Postmodernism, a poorly defined term, is nevertheless influencing art, architecture, literature and philosophy. And despite its definitional ambiguities, some philosophers see in postmodernism a reason for the rise and interest in business ethics. This view is chailenged on two grounds: (1) its philosophical source in Europe; and (2) its vocabulary. Martin Heidegger, one of the major forces in postmodernism’s rise, left a confusing legacy. In his early years, Heidegger advocated moral subjectivism; in his later years, he argued that moral standards could be found in the lives of human gods whose pronouncements would replace the precepts of a Western Civilization he found decadent.

Contemporary postmodernism seems to take inspiration from the views of both the younger and older Heidegger even though he, himself, saw contradictions between them. The confusion is compounded by incorporation of Neitzsche's God-is-dead thesis into Heideggerian thought, thereby, confronting philosophers with a dilemma: if God is out of the picture, and if objective rules derived from human nature do not exist, what human gods can lead us? Will they come from a political or cultural elite? How should we know them? Why should we trust them? Unless—and until—these questions are answered, it is unwise to build business ethics on a postmodern foundation.

Another—and seemingly insignificant—reason for rejecting postmodernism ethics is the esoteric vocabulary used by its expositors to advance it. More jargon will not help philosophers who try to respond to moral questions raised by business managers themselves.

Ethicists and legal theorists have proposed models of corporate culpability that shift the standard of guilt determination from vicarious attribution of individual action and intention to an assessment of culture, policies, as well as organizational action and inaction. This paper briefly reviews four prominent models of corporate culpability, arguing that each makes claims that extend well beyond the limits of existing law. As an alternative to these models, a constructive corporate fault is described that relies on both objective and subjective reasonableness judgments. The paper concludes with a consideration of constructive corporate fault in relation to an Accountability model of corporate liability.

A group of economists has recently begun addressing questions at the intersection of ethics and economics. They are preparing new definitions of individual choice that combine self-interest and other-interest, new processes of interpersonal exchange that result in cooperation rather than conflict, and new measures of social well-being that include rights as well as outcomes. This article surveys that work, and suggests areas where conceptual inputs from business ethicists are clearly needed, and where multiple opportunities for interactive research are obviously present.

The introduction of ethics in the running of a corporate firm is functional to the reaching of its business purposes.

The adoption of values of distributive justice (equity) and respect (trust) concurs and determines the building of trust both inside the corporation itself and externally, making the birth of solid relationships based on collaboration and a lasting sense of loyalty possible in a productive world, which tends to praise efficiency throughout the entire production line. Therefore, the judgment that ethics pays and the conclusion that the growth of an “ethical sense” in the organization makes up one of the most difficult challenges of modern management.

Our research investigated pricing policies of fast-food restaurants in predominantly black neighborhoods. We argue that the lack of monitoring of franchisees’ pricing policies leads to higher prices. Results indicate that franchisees are significantly more likely than company-owned outlets to charge higher prices based on the proportion of blacks in a neighborhood. These price differences do not appear to be explained away by cost or competition factors. Our findings do not establish an intent to discriminate; nevertheless, we discuss the fairness of the pricing structure found.

This article uses philosopher Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice to shed light on the legal concept of the fiduciary, alongside demonstrating the wider contribution Fricker’s work can make to business ethics. Fiduciary, from the Latin fīdūcia, meaning “trust,” plays a fundamental role in all financial and business organisations: it acts as a moral safeguard of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary. The article focuses on the ethics of the fiduciary, but from a unique historical perspective, referring back to the original formulation of the fiduciary within a familial context to investigate presuppositions regarding agential capabilities, whilst also paying attention to the power mechanism embedded in the trustee–beneficiary relationship. Using Fricker’s theory of pre-emptive testimonial injustice, the analysis elucidates the impact of cumulative beneficiary silencing in contemporary contexts, and the article uncovers ethical issues of an epistemological kind at the core of the fiduciary—of epistemic injustice.

It had to happen. After two full decades of intense energy, business ethicists and business practitioners may actually have succeeded in suppressing the feeblest joke of the profession: “Business Ethics. Isn’t that an oxymoron?” Har har har.

In the early days of business ethics, the oxymoron had actual embodiments. “Business” was represented by hard-nosed, thick-skinned managers with no inclination to adopt academia’s language and critiques. “Ethics” was embodied by ivory-towered theoreticians with an undisguised contempt for profit makers. What a joke to think of these two groups as conceptually productive partners.

In this paper we examine how ethical values contribute to national economic prosperity. We extend the concept of an ethical wealth of nations first introduced by Donaldson in which he proposed four categories of ethical values—fairer distribution of goods, better government, ingrained social cooperation, and inculcation of economic duties—that can drive economic performance, but only if citizens ascribe “intrinsic value” to them independent of their economic interests. Our analysis draws on institutional economics and sociology research to show that if ethical values are to drive economic performance, they must also be supported by the institutional fabric of the nation. We embed an expanded set of ethical values in a set of democratic, free market and civil society institutions spanning three sectors of society—political, economic and cultural respectively. We conclude by discussing the implications of our institutional framework for moral education.

Ethical analyses of the relations between managers and subordinates have traditionally focused on the employment contract. The inequality and requisite mutual trust between managers and subordinates makes the sub-disciplines of professional ethics and feminist ethics more applicable than the contractarian perspective. When professional ethics is applied to hierarchic relationships, specific obligations emerge for managers and subordinates alike. The application of feminist ethics results in the identification of an entirely different, though not contradictory, set of obligations. In toto, the analysis improves on the conventional wisdom governing hierarchic relationships while at the same time remaining consistent with our moral intuitions.

In recent years, many business ethicists have raised problems with the “ethics pays” credo. Despite these problems, many continue to hold it. I argue that support for the credo leads business ethicists away from a potentially fruitful approach found in Hume’s moral philosophy. I begin by demonstrating that attempts to support the credo fail because proponents are trying to provide an answer to the “Why be moral?” question that is based on rational self-interest. Then, I show that Hume’s sentiments-based moral theory provides an alternative to the credo that points toward a more fruitful approach to business ethics. Along the way, I examine a recent social contract alternative to the credo that, despite many appealing features, is less effective than is the Humean alternative. Finally, I develop a Humean approach to business ethics and demonstrate why it is a desirable alternative that business ethicists should explore.

Manuel Velasquez and F. Neil Brady apply the doctrine of double effect to business ethics and conclude that the doctrine allows a pharmaceutical company to sell a drug with potentially fatal side effects only if it also has the good effect of saving lives. This forbids the sale of many common products, such as automobiles and alcohol. My account preserves the virtues of the doctrine of double effect without making it too restrictive. I apply the doctrine to a pharmaceutical company’s decision to market a drug with dangerous side effects and argue that free markets often offer the best way to compare the good and bad effects of business decisions. I conclude that the doctrine does allow a business to sell a potentially fatal product that does not save lives, provided that it warns consumers about the danger.

In the early 1990s, managers at Exxon decided to seek lower cost disposal in Louisiana for oil-field wastes declared hazardous in Alabama. This decision resulted in injuries to the residents of Grand Bois, Louisiana; the disposal company; Exxon; and the oil industry in the state. Given the need for business and society to manage business operations for mutual benefit, it is essential to understand why businesses injure the public so that similar incidents do not happen again. The authors use three analytical perspectives to suggest how corporations may make unethical decisions without purposefully setting out to do so: their managers may fail to understand changing social expectations for corporate behavior; they may adopt organizational structures, policies, and procedures that block ethical action in the name of efficiency; and they may follow unwritten rules of behavior for career success that exclude ethics. These perspectives suggest that individual Exxon managers may not have been making greed-based decisions, weighing corporate gains against harms to others. The situation more likely involved a failure, for the reasons discussed, to raise ethics questions in making business decisions. This explanation does not make much difference to those injured nor does it absolve those who made the decisions. It does make a difference to society and to companies seeking to understand factors that have to be overcome in any large corporation that wishes to prevent such events from occurring.

The claim of neutrality made on behalf of “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” has been re-enforced by Kay Mathiesen’s creation of “The Altruist’s Dilemma.” That this represents a neutral variation on “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” is compromised, however, by the failure of “The Altruist’s Dilemma” to deal with altruism in a full sense. The difference illustrates how, in contrast to its professed neutrality, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” involves very definite views of humanity and the nature of life itself. This is confirmed by Mathiesen’s misreading of O. Henry’s “The Gift of the Magi.”

This paper clarifies the nature of genetic screening and morally evaluates using it to deny people employment. Four sets of variables determine screening’s ability to forecast disorder. The first two concern epistemological limitations: whether the gene itself has been located; whether knowledge of other family members is necessary. The latter two refer to genetic causality: whether other genes are needed; whether the gene causes the disorder or just a susceptibility to it.

Considerations of privacy and justice warrant restricting screening to job-specific disorders, without prejudice to the worker. Screening is more of an invasion of privacy than most “searches” because our very selves are disclosed; serious stigmatizing can result. It is unjust to penalize someone for a susceptibility to a disorder. It is also unjust to use the genetic knowledge and technology, developed with public monies allocated for public good, against members of the public.

Since the Enlightenment our attachment to the past has been greatly weakened, in some areas of social life it has almost ceased to exist. This characteristic of the modern mind is seen as an overreaction. The modern mind has lost the capacity to appreciate the positive contribution the maintenance of the past in the present achieves in social life, especially in the sphere of moral conduct.

In the field of organization theory, nowhere is the past as explicitly distrusted as in critical organization theory. The maintenance of the past in the present is seen as a potential carrier of oppressive and unjust social relationships. Perpetual critique is advocated as a means to uncover these oppressive and unjust relations and prevent any new undemocratic relations from becoming established.

I present an historical and cultural analysis of the modern attitude toward the past and develop a concept of moral tradition to analyze critical organization theory’s ethical assumptions and implications. In so doing, an effort is made to rectify the exaggerated confidence critical organization theory places in rationalism and individualism and to recognize the ineluctable role traditions play not only in organizational life, but also in the way we theorize about organizations.

Professors Bill Shaw and John Corvino, in a response article published in the July, 1996 issue of Business Ethics Quarterly, provide a clearly courteous and obviously well-intended criticism of my original (1994) position on the question of why a manager, and in consequence an organization, should be moral. I disagree with their reasoning and, because I believe that this form of the “Why Be Moral?” question lies at the heart of any potential juncture between our field of business ethics and the economic and behavioral disciplines of business management, I should like to reply in what I hope will be equally courteous and well-intended terms.

Managers have a unique fiduciary responsibility to shareholders of a firm that implies a set of ethical obligations. At a minimum, managers are required to protect shareholder’s interests when other stakeholders are unaffected by their decision. This ethical imperative has been established in the literature. In cases of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, the board of directors of the firm has an ethical obligation to shareholders. The structure of the board can affect its ability to fulfill this obligation. Two specific cases where managerial actions have been argued to be unethical are the adoption of classified boards and poison pills. In this study, we empirically analyze the role of board structure in protecting shareholder rights in the specific case of antitakeover provisions. We test this question on a sample of firms whose shareholders have voted to remove antitakeover provisions and find that independent, focused boards are more likely to accede to shareholder resolutions than are less independent boards. Board size is also important and related to other board structures. We draw implications of this finding for future research on the ethics of board governance.

What’s really needed is a change in mindset—one that fosters not only a culture of compliance but also a company-wide environment that fosters ethical behavior and decision-making.—William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman (2004)

Does the content of a physically dangerous job affect the moral permissibility of hiring for that job? To what extent may employers consider costs in choosing workplace safety measures? Drawing on Kantian ethical theory, this article defends two strong ethical standards of workplace safety. First, the content of a hazardous job does indeed affect the moral permissibility of offering it. Unless employees need hazard pay to meet basic needs, it is permissible to offer a dangerous job only if prospective employees have a reason other than hazard pay to choose this job instead of safer alternatives. Second, employers typically cannot justify omitting expensive safety measures by paying employees more, even if employees prefer higher pay to greater safety. Employers offering dangerous jobs must meet these two standards to avoid treating their employees merely as means.

In a recent article in this journal, David Faraci (2019) argues that the value of fairness can plausibly be appealed to in order to vindicate the view that consensual, mutually beneficial employment relationships can be wrongfully exploitative, even if employers have no obligation to hire or otherwise benefit those who are badly off enough to be vulnerable to wage exploitation. In this commentary, I argue that several values provide potentially strong grounds for thinking that it is at least sometimes better, morally speaking, for employers to hire worse-off people at intuitively exploitative wages than to hire better-off people at intuitively fair wages. Rather than suggesting that hiring badly off people at intuitively exploitative wages is permissible, however, I suggest that this gives us reason to think that employers can be obligated to hire worse-off people rather than better-off people and to pay them nonexploitative wages.