We review and synthesize over two decades of research on ethical culture in organizations, examining eighty-nine relevant scholarly works. Our article discusses the conceptualization of ethical culture in a cross-disciplinary space and its critical role in ethical decision-making. With a view to advancing future research, we analyze the antecedents, outcomes, and mediator and moderator roles of ethical culture. To do so, we identify measures and theories used in past studies and make recommendations. We propose, inter alia, the use of validated measures, application of a wider range of theories, adoption of longitudinal studies, and study of group-level data in organizations. We explore research possibilities in new and emergent forms of organizations, ways of organizing work, and technology in ethical decision-making, such as the role of artificial intelligence. We also recommend the study of a broad range of leadership styles and their influence in shaping ethical cultures in organizations.

Demands have been growing upon firms to take actions in the interests of workers, the environment, local communities, and others. Firms sometimes have felt they could best discharge such responsibilities by cooperating with other firms. This, however, is suspect from the point of view of a purely economic interpretation of competition law, since interfirm agreements may raise prices and thus lower welfare for consumers. Should competition law remain focused on competition enhancing economic welfare, or be reformed to allow for acts of cooperation that are socially beneficial? To answer this question, the article provides a philosophical reevaluation of the deep-seated view that firms are merely private actors. It argues that demands of political legitimacy should also be addressed at firms cooperating together, and that standard views of democratic accountability should be broadened, introducing a model of delegated, sequential decision making which allows regulatory agencies and parliaments to control interfirm agreements.

In this article, I aim to clarify some key issues in the ongoing debate about the relationship between Rawlsian political philosophy and business ethics. First, I discuss precisely what we ought to be asking when we consider whether corporations are part of the “basic structure of society.” I suggest that the relevant questions have been mischaracterized in much of the existing debate, and that some key distinctions have been overlooked. I then argue that although Rawlsian theory’s potential implications for business ethics are more extensive than some have suggested, the nature of the concern that we ought to have about the effects of corporate behavior on individuals’ economic and social conditions should lead us to reject the view that corporations are bound by principles of justice only if, and insofar as, they are part of the basic structure.

One of the most important and challenging issues of business ethics—or indeed of ethics more generally—is that of “moral responsibility.” And though this problem has been with us from the outset of reflection on ethics and business, the following developments in the late twentieth century have exacerbated its difficulty: the increased mobility among people, the development of increasingly complex technologies with ever more significant consequences, the extension of the distance between people’s actions and the effects of their actions, the extended distance between the manufacturers of products and the consequences of those products, the expanded possibilities for anonymous actions, and the collapse of many customary forms of restraints between both individuals and organizations. As a consequence, I believe, we are in the midst of rethinking and developing new and creative ways of extending our notion of responsibility.

Business ethics is an eclectic blend of intellectual traditions that seeks to exam ine the question of “what should I do in my business relationships.” This paper attempts to widen this discussion by proposing an alternative view of the nature of ethical behaviour: ethical behaviour as a situated social accomplishment. From an ethnomethodological perspective, norms and rules have the status of interpretive aids which are used to negotiate an acceptable meaning for a situation; norms and rules are constituted by, and in part constitute, the situations in which they occur. While most work in business ethics has tended to reify ethical practices, this paper stresses the contingent and situational nature of ethical decision making. In addition to presenting an ethnomethodological perspective, this paper discusses the methodological ramifications of this perspective through an examination of three ethnographic studies of situated rule usage.

This paper argues that the desirable features of postmodernism identified by Ronald Green are not exclusive to postmodernism; that to the extent these features are postmodern, they are not necessarily features of business ethics; that, with qualification, these are desirable features to include in business ethics; that the best way to accomplish this inclusion is by appealing to an Aristotelian model; and that postmodernism has implications for the legal environment of business.

In this paper we present six criteria for assessing proposed solutions to environmental risk problems. To assess the final criterion—the criterion of ethical responsibility—we suggest another series of criteria. However, before these criteria can be used to address ethical problems, business persons must be willing to discuss the problem in ethical terms. Yet many decision makers are unwilling to do so. Drawing on research by James Waters and Frederick Bird, we discuss this “moral muteness”—the inability or unwillingness to use moral language to solve moral problems—and suggest some underlying causes of moral muteness.

Fundamental theological and ethical themes of Luther’s thought and tradition provide a basis for appreciating both the role of business in God’s providential design and the importance of occupation for living out one’s Christian vocation. These same insights establish the ethical basis for a critical appraisal of the current practice of downsizing and its negative impact on the quality of individual lives and whole communities. While Lutheran ethics is realistic about the ambiguities of life, it is also an ethic of compassionate love seeking justice in the world of business as in all of life.

As the author of one book on the elements of game theory and another on the possible applications to ethics (Binmore [3,4,5]), I suppose it is natural that I should be asked to reply to Robert Solomon’s (13) claim that “game theory has been a disaster in ethics, and now it threatens to become devastating to business ethics as well.” However, I find myself somewhat at a loss as to know what to say, since the game theory he attacks is not practiced by any game theorists with whom I am familiar. At first, I thought this was because my friends and I were deemed to fall into the class of “refined” game theorists to whom Solomon is willing to grant grudging acceptance, but it turns out that their refinement lies in appealing to principles that contradict the essence of the game theoretic enterprise. My guess is therefore that the plain old “vulgar” game theory which he attacks is actually intended to be the same game theory for which John Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten were recently awarded the Nobel Prize. My strategy in replying will therefore have to be the same as those innocent men who are asked why they beat their wives. Instead of explaining why wife beating is a good idea, I shall have to insist that I don’t beat my wife at all.

Today’s international business environment is complicated by human rights abuses and social and economic repression in various countries. This paper introduces controversies with foreign investment in Burma to develop and describe alternative terms of global business engagement in ethically challenging settings. Two forms of engagement—unrestricted and constructive—and two forms of non-engagement—principled and sanctioned—are discussed. All four alternatives are examined for their ethical, social change, and cultural foundations. Additional considerations are posed in respect to constructive engagement, moral leadership by global business executives, needs for model building and evaluative research, and realities in the ethical context of global business.

The Prisoner's Dilemma is a popular device used by researchers to analyze such institutions as business and the modern corporation. This popularity is not deserved under a certain condition that is widespread in college education. If we, as management educators, take seriously our parts in preparing our students to participate in the institutions of a democratic society, then the Prisoner's Dilemma—as clever a rhetorical device as it is—is an unacceptable means to that end. By posing certain questions about the prisoners in the Prisoner's Dilemma, I show that management educators have created a Prisoners Dilemma, whereby they intellectually imprison themselves and their students by continuing to appeal to the Prisoner's Dilemma. These questions are not encouraged by the advocates of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Legal issues have long been a prominent part of the discourse of business ethics. This widespread attention to legal questions within business ethics arises primarily because specific legal issues are as a practical matter often intertwined with prominent ethical issues occurring in the workplace. Many of the central issues of business ethics—issues such as whistle blowing, insider trading, and workplace privacy—have significant legal dimensions.

But this widespread attention to specific legal issues obscures a more significant deficiency within business ethics. This deficiency relates to the consideration of law at a much more fundamental level. Business ethics lacks any developed awareness of the images of law within its discourse.

Unlike jurisprudence, the field of business ethics has little in the way of fully developed models or concepts of law. Rather, our understanding of the law here exists more at the level of images—general, unreflected-upon depictions of the law, determinate in some aspects, indeterminate in others.

Such images are epistemologically potent, containing unexamined assumptions and exerting an often unrecognized influence over the development of our knowledge. As such, they deserve our attention, especially within a newly evolving field such as business ethics. Of particular importance to business ethics is how such images portray the relation of law to ethics.

This paper shows how John R. Commons’ analysis of a firm’s goodwill value gives analytical support to Professor Amartya Sen’s contention (BEQ, 1993) that business ethics makes economic sense. A firm’s market value consists of the value of both tangible and intangible capital, including the goodwill value of ongoing customer relations. If a firm is to defend its goodwill value, it needs to have the protection of the courts and to pursue ethical practices. The courts defend fair competition by giving protection from unethical competitors while the firm defends its reputation with honest dealings.

By implication, firms which depend on ongoing customer relations will tend to engage in more ethical business practices than firms which do not. Even a firm which makes a mistake that compromises its product’s safety may reduce the loss of goodwill value over time by admitting the mistake early rather than hiding it.

Also by implication, the transition from a command socialist economy to a market economy cannot be made instantaneously since trust, reputation, and these ongoing customer relations—key institutions of market economies—cannot be generated instantaneously.

In this address, I distinguish and explore three conceptions of wages. A wage is a reward, given in recognition of the performance of a valued task. It is also an incentive: a way to entice workers to take and keep jobs, and to motivate them to work hard. Finally, a wage is a price of labor, and like all prices, conveys valuable information about relative scarcity. I show that each conception of wages has its own normative logic, or appropriate justification, and these logics can come apart. This explains some of the debate about wages and makes the project of justifying a wage simpliciter difficult. I identify which logic we should choose, since we must choose, and say what this means for how we should think about the justification of pay.

Alternative currencies are means of payment that circulate alongside—as an alternative or complement to—official currencies. While these currencies have existed for a long time, both society and academia have shown a renewed interest in their potential to decentralize the governance of monetary affairs and to bring people and organizations together in more ethical or sustainable ways. This article is a review of the ethical and philosophical implications of these alternative monetary projects. We first discuss various classifications of these currencies before analyzing the ethical challenges linked to the way they tackle social and environmental issues. We also examine the incentive-based and coercive mechanisms used by these currencies from an ethical perspective and debate the promises and perils of monetary decentralization and democracy. We conclude by identifying an agenda for future research.

Scholars who favor shareholder primacy usually claim either that managers should not fulfill corporate duties of beneficence or that, if they are required to fulfill them, they do so by going against their obligations to shareholders. Distinguishing between structurally different types of duties of beneficence and recognizing the full force of the normative demands imposed on managers reveal that this view needs to be qualified. Although it is correct to think that managers, when acting on behalf of shareholders, are not required to fulfill wide duties of charity, they are nevertheless required to fulfill a variety of narrow duties of beneficence. What is more, the obligation to fulfill these duties arises precisely because they are acting on behalf of shareholders. As such, this article 1) refines our understanding of the duties of corporate beneficence and 2) helps to identify which duties of beneficence are imposed on managers when they are acting on behalf of shareholders.

Employees who possess cross-cultural capabilities are increasingly sought after due to unparalleled numbers of cross-cultural interactions. Previous research has primarily focused on the bright side of these capabilities, including important individual and work outcomes. In contrast, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the cross-cultural capability of cultural intelligence (CQ) can lead to both positive and negative outcomes. Applying the general theory of confluence, we propose that expatriates high in CQ excel in customer relationship performance, while simultaneously behaving opportunistically. We also suggest that ethical relativism moderates these relationships. Using mixed methods, four separate studies generally support our predictions while also deepening our understanding of various forms of opportunism and the mechanism behind two seemingly opposing effects. Conceptual and managerial implications of CQ for opportunism, customer relationship performance, and ethics are discussed.

Postmodernism, a poorly defined term, is nevertheless influencing art, architecture, literature and philosophy. And despite its definitional ambiguities, some philosophers see in postmodernism a reason for the rise and interest in business ethics. This view is chailenged on two grounds: (1) its philosophical source in Europe; and (2) its vocabulary. Martin Heidegger, one of the major forces in postmodernism’s rise, left a confusing legacy. In his early years, Heidegger advocated moral subjectivism; in his later years, he argued that moral standards could be found in the lives of human gods whose pronouncements would replace the precepts of a Western Civilization he found decadent.

Contemporary postmodernism seems to take inspiration from the views of both the younger and older Heidegger even though he, himself, saw contradictions between them. The confusion is compounded by incorporation of Neitzsche's God-is-dead thesis into Heideggerian thought, thereby, confronting philosophers with a dilemma: if God is out of the picture, and if objective rules derived from human nature do not exist, what human gods can lead us? Will they come from a political or cultural elite? How should we know them? Why should we trust them? Unless—and until—these questions are answered, it is unwise to build business ethics on a postmodern foundation.

Another—and seemingly insignificant—reason for rejecting postmodernism ethics is the esoteric vocabulary used by its expositors to advance it. More jargon will not help philosophers who try to respond to moral questions raised by business managers themselves.

This paper explores the relationship between declining organizations and unethical behavior. Data from a four month long management simulation indicate that declining organizations demonstrate a greater propensity for unethical activities than do more successful companies. The results indicate that: 1) organizations in decline are more likely to be involved in unethical activities; 2) the more severe the decline is, the more unethical the behavior is likely to be; and 3) it is organizational decline and not initial propensities toward unethical conduct that explains the unethical behavior. The paper also discusses the implications of these findings and outlines future streams of research.