Does partisanship matter for income inequality? The empirical evidence is notably mixed. I argue that these inconsistent findings are partly the result of scholars not (properly) modeling the relationship between unionization and the partisan composition of government. If we accept that union members favor greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than non-union members, politicians desire to hold elected office and be popular but also to implement particular public policies, and left party politicians share union members’ policy preferences to a greater extent than center and right party politicians, then partisan differences should be greatest at moderate levels of unionization, a condition that allows all politicians to pursue their policy preferences while maintaining electoral viability. The empirical analysis examines 16 wealthy democracies between 1970 and 2010. The results of error-correction models confirm the theoretical expectation and hold regardless of whether there is a majoritarian or proportional representation electoral system.

This paper examines the degree to which political connections affect business rankings through a statistical analysis of Turkey's industry rankings between 2003 and 2011. The analysis demonstrates that business performance is associated with connectedness through industry and firm level data. We show that political connectedness varies according to the firm's channel of access to obtain favouritism either through direct personal ties or institutional networks. Ideological motivations emerge to be significant in mobilizing, shaping and tying firm behaviour to broader political agendas. In the conclusion we discuss the impact of deepening connectedness on long-term business fortunes and political institutions.

Despite the observed frequency of firm lobbying, scholars attempting to explain this behavior have had little luck. Pushing away from theories that center on firm characteristics, this paper argues that firm lobbying can be best explained with a sociological model of competitive action. In particular, firms that perceive other firms to have influence on policy are more likely to lobby policy-makers. Since firms are both competitors in a free market and socially embedded actors, their belief in other firms’ influence on policy pushes them to engage in similar behavior in order to increase profit and survive. I test this argument with a combination of quantitative analysis of survey responses from 7247 firms in 40 countries from the World Bank Enterprise Survey and seven qualitative interviews with key firms in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The results provide evidence for the hypothesis. This finding implies that scholars should not only take into account firm characteristics, but also explore the possible effects of how a firm's decision to lobby or not is influenced by its environment.

I conduct an event study of an exogenous pollution shock-smog in the winter of 2013 to examine how the market values of firms in polluting industries and environmental protecting industries, respectively, responded in “the world's worst polluter”: China. I first show that politically connected polluters, defined by having at least one board member who was a former local bureaucrat, are more likely to be state owned and in debt. During the 21 days of the smog, polluters experienced a cumulative abnormal return of −5.38%, while protectors had a cumulative abnormal return of 3.50%. However, politically connected polluters were less susceptible to the shock: they experienced a 1% greater positive abnormal return than unconnected polluters. Connected protectors also benefited from a greater 1% abnormal return than unconnected protectors. The findings imply that environmental disasters have distributional effects, and support a theory that links rent-seeking behavior to pollution.

Contemporary discussions in the comparative political economy of innovation revolve specifically around the question of globalization's impact on the observable diversity of innovation patterns, institutionally grounded comparative advantages of firms and countries as well as their evolution over time. The paper develops the concept of “contingent institutional adaptation” to trace institutional evolution at the firm level. It advances the idea that contingent adaptation can cause institutional hybridization, an evolutionary path defined by change and continuity, thereby offering a more nuanced concept of institutional evolution over time. In a historic single-case study the paper investigates the German Siemens AG and its efforts to remain on the cutting-edge of major information and communication technologies in two time periods (1847–1914; 1989–2013), both marked by institutional adaptations resulting in hybridization. Ultimately, institutional hybridization led to Siemens’ retreat from all information and communication technology sectors.

When it comes to our understanding of the distribution and exercise of political power in the US, does it matter that women have not been able to break the glass ceiling? Most political decisions in the US are shaped by the preferences of elites. However, despite of important economic gains women continue to play a minor, and rather peripheral role, in the US business elite, with very few of them appointed to top management or to the CEO position, and an even smaller number belonging to the inner circle of corporate board directors. In parallel, the number of women who are millionaires is on the increase, but their impact on the political process is still small. Women are the majority of eligible and actual voters, and non-elite and elite women in particular have different political preferences than men – especially in the areas of social spending. However, in spite of the increased concerns with the high levels of inequality in the US, little or no change can be expected if women's voices continue to be drowned by the overwhelming male presence in the commanding heights of the business landscape.