Stanley Cavell’s moral perfectionism places the task of cultivating richer self-understanding and self-expression at the center of corporate life. We show how his approach reframes business as an opportunity for moral soul-craft, achieved through the articulation of increasingly reflective inner life in organizational culture. Instead of norming constraints on business activity, perfectionism opens new possibilities for conducting commercial exchange as a form of conversation, leading to personal growth. This approach guides executives in designing businesses that foster genius and channel creativity, while giving all stakeholders a meaningful voice within a culture of trust. We first give an account of Cavellian perfectionism. Then, we explain how this underrepresented strand of moral reflection challenges and enriches, but does not supplant, prevailing ethical theories—including other versions of perfectionism. We then demonstrate the salience of Cavellian perfectionism to business ethics through examples from marketing, human resources, and executive organizational design and development.

The aim of this essay is to present a model of ethical technology management which assumes that elites who make the system design and development decisions should minimize the risks to stakeholders rather than maximize gains for their organizations. Given the unsettled state in ehical theory a familiar substantive Social, Economic, Environmental and Rights value set or ‘SEER’ ethic is presented. To enable foresight of the negative SEER effects of innovations a technology life cycle is introduced. A cognate issue life cycle is presented to facilitate the ethical resolution of SEER issues associated with such effects. The resultant problem of increased front end load delays and costs, due to ongoing system redesign and stakeholder discussions is found to preferable to high ‘rear end load’ crisis costs, e.g., of the Ford Pinto, Exxon Valdez, Dalkon IUD Shield, and the Union Carbide Bhopal plant. Furthermore the model promises improved returns on the capital investments involved, indications for further research in ethics, economics and organizational theory are noted.

“Technology is not preordained. There are choices to be made.”

—Ursula Franklin, The Real World of Technology

Through an international case study, this paper illustrates how a conversation method was used effectively to address a cross-cultural ethics problem. The method included as moments in one continuous process three different dimensions of postmodernism—Gadamer reconstruction, Derrida deconstruction, and Rorty neopragmatism. In addition to including different dimensions of postmodernism, the method combines effective mutual learning and effective action. Strengths and limitations of the approach are discussed. The article demonstrates how it can be beneficial to build bridges between and within the postmodernism and organization ethics literatures. Also, the article demonstrates how postmodernism can be positively ethical and not necessarily aethical or nihilistic.

Corporate moral agency is an important philosophical issue with significant implications for corporate law scholarship. While some legal scholars have recognized the significance of this issue for the analysis of corporate law, legal scholars generally have yet to give it the kind of attention and thorough examination it deserves. In this regard, Michael Phillips makes a valuable contribution to the debate, exploring how theories of the corporation prevalent in legal scholarship bear on the question of corporate moral agency. His analysis provides us with many insights. Still, I wish to raise some questions regarding his approach. Raising these questions, I believe, will help us to recognize more fully the possibilities the issue of corporate moral agency holds for corporate law scholarship.

War has broken out in the technological global economy, principally in battles over intellectual property. A particularly fierce aspect of this battle sets people who guard proprietary software against hackers, who want information to be free. The key challenge today is to produce an adequate conceptual lens for seeing what ethically is at stake in this battle. Toward this end, this paper uses the just war tradition to analyze differences between proponents of Free Software and proponents of Open Source Software. This paper’s use of three just war criteria—Just Cause, Right Intention, and Discrimination—illustrates how the just war tradition can raise the level of ethical awareness about the intellectual property wars that continue to rage in the technological global economy.

The division between the two [open source and free software] is often bitterly contested, both from inside and outside the communities. The holiest of holy wars are not fought over word processors, operating systems, or compilers. They are all about software licenses.—Joe Barr

In the Kasky case, the Supreme Court of California determined that Nike, Inc., might be accountable in a civil action for misleading statements that it made to the press and to the public about its operations in Southeast Asia. The Kasky case is examined here in its legal and ethical aspects. The U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment cases that distinguish between commercial speech and political speech are explained, and the arguments in favor of greater protection for Nike's statements about its overseas operations are evaluated in light of Donaldson and Dunfee's integrative social contracts theory. The hypernorm of “necessary social efficiency” is invoked to claim that the arguments made by Nike and various “friends of the court” in favor of greater protection for corporate speech are problematic. Reliable information is the lifeblood of both democracy and efficient free markets. Thus, the more ethical approach is for corporations to support systemic legal reforms that would predictably sanction false and misleading statements in accordance with clear guidelines.

In recent years, a number of authors have used game-theoretic reasoning to explain why purely self-interested agents would ever conform their economic activities with the requirements of justice, when by doing so they forego opportunities to reap unilateral net gains by exploiting others. In this paper, I argue that Hume’s justification of honest economic exchanges between self-interested agents in the Treatise foreshadows this contemporary literature. Hume analyzes the problem of explaining justice in self-interested economic exchange as a problem of agents coordinating on a pattern of reciprocal cooperation, as opposed to some other behavioral pattern such as reciprocal exploitation, in exchanges repeated over time. Hume’s arguments anticipate informally the contemporary interpretation of just economic practices as forming part of an equilibrium of a repeated game. I close the paper by arguing that Hume does not provide a satisfactory explanation of how the mutual expectations that support justice in economic exchange arise in a community of self-interested agents. The problem Hume leaves unsolved is one of equilibrium selection, that is: Why do agents follow an equilibrium corresponding to just economic exchanges rather than some other equilibrium corresponding to unjust exchanges? I also argue that contemporary game theory still lacks a satisfactory theory of equilibrium selection, but that such a theory would lead us closer to a satisfactory Humean reconciliation of justice and self-interest in economic exchange.

To date, BEQ has published contributions mainly from philosophers and social scientists. With these essays, we hope to expand this interdisciplinary conversation. The origins of this special issue extend back to a DePaul University conference some ten years ago, when Richard T. De George asserted that there was little that philosophers could learn from religious thinkers that would be of value for the field of business ethics (De George, 1986a). The challenge nestled deep in this author, much like the proverbial irritating grain of sand in the shell of an oyster, and it continues to merit serious reflection: what can religious approaches offer to the field? Are there indeed any pearls of insight to be harvested? Is there even an academic field of what might be termed religious business ethics?

In a recent contribution to this journal, Etzioni (1998) has introduced a “communitarian note on stakeholder theory” based on a principle of fairness. While we do not challenge the principle of fairness itself, we claim that when this principle is applied only to those who invest in the corporation, it cannot serve as the ground for an ethical stakeholder theory. A focus on low-skilled workers as a stakeholder group will help us to illustrate this claim.

A key factor in the decision to convert a publicly owned company to private status is the expectation that value will be created, providing the firm with rent. These rents have implications regarding the property rights of the firm’s capital-contributing constituencies. We identify and analyze the types of rent associated with the newly private firm. Compared to public firms, going private allows owners the potential to partition part of the residual risk to bond holders and employees, rendering them to be co-residual risk bearers with owners. We propose that new promotion-based contracts with bond holders and employees, reflecting their particular investments, be negotiated as the firm migrates from public to private status. These contracts should acknowledge the firm’s intent to maximize shareholder value and its need to take the risks necessary to do so, but support that the firm’s survival not be undermined due to its possibly opportunistic owners.

The articles in the special issue of Business Ethics Quarterly (2015), “Normative Business Ethics in a Global Economy: New Directions on Donaldsonian Themes,” were written by a set of outstanding scholars: Margaret M. Blair, Joseph P. Gaspar, Nien-hê Hsieh, Peter L. Jennings, Marietta Peytcheva, Andreas Georg Scherer, Amy J. Sepinwall, Andrew Stark, Danielle E. Warren, and Manuel Velasquez. In this commentary I reply to my colleagues, arranging my reply around the following themes: 1) the corporate moral agent; 2) the idea of a social contract for business; 3) managing ethics within corporations; and 4) values in business. I discuss each in turn. However, I reflect first on my idiosyncratic approach to business ethics.

Thomas Donaldson’s framework for dealing with value-conflicts between a manager’s home and host country distinguishes between a “conflict of relative [economic] development”—conflicting norms that arise because home and host are at two different stages of economic development—and a “conflict of culture,” which arises because the home and host’s different cultures generate conflicting norms on the issue the manager faces. My question here is a thought experiment. What different insights might emerge if we flipped Donaldson’s framework around? Specifically: What if we viewed the kinds of conflicts that fall under Donaldson’s “conflicts of culture” as arising not because the home and host exhibit a “fundamental” conflict in cultural norms, but because they are at two different stages of cultural development? And what if we viewed “conflicts of relative economic development” as conflicts that occur not because home and host are at two different stages of economic development but, simply, because their economies contemporaneously interact with each other in ways that generate normative conflict: call them “conflicts of economy”?

Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs)—private governance mechanisms involving firms, civil society organizations, and other actors deliberating to set rules, such as standards or codes of conduct, with which firms comply voluntarily—have become important tools for governing global business activities and the social and environmental consequences of these activities. Yet, this growth is paralleled with concerns about MSIs’ deliberative capacity, including the limited inclusion of some marginalized stakeholders, bias toward corporate interests, and, ultimately, ineffectiveness in their role as regulators. In this article, we conceptualize MSIs as deliberative systems to open the black box of the different elements that make up the MSI polity and better understand how their deliberative capacity hinges on problems in different elements. On the basis of this conceptualization, we examine how deliberative mini-publics—forums in which a randomly selected group of individuals from a particular population engage in learning and facilitated deliberations about a topic—can improve the deliberative capacity of MSIs.

This essay examines how normative theories of enterprise can be strengthened by incorporating the empirical study of motivation into the theory-development process. The link between moral conduct and motivation in the literature is reviewed, the framework for Motivational Appeal Analysis introduced and applied, and implications for theory and research are discussed.

This article introduces the second of two special issues on philosophical approaches to leadership ethics. In this issue, the articles draw on the works of Plato, Niccolò Machiavelli, Michel Foucault, and Jürgen Habermas to explore questions in leadership ethics concerning leaders’ self-knowledge and self-constitution and their responsibilities to their followers. The articles in this issue demonstrate the potential of philosophy to deepen our understanding of leadership and ethics.

If an employee is committed to his firm—if he is “attached” or “bound” to it—then his firm may be able to obtain a discount on his labor. This paper asks: Is it wrong for firms to do so? If we understand just or fair pay solely in terms of voluntary agreements between employers and employees, the answer seems to be ‘no.’ Against this, I argue that, in some cases, it is ‘yes.’ In particular, it is wrong for firms to try to obtain discounts on their committed employees’ labor when their employees reasonably expect that they will not try to obtain them. In the process, I probe the limits of exploitation and question the relevance of contribution to fairness in compensation.

The kind of commitment to moral rules that characterizes effective interaction between persons in among others places, manufacturing and commercial settings is characteristically treated by economists and game theorists as a public good, the securing of which requires the expenditure of scarce resources on surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. Alternatively put, the view is that, characteristically, rational persons cannot voluntarily guide their choices by rules, but can only be goaded into acting in accordance with such rules by the fear of social and formal sanctions. On this way of thinking, rational individuals are condemned to having to settle for the “second-best” results that are thereby implied. This conclusion rests not only on an appeal to a consequentialist perspective, but also a separability principle. Against this, it is argued that consequentialism itself offers a basis for the rejection of the separability principle, and a defense of the thesis that, for a wide range of realistic cases, being disposed to voluntarily guide one’s choice by rules (on the condition that others can be expected to do so as well) is a necessary condition of engaging in rational interaction.

Most people do not trust most other people, unmonitored, to honor obligations completely. Because of this they use substantial amounts of resources to specify the details of agreements, and to police them. Use of these resources … could be greatly reduced, if transacting parties would agree to honor the spirit of their agreement and simply shake hands. The resource saving to the two parties combined, from substituting this mode of “enforcing” agreements to those currently used, is clear. Why, then, does not this more efficient mode of transacting drive out the more costly methods through the normal competitive process? … The underlying rationale for this … is that it is privately profitable to engage in some degree of “cheating” on agreements, and to use resources to disguise this fact. — M. W. Reder, “The Place of Ethics in the Theory of Production”

The claim that “Everyone's doing it” is frequently offered as a reason for engaging in behavior that is widespread but less-than-ideal. This is particularly true in business, where competitors’ conduct often forces hard choices on managers. When is the claim “Everyone's doing it” a morally valid reason for following others’ lead? This discussion proposes and develops five prima facie conditions to identify when the existence of prevalent but otherwise undesirable behavior provides a moral justification for our engaging in such behavior ourselves. The balance of the discussion focuses on testing these conditions by applying them to a series of representative cases in business ethics.