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Resource-rationality as a normative standard of human rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 March 2020

Matteo Colombo
Matteo Colombo*
Affiliation:
Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, 5000LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. m.colombo@uvt.nlhttps://mteocolphi.wordpress.com/
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Abstract

Lieder and Griffiths introduce resource-rational analysis as a methodological device for the empirical study of the mind. But they also suggest resource-rationality serves as a normative standard to reassess the limits and scope of human rationality. Although the methodological status of resource-rational analysis is convincing, its normative status is not.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 43 , 2020 , e5
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020

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