In 1998, activist Marc Kasky sued Nike for alleged false advertising and unfair competition under California law. Kasky alleged that Nike made false statements in a variety of what we would usually consider non-advertising forums, including interviews and letters to the press. The Supreme Court of California permitted Kasky's suit to go forward, even though the statements were not a part of traditional paid commercial advertisements. The Supreme Court of the United States, which initially granted certiorari to review the case, dismissed the writ on June 26, 2003, leaving intact California's broad interpretation of its statute and narrow construction of the Constitutional speech protections that constrain that statute. What is typically referred to as “the Nike case” or “the Kasky case” can mean either Kasky v. Nike (as the case was originally filed) or Nike v. Kasky (when Nike appealed the lower court's judgment).

In the recent case of Nike v. Kasky both sides argued that their standard for distinguishing commercial speech from political speech would create the better policy for ensuring accurate and complete disclosure of social information by corporations. Using insights from information economics, we argue that neither standard will achieve the policy goal of optimal truthful disclosure. Instead, we argue that the appropriate standard is one of optimal truthful disclosure—balancing the value of speech against the costs of misinformation. Specifically, we argue that an SEC-sanctioned safe harbor available under a closely supervised system for social reporting will bring about optimal truthful disclosure. The scheme is intended to enhance stakeholder confidence in corporate social and political commentary, while at the same time encouraging corporations to provide accurate information in a fair playing field of public debate.

This article explores the law and ethics of lobbying. The legal discussion examines disclosure regulations, employment restrictions, bribery laws, and anti-fraud provisions as each applies to the lobbying context. The analysis demonstrates that given the social value placed on the First Amendment, federal law generally affords lobbyists wide latitude in determining who, what, when, where, and how to lobby.

This article explores the law and ethics of lobbying. The legal discussion examines disclosure regulations, employment restrictions, bribery laws, and anti-fraud provisions as each applies to the lobbying context. The analysis demonstrates that given the social value placed on the First Amendment, federal law generally affords lobbyists wide latitude in determining who, what, when, where, and how to lobby.

In the Kasky case, the Supreme Court of California determined that Nike, Inc., might be accountable in a civil action for misleading statements that it made to the press and to the public about its operations in Southeast Asia. The Kasky case is examined here in its legal and ethical aspects. The U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment cases that distinguish between commercial speech and political speech are explained, and the arguments in favor of greater protection for Nike's statements about its overseas operations are evaluated in light of Donaldson and Dunfee's integrative social contracts theory. The hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency” is invoked to claim that the arguments made by Nike and various “friends of the court” in favor of greater protection for corporate speech are problematic. Reliable information is the lifeblood of both democracy and efficient free markets. Thus, the more ethical approach is for corporations to support systemic legal reforms that would predictably sanction false and misleading statements in accordance with clear guidelines.

Raising the issue of corporate moral agency in our examination of the morality of corporate speech is important for two fundamental reasons. Each reason suggests we exercise caution in conflating corporations and individuals as the law often does. First, raising the issue of corporate moral agency is important to the aim of providing a framework for ethically evaluating corporate speech. It is tempting to proceed as if the nature of corporate speech is self-evident. But this is hardly the case. Corporations are not natural persons, and we mustn't assume corporate speech is indistinguishable from human speech. Before we can ethically evaluate corporate speech, we must first clarify what corporate speech is. This requires an understanding of the fundamental nature of the corporate entity, including its moral status. Second, raising the issue of corporate moral agency is important if we wish to promote morally responsible corporate speech. Any diminished moral capacity on the corporation's part would suggest a core role for the strong legal reinforcement of any ethical aspirations here. In promoting morally responsible corporate speech, ethical injunctions uncoupled from an effective legal regime may hold only limited promise.

Wayne Norman and Chris MacDonald launch a strong attack against Triple Bottom Line or 3BL accounting in their article “Getting to the Bottom of ‘Triple Bottom Line’” (2004). This response suggests that, while limitations to 3BL accounting do exist, the critique of Norman and MacDonald is deeply flawed.

We respond to Moses Pava's defense of the “Triple Bottom Line” (3BL) concept against our earlier criticisms. We argue that, pace Pava, the multiplicity of measures (and units of measure) that go into evaluating ethical performance cannot reasonably be compared to the handful of standard methods for evaluating financial performance. We also question Pava's claim that usage of the term “3BL” is somehow intended to be ironical or subversive.

Arnold and Bowie (2003) attempt to derive ethical constraints on the actions of the managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs), or the MNEs themselves, from a Kantian perspective. We contest Arnold and Bowie's claims regarding MNE duties, in particular that MNEs have a duty to pay a subsistence wage above market levels. We conclude that even within Arnold and Bowie's Kantian framework such a duty does not properly emerge. In addition, we argue that the account of coercion used by Arnold and Bowie does not serve their purposes. Arnold and Bowie address consequentialist issues by arguing that their conclusions are not undercut by economic considerations regarding unemployment. We argue that Arnold and Bowie have misread the economic literature in this regard.

In “Sweatshops and Respect for Persons” we argued on Kantian grounds that managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have the following duties: to adhere to local labor laws, to refrain from coercion, to meet minimum health and safety standards, and to pay workers a living wage. In their commentary on our paper Sollars and Englander challenge some of our conclusions. We argue here that several of their criticisms are based on an inaccurate reading of our paper, and that none of the remaining criticisms successfully challenge our main arguments. By highlighting the shortcomings of their arguments we hope to advance discussion of the ethical treatment of workers in global supply chains.

These are two interesting, controversial, complementary books. The authors are of different generations. John Perkins is sixty (2005). He was a college student during the Vietnam War who came to oppose the war, then joined the Peace Corps to avoid the draft. Noreena Hertz is thirty-six. She is an academic/activist, a professor of political economy who was tear-gassed at the massive Global Justice protest in Genoa (2001) at which hundreds were beaten by the Italian police and one protestor killed.

Not so long ago I interviewed a computer engineer in her home. Surrounded with toys and a napping baby—the interview time had been chosen carefully—she talked about how she worked as an independent contractor for a large electronics company. Connected by high-speed broadband, two telephone lines, and a cell phone, she felt fully integrated into the work, exchanging electronic files with her colleagues and having telephone conversations with customers two continents and umpteen time zones away. She told me she often worked late after the baby was in bed and during the baby's afternoon nap before she went to pick her older child up from school. Despite these odd working times, however, she was convinced that none of the company's customers and only some of her work colleagues knew that she worked at home. She was very contented with the arrangement.