory responses. As a global financial centre, Hong Kong has gradually established a regulatory framework for mobile payment, addressing the relevant risks with rules on payment and privacy. However, there is still room for further improvement, in terms of measures to deal with cybersecurity issues and strengthen the protection of personal data. The Hong Kong experiences suggest that, to regulate a new and fast-growing industry such as mobile payment, the regulatory regime needs to be improved continuously to alleviate the risk concerns, so as to enhance the protection of financial consumers and society at large.

This paper focuses on Internet intermediaries’ civil liabilities for contents produced by third parties. By comparing Chinese law with the laws of the US and EU, it argues that the US law grants broad civil immunity to Internet intermediaries, and the EU and China restrict civil immunity to intermediaries but in different ways. This is on account of how, in the US, Internet intermediaries enjoy civil immunity as long as they do not become content providers. In the EU, aside from mere conduit intermediaries, all other intermediaries are subject to the notice-and-take-down mechanism before enjoying civil immunity. In contrast, in China, even after an intermediary properly follows the notice-and-take-down mechanism, it may still be subject to civil liability under the Chinese Consumer Law. Further, this paper argues that the policy priority for the law for Internet intermediaries varies fundamentally in the three jurisdictions. The US law for intermediaries’ liability focuses on protecting freedom of speech. The EU emphasizes the protection of personal information as a fundamental human right. Contrastingly, Chinese policy priority is unclear. Consumer protection has boomed in public popularity and increasingly attracted the attentions of the legislature and judiciary in China. However, it is doubtable that the protection of consumers can provide a prevailing policy support for Chinese law in the same way as freedom of speech and the protection of personal information do under the laws of the US and the EU, respectively.

Many studies agree that a weak intellectual property right (IPR) legal system likely reduces innovation or creation; they also predict that increasing intellectual properties (IPs) in developing countries will automatically lead to local needs for stronger formal protection. However, the situation is found to be more complex in China. With a focus on the use of IPs and relevant protection mechanisms in China, this study points out that many companies acquire IPs for purposes that do not depend on their enforcement; many companies have informal ways of protecting their IPs without resorting to court enforcement. Both the alternative functions and the alternative enforcement mechanisms are shaped by industrial characteristics, especially in four aspects: technological features, administrative regulation, market characteristics, and network structure. Based on studies of different industrial sectors in China, this article develops a general framework for analyzing the role of IPRs in industrial practice.