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Self-interested agents create, maintain, and modify group-functional culture

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Manvir Singh ,
Luke Glowacki  and
Richard W. Wrangham
Manvir Singh
Affiliation:
Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Peabody Museum, Cambridge, MA 02138. manvirsingh@fas.harvard.eduglowacki@fas.harvard.eduwrangham@fas.harvard.eduhttp://www.manvir.orghttp://scholar.harvard.edu/glowacki/home
Luke Glowacki
Affiliation:
Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Peabody Museum, Cambridge, MA 02138. manvirsingh@fas.harvard.eduglowacki@fas.harvard.eduwrangham@fas.harvard.eduhttp://www.manvir.orghttp://scholar.harvard.edu/glowacki/home
Richard W. Wrangham
Affiliation:
Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Peabody Museum, Cambridge, MA 02138. manvirsingh@fas.harvard.eduglowacki@fas.harvard.eduwrangham@fas.harvard.eduhttp://www.manvir.orghttp://scholar.harvard.edu/glowacki/home
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Abstract

We agree that institutions and rules are crucial for explaining human sociality, but we question the claim of there not being “alternatives to CGS [that] can easily account for the institutionalized cooperation that characterizes human societies” (target article, sect. 7). Hypothesizing that self-interested individuals coercively and collaboratively create rules, we propose that agent-based hypotheses offer viable alternatives to cultural group selection (CGS).

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 39 , 2016 , e52
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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