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Can resources save rationality? “Anti-Bayesian” updating in cognition and perception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Eric Mandelbaum ,
Isabel Won ,
Steven Gross  and
Chaz Firestone
Eric Mandelbaum
Affiliation:
Baruch College, CUNY Graduate Center, Department of Philosophy, New York, NY10016emandelbaum@gc.cuny.eduhttp://ericmandelbaum.com
Isabel Won
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD21218iwon1@jhu.educhaz@jhu.eduhttp://perception.jhu.edu
Steven Gross
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD21218sgross11@jhu.eduhttps://sites.google.com/site/grosssteven/
Chaz Firestone
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD21218iwon1@jhu.educhaz@jhu.eduhttp://perception.jhu.edu
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Abstract

Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena – belief polarization and the size-weight illusion – that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e16
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

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