Negotiations for China's accession to the WTO provoked a debate between pessimists who believed that opening the economy would lead to a flood of imports and a de-nationalization of manufacturing industry, and those who believed that it would spur rationalization of state-owned enterprises, lock in domestic reforms, attract foreign investment, and open the way for trade expansion. The industry most frequently mentioned as endangered was motor vehicles, where an awkward combination of Stalinist central planning with localized autarky had resulted in a proliferation of inefficient producers. With the partial exception of two investments by Volkswagen, initial joint ventures in assembly operations failed miserably. China's commitments on joining the WTO banned (or at least complicated) many of the most important industrial policy tools it had used to promote the auto industry since the opening to joint ventures in the early 1980s'including performance requirements, high tariffs, and numerical quotas. After accession in 2001, tariffs fell steadily while output and foreign investment soared. The Chinese government moved towards a lighter-handed but more effective form of industrial policy that reduced top-down planning while expanding market incentives and scope for managerial freedom. Rather than destroying industrial policy for the auto industry, WTO accession constrained and disciplined it. When foreign auto firms and their governments pushed for more aggressive protection of trademarks and other intellectual property rights under the WTO, the Chinese government initially stalled. Continuing pressure then tilted the balance of state policy toward promotion of independent design, whether by state-owned enterprises testing the boundaries of their joint ventures with foreign multinationals, or by audacious smaller firms purchasing foreign designs and technology to complement inexpensive local parts and assembly, thereby creating the conditions for the emergence of a more competitive industry.

Scholars of business associations have recently learned a great deal about how associations contribute to development, but much less about the origins of such developmental associations. This essay introduces and assesses a new political explanation for the origins of ‘developmental associations.’ Conventional wisdom holds that developmental associations must be able to rise above political and collusive pressures and establish autonomy from states. Yet, I argue that these associations' developmental capacities emerge as a result of active state support by key actors, and in response to challenges and threats posed by competitive business organizations. Developmental associations emerge and acquire their capacities as they confront internal threats from other associations, as well as utilize the opportunities presented by the national state and international channels. In this view, functional or organizational capacity is not enough, rather, developmental business associations, must exhibit political capacity'that is the ability to manage the political environment, and respond to the structure of opportunities and threats. This explanation views developmental business associations as political organizations seeking power as well as offers a historically sensitive analysis of transformation of business politics in reforming India.

In recent years programs of private regulation have spread from North America and Europe to developing countries around the world. Though central to debates over public versus private international governance, little is known about the actual operations of these programs, especially in developing countries where weak state regulation has failed for decades to control environmental degradation. This paper assesses the effectiveness in Argentina of two prominent global private environmental regulatory programs'the chemical industry's Responsible Care® program and the Forest Stewardship Council. Argentina presents an intriguing country case because, despite conditions and policies that should support such programs, their implementation there has been stunted when compared against other regional cases. A focus on the demand and supply factors that shape these programs in Argentina reveals that market demand is a necessary but insufficient condition for regime effectiveness. Supply-side factors such as industry characteristics, public policies, and the institutional culture of firms significantly influence program implementation. Some transnational corporations helped export these program to Argentina; however, many others have shown opposition or disinterest, stifling program development. Also, feckless and unstable state agencies have created an institutional environment unfavorable even for private initiatives aimed at bypassing government interference.

Rulings made by the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement body have, since the organization's creation in 1995, significantly advanced global economic liberalization. The response of business has been varied and far from uniformly supportive of the WTO agenda. The reason stems from the fact that adjusting to liberalization measures is easier in some industries than in others. The response is premised on the strategic alternatives available within an industry. Through examining antidumping (AD) elements of the European Union (EU) trade policy regime in the context of two European industries - chemicals and textiles - we find that both are under severe competitive pressure, due to WTO-induced market liberalization. However, the responses taken by companies within the respective industries are very different. We suggest that while WTO activity catalyzes industry evolution, the form of that adjustment is highly industry specific. In the case of textiles, the disaggregation of the industry value chain allows for a variety of product and locational adjustment strategies. In contrast, the chemicals industry is nationally based, reliant on intellectual property for competitive advantage and structurally limited in its ability to adopt a wide range of adjustment strategies. Therefore, in the absence of alternative strategy options, EU chemical companies lobby for rule harmonization in the WTO.