Why and when does outrage grow? This essay, based on the 2018 LSE Behavioural Public Policy Lecture delivered in February 2018, explores two potential answers. The first points to a revision or weakening of social norms, which leads people to express outrage that they had previously suppressed. The second points to a revision or weakening of social norms, which leads people to express outrage that they had not previously felt (and may or may not now feel). The intensity of outrage is often a product of what is most salient. It is also a product of ‘normalization’; people compare apparently outrageous behavior to behavior falling into the same category in which it is observed, and do not compare it to other cases, which leads to predictable incoherence in judgments. These points bear on the #MeToo movement of 2017 and 2018 and the rise and fall (and rise again, and fall again) of discrimination on the basis of sex and race (and also religion and ethnicity).

Neuroimaging methods provide insight into the neural mechanisms underlying the decision process, characterizing choice at the individual level and, in a growing number of contexts, predicting national- and market-level behavior. This dual capacity to examine heterogeneity while forecasting aggregate choice is particularly beneficial to those studying environmental decision-making. To effectively reduce residential energy usage and foster other pro-environmental behaviors, policy-makers must understand the effects of information frames and behavioral nudges across individuals who hold a diverse array of attitudes toward the environment and face a broad range of barriers to action. This paper articulates the potential of neuroeconomic methods to aid environmental policy-makers interested in behavior change, especially those interested in closing the energy efficiency gap. Investigation into the roles of affect, eco-labeling and social norms will be discussed, as well as personal identity and climate change beliefs. Combining neuroimaging with behavioral economics experiments can inform the development of effective messaging, characterize the influence of individual differences on the decision process and aid in forecasting the efficacy of policy interventions at scale.

Many public policies are designed to counteract commonly made decisions that result in poor health. These policies have primarily been informed by the behavioural economics of decision making. Underappreciated in this conversation has been the perspective from neuroscience, despite its recent success – and the likelihood of future progress – in advancing our understanding of the neural basis for health-related decisions. Using tobacco control as an example, we provide a concise overview of how public health policies can and should be informed by neuroscience. We propose that such input can improve policies by increasing their effectiveness, improving screening efficiency and informing relevant ethical considerations. Finally, we recognise limitations and highlight roles that key stakeholders can play in incorporating neuroscientific evidence for the benefit of public policy.

Adolescence is a period of remarkable psychosocial and neural development. Many life-long health habits are established during adolescence, making it a window of opportunity for health promotion. One way to promote adolescent health is through mass and social media campaigns. Although some health media campaigns that target adolescents are effective in changing health-relevant cognitions and behaviors, there is considerable room for improving these outcomes. Recent advancements combining neuroimaging tools and health persuasion have suggested key neural mechanisms underlying behavior change and retransmission of health-relevant ideas and norms in adults. This line of work highlights the integral role of the brain's value system in health persuasion and its importance for improving campaign design and effectiveness. Less is known about how these insights could be leveraged to inform adolescent health persuasion. In this article, we review what is known and unknown about the development of the brain's value system and its connections with cognitive control and social cognition systems across adolescence. Combining these insights, we propose that neuroimaging tools offer unique possibilities that could improve adolescent media health campaigns and promote adolescent well-being.

There have been few empirical studies on how consumers respond to their loss experience over time when choosing between high- and low-deductible health insurance plans. To address this question, we designed a ten-period web-based experiment to explore how subjects respond to the presence or absence of illness-related costs in a given period when making their future health insurance choices when they are explicitly informed that future premiums or loss probabilities will not change over time. A sizable minority of the respondents who initially chose high-deductible plans switched after a loss, and switching is more likely if they self-report negative emotional responses to experiencing an uninsured loss. Switching from low- to high-deductible plans is less likely and less responsive to loss experience. The study reveals that many individuals make their health insurance choices by considering factors not included in classical economic models of choice.

People's risk estimates often do not align with the evidence available to them. In particular, people tend to discount bad news (such as evidence suggesting their risk of being involved in a car accident is higher than they thought) as compared to good news (evidence suggesting it is lower) – this is known as the belief update bias. It has been assumed that individuals use motivated reasoning to rationalise away unwanted evidence (e.g., “I am a safe driver, thus these statistics do not apply to me”). However, whether reasoning is required to discount bad news has not been tested directly. Here, we restrict cognitive resources using a cognitive load (Experiment 1) and a time restriction manipulation (Experiment 3) and find that while these manipulations diminish learning in general, they do not diminish the bias. Furthermore, we also show that the relative neglect of bad news happens the moment new evidence is presented, not when participants are subsequently prompted to state their belief (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that reasoning is not required for bad news to be discounted as compared to good news.

Received research shows numerous motives for migration, but fewer reasons for return migration. This paper aims to correct this imbalance. Twelve reasons for return migration are presented and discussed briefly. The reasons listed are derived from research on migration conducted by the author in the course of the past three and a half decades. The purpose of the paper is to pull together insights gained from that research so as to formulate a base for future inquiry, both analytical and empirical. In addition, just as research on motives for migration can help to establish the reasons for return migration, research on the latter can help to deepen understanding of the former. Moreover, in a great many circumstances and for a variety of reasons, countries that host migrants may want them to leave. In such circumstances, enacting policies that align with motives for return migration will be more efficient than devising measures that are independent of these motives.