If there is a consensus on ‘consensus’ amongst political scientists it is that it occurs where there is a high degree of ‘trust’ amongst members of a political system. It may not always be clear whether such trust must be found amongst the citizens at large or only amongst the elite or between citizens and elite. Nor is it always certain whether ‘trust’ is a condition for consensual politics or an aspect of it. Nevertheless ‘trust’ would appear essential in a liberal democracy or a polyarchy. The section on ‘Trust’ in Robert A. Dahl's Polyarchy is indicative of this current concern. He argues that ‘mutual trust favors polyarchy and public contestation while extreme distrust favors hegemony’. This is for three reasons. Firstly, the mutual communication required in a polyarchy best occurs where men trust one another. Secondly, men need to trust one another if they are to associate together in the achievement of those objectives which they cannot gain by their own individual action. Thirdly, a feeling of trust prevents political disputes from turning into severe enmity.

The seniority system in the American Congress exhibits many characteristics of its parent institution. Both are held to be powerful, durable, and somewhat peculiar. Both celebrate age, tradition, and a particular kind of experience. They are skeptical of new things – whether policies, computerized information systems, or newly elected members. Both can be attacked for sluggishness, defense of the status quo, and lack of vigor and merit in leadership. The family resemblance goes further. Both have been century-long targets of criticism and attempts at reform. And both have resisted these attacks by doing what they do best – by simply outlasting the reform attempts and the reformers.

Coalition phenomena are at the heart of politics everywhere, but they acquire a special significance in fragmented multiparty systems. In these systems, the distribution of political forces is such that parties are compelled to seek out at least one and often two or more partners, depending on the level of the system's fragmentation. The existence of a structural constraint that forces co-operative interaction is a major distinguishing feature of these systems and, accordingly, coalition-related phenomena occupy a central position in the political process. Coalition-maintenance activities are prominent, debates over coalition alternatives are frequent, procedures for the resolution of cabinet crises become institutionalized, and appropriate general orientations develop both at the level of the specialized actors in the political system and of the citizenry.

The academic literature on interest groups has tended to concentrate on the assessment of the relative influence of these groups in different political systems, and on the implications of the activities of interest groups for democratic ideology. In recent years, however, the work of Mancur Olson has stimulated an increasing interest in the formation of interest groups, and in the reasons why individuals (or corporate bodies) join them. The aim of this article is to examine Olson's analysis in the light of a study of one major British economic interest group, the Confederation of British Industry. In the course of this examination I hope to illustrate some of the weaknesses of Olson's analysis and to suggest how it might be refined and developed.

Inherent in many models of voting, as well as in defences of representative democracy, is the assumption that the voting public has knowledge of and opinions about public policy issues. In recent years in the United States a stream of scholarly articles has been devoted to assessing not just the extent to which issue knowledge and opinions exist but also the extent to which they influence electoral decisions. This new literature suggests that issue-related perceptions and attitudes are rather more important in the electoral process than earlier studies had suggested. This increased focus on issues appears to reflect both methodological changes in the analysis of them and also real changes in the importance of policy issues in American electoral politics. By contrast, students of British electoral behaviour have made few systematic attempts to assess the fit between popular attitudes and knowledge of party policy positions on issues. Instead, the conventional wisdom is repeated which holds that ‘a majority of people are either ignorant of, or disagree with, the specific policies of the party they support’. The implication of this seems to be that electors' familiarity with issues is so low, and the holding of policy attitudes by them so uncommon, that rigorous analysis of issues in the context of electoral politics is unnecessary.

In the twenty-odd years since the declaration of a state of emergency in Kenya in October 1952, the analysis of the phenomenon known as ‘Mau Mau’ has undergone a fundamental revision. The initial interpretation, advanced by the colonial authorities and their apologists and by a few (mostly British) scholars, explained ‘Mau Mau’ as a fanatic, atavistic, savage religious cult consciously created and manipulated by a group of unscrupulous, power-hungry leaders. It was said to be rooted in a mass psychosis affecting an unstable tribe freed from the anchoring constraints of tradition. It was also said to have had no direct links to socio-economic conditions in the colony or to the policies of the Kenya government. This interpretation, popularized by a large and sensational journalistic literature, went virtually unchallenged for more than a decade. During this period ‘Mau Mau’ and its antecedents were largely ignored by social scientists. As late as 1965, Gilbert Kushner could report that a search of major anthropological journals revealed, at best, only peripheral mention of Mau Mau. Where ‘Mau Mau’ was explicitly considered, the basic premise of the official explanation was generally accepted, and the phenomenon was treated as a nativistic cult or revitalization movement.

Some political theorists maintain that Niccolò Machiavelli was a rather immoral sort. His exhortations to guile, perfidy, deception and opportunism were numerous, his scruples few. Others, in a more revisionist vein, suggest that his preferred tactics were only meant for the common good. Yet, whether Machiavelli was a scientist, a descriptivist, a technician, a moralist or an immoralist is immaterial from one standpoint: he taught us something about the nature of human interaction in the State. Machiavellian interpretations of human events underlie many of our personal impressions of political life. We speak of strategy, tactics, morality, honesty as if the locations of political leaders along those dimensions determine what governments do for us or to us.

Public expenditure is quite the most visible and quantifiable measure of government activity. It is therefore surprising that in Britain, as distinct from the United States, this area has been massively neglected by political scientists. This neglect is all the odder since public expenditure in Britain – comprehensively and conventionally defined to include all spending by central and local government, as well as capital investment by public corporations – has been increasing rapidly both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the national income: between the early 1960s and the middle 'seventies, it rose from just under two-fifths to almost three-fifths of the Gross National Product. So, in effect, the scope of political decision-making about the distribution of national resources has grown considerably, reflecting the changing balance between the political market and the economic market. The dynamics of this process are highly relevant for an understanding of the British political system.

Over the last twenty years a succession of theories of politics has appeared of which the hallmark is an attempt to adapt utilitarian marginalism to the purpose of political explanation. Theories in this intellectual style may be designated ‘economic’ theories of politics since utilitarian marginalism was first developed in the context of economic theorizing; its invention was indeed the birth of a notion of ‘economies’ as distinct from the ‘political economy’of Smith, Ricardo, Marx and J. S. Mill. Anthony Downs pioneered the economic approach with his bravura economic theory of democracy in 1957, which remains probably the best-known example of it. Many of the fundamental objections to economic theories of politics were explored by C. B. Macpherson in 1961 in a brief but penetrating essay; but Macpherson's essay was not decisive in checking the popularity of such theories. Despite his criticism, they have continued to proliferate.

The military regime has now become a common phenomenon throughout the world. Research on the military in low-income systems used to focus on the military coup rather than on the military regime, but in recent years this imbalance has lessened. Moreover, many of the old ‘standard findings’ about military regimes have come to be rejected. It is fitting that they should have been since they tended to be the products more of stereotyping and inadequate theorizing than of systematic research.

This article develops a number of themes first raised in an earlier paper where we attempted to publicize the existence of Census data based, for the first time, on British parliamentary constituencies, and where we briefly described the potential and limits of a variety of available statistical techniques of analysis. Until the earlier paper was published, studies of British electoral behaviour using aggregate data were largely historical, generally used only the simplest statistical techniques such as cross-tabulations, and usually proceeded blithely unaware of the snares of ecological inference. A small number of more advanced analyses had appeared but none focused on Britain or even on England as a whole. Since our earlier article appeared, there have been two attempts to construct predictive models of Labour support by applying multivariate statistical analysis to aggregate-level data. As we show in this paper, both Barnett and Rasmussen produce models that are statistically less powerful than our own and are subject to various weaknesses, of which the most important is the failure to tackle the problem of ecological inference.

Tocqueville described the eventual progress of equality as inevitable; today its prospects seem less assured. The main engines of equality's modest advance are to be found in contemporary welfare states, where politics concerns who gets what and why. Governments are deeply concerned with these matters even when beguiling themselves, as well as the rest of us, into overlooking the cumulative results of their actions. By shoring up and gradually reshaping stratification systems, they help provide frameworks within which we live and plan our futures. Ordinary citizens are more attuned to the facts of inequality than to speculations about its origins. This essay investigates when and how citizens learn about stratification in England and the United States.

The notion of power may well be central to all of the social sciences, yet the prevailing ways of thinking about power are very unsatisfactory. Intuitive ideas about power appear at first sight to have little logical consistency and are therefore confusing, while the more precise ideas that have been offered appear to be too narrow and are therefore ignored. Perhaps the main reason for the intractability of the concept is that it encompasses a number of seemingly unrelated ideas; it is ‘not a thing at all but many things’. This view is shared by many of those who have worked most closely with the concept. William Riker, for example, feels that the concept should be banished, James March says that it is disappointing, and Robert Dahl admits that there are students of the subject who feel that the whole study of power is a bottomless swamp.

The ‘primacy principle’ comprises three assumptions about political orientations. The first is that they are learned during childhood. The second is that this childhood learning further shapes any subsequent modifications of them. The third is that the scale of any such subsequent modifications is small: fundamental political orientations tend to endure through life. We propose, using cohort analysis, to examine the extent to which three political orientations – party identification, political efficacy and political trust – do, as a matter of fact, endure through adulthood.

Theories of policy formation derived from the experience of one country are not always easy to apply in another. This is particularly true of policy making in British cities, where scholars have often found that the relevance of theories developed in the United States is strictly limited. This paper seeks to explore two approaches that have been influential in orienting theory-building in American local politics – the ‘elite’ approach and the ‘pluralist’ – and to examine their relevance to policy analysis in urban Britain. Our contention is that both of these approaches, if reformulated so as to apply to policy-making processes in different arenas of decision, afford valuable insights. Data collected in three Greater London boroughs, which were attempting a vast reorganization of secondary education, suggest that distinctly British patterns of pluralist and elite-oriented policy-making behavior are related to particular types of governmental outputs.

Despite the greatly enhanced interest in processes of political change that political scientists have shown in recent years, there are still areas that have received attention in only the most speculative manner. Modernization, political development and comparative history are becoming established subdisciplines, reflecting ‘the change to change’. But the political processes involved in the transformation of advanced industrial societies have as yet received only cursory empirical treatment.

Ever since the technique widely known as the semantic differential was pioneered by Charles Osgood, it has been widely applied in most of the social sciences, as well as in a variety of other fields. While the broadest applications of the technique, including much of Osgood's own work, are in the areas of experimental and social psychology, variants of the semantic differential are widely scattered through research in such diverse fields as linguistics, anthropology, and education, not to mention such non-academic fields as journalism and marketing. The attempt by a number of political scientists, particularly in Britain and in Canada, to adapt this technique to the study of political party images represents one of these variants.

One observation about the budgets of governments has passed into the conventional wisdom: budget-making, we are told, is a process of ‘incremental decision making’. The approach of the incrementalists is directed primarily to the question of how the creation of the new budget in a particular year (‘the budgetary process’) is to be explained. The approach seeks to characterize how budgeters respond to the problem of allocating resources and to develop explanatory models of budgetary outputs. But, despite the volume of research that now exists on budgetary incrementalism, the operationalization of the concept remains an issue, and many of the empirical studies have the limited perspective of a single budget-making system – that is, of one set of resource allocators, who employ the same standard operating procedures, rules of search, and so on. This paper has two objectives: (1) to explicate some simple operational models of budgetary incrementalism; and (2) to examine the adequacy of these models by means of an empirical test in four comparable budget-making systems – British county boroughs.

In his recent review of Albert O. Hirschman's book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Brian Barry suggested that the next step was ‘to look more systematically at ways in which exit and voice can be related, and to try and bring all the variables relevant to each kind of relationship into an explicit theoretical structure.’ This paper is an attempt to move in this direction by locating the concepts involved unequivocally within the so-called ‘economic’ or ‘rational choice’ paradigm. It is hoped that any resulting loss of richness will be more than compensated for by an increase in the internal consistency of the argument. It will be demonstrated that most of the logic of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty rests on ‘economic’ assumptions – Barry has already shown that where Hirschman departs from these his argument is at its weakest – and that making this reliance fully explicit not only increases the rigor of the approach but reorients some of the conclusions.