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Heuristics and the naturalistic fallacy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 March 2020
Abstract
Lieder and Griffith's account of resource-rationality relies heavily on a notion of teleology. In this commentary, I criticize their teleocentric view as being incompatible with evolutionary theory, in which they aim to ground their analysis. As such, to save their view, I argue that they must jettison the notion of teleology, and their teleologically laden conclusions.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2020
References
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Hume, D. (1739–40/2000) A treatise of human nature, ed. Norton, D. F. & Norton, M. J.. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nagel, T. (2012) Mind and cosmos: Why the materialist Neo-Darwinian conception of nature is almost certainly false, 1st edition. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pittendrigh, C. (1958) Adaptation, natural selection, and behavior. In: Behavior and evolution, ed. Roe, A. & Simpson, G. G.. Yale University Press.Google Scholar
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Target article
Resource-rational analysis: Understanding human cognition as the optimal use of limited computational resources
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Author response
Advancing rational analysis to the algorithmic level