FOLLOWING a referendum on 23 June 2016 in which 52% of voters (38% of the total electorate) had expressed a preference for the UK to leave the EU, the Government announced that it would start the process of withdrawal, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), by notifying the European Council of the UK's decision, exercising the Government's prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. A number of legal challenges were fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Birnie and others intervening) [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 after an expedited hearing, the Court decided two issues: (1) whether the Government could exercise its power under the royal prerogative to give notice, or needed an Act of Parliament to authorise the giving of notice; and (2) whether the Government required the consent of devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales before giving notice or introducing to Parliament a Bill authorising the giving of notice. The Court sat unprecedentedly with all 11 serving members. On issue (1), the Court, by an 8–3 majority, held that an Act of Parliament would be required in order to authorise the giving of notice. On issue (2), the Court unanimously held that there was no legal requirement for consent by the devolved institutions.

IN the joined appeals of Belhaj v Straw and Rahmatullah (No 1) v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 3, the UK Supreme Court held that state immunity and the foreign act of state doctrine did not prevent claims against the British Government alleging complicity in human rights abuses and breaches of peremptory norms of international law.

IT is trite law that good reasons must be given to justify infringements of fundamental rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. But what reasons can one count as good reasons? In Re Brewster's Application [2017] UKSC 8; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 519, the United Kingdom Supreme Court addressed the question of how much deference courts should afford to post hoc rationalisations of decisions challenged for non-compliance with the Convention. The answer given by Lord Kerr, with whom Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Reed and Lord Dyson agreed, is interesting in its own terms and may have implications outside the confines of the Convention.

The exercise of the Secretary of State's power to release from prison a murderer sentenced to a whole life order would be controversial and politically fraught. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR”) succinct summary of the offending leading to the whole life order imposed on the applicant in Hutchinson v United Kingdom (57592/08), Judgment of 17 January 2017, demonstrates quite why a Secretary of State would find exercising their compassionate release powers so politically unpalatable: “In October 1983, the applicant broke into a family home, where he stabbed to death a man, his wife and their adult son. He then repeatedly raped their 18-year-old daughter, having first dragged her past her father's body” (at [10]). Yet the power to release life sentence prisoners on compassionate grounds under s. 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 has become the fig leaf covering a more fundamental disagreement between the domestic courts and the ECtHR: whether it is possible to commit offences of such gravity that, for the purposes of retribution and deterrence, a person must forfeit their right to liberty for the duration of their life.

PRODUCT liability law has struggled to develop a test for identifying when products are defective under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (“CPA”). In Wilkes v Depuy International Ltd. [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), Hickinbottom J. offered the most prolonged reflection on product defect since A v National Blood Authority [2001] EWHC 446 (QB), and rejected much of the framework of NBA. However, Wilkes provides little guidance regarding when products should be identified as being defective, reinforcing the need for a more deeply grounded approach.

SUPPOSE a trustee misapplies trust funds to purchase property for his own benefit. If the acquired property increases in value, what is the nature of the beneficiaries’ claim in respect of those gains? This was recently considered by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Tang v Tang [2017] HKCFA 3. In 2003 the administrator of an estate (the defendant) purchased property (the “Property”). The purchase was partly funded by the unauthorised use of HK $11.48 m from the estate. Shortly afterwards, the defendant executed a declaration of trust over the Property in favour of his corporate vehicle, Tri-Strong Investment Ltd. The Property was subsequently transferred to this company. Seven months after acquiring the Property, the defendant paid the estate the full amount that had been withdrawn together with interest. In 2005 the estate beneficiaries discovered the defendant's misuse of estate money and commenced proceedings alleging breach of fiduciary duty. By the time the matter was heard, the Property had increased significantly in value.

IN AMT Futures Ltd. v Marzillier [2017] UKSC 13; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 853, the Supreme Court had to decide where a “harmful event” occurred in order to determine whether the English court had jurisdiction over the defendant, Marzillier, a German lawyer. AMT brought an action in England against Marzillier for inducing breaches of contracts made between AMT and their European clients. Although the client contracts contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts, Marzillier had encouraged the clients to bring actions against AMT in Germany. The claims were made under German law of delict alleging that AMT were accessory to the bad investment advice given by the clients’ brokers. The brokers were insolvent. The German claims were brought directly against AMT and AMT settled. It had lost on the jurisdiction question in Germany because the exclusive jurisdiction clause did not bind the clients. They were consumers. Additionally, the actions were in tort and therefore did not fall within the scope of the clause. AMT brought this action in England after paying over £2m in settlement and costs in Germany. AMT argued that Marzillier had deprived AMT of the benefit of the contractual exclusive jurisdiction agreement by inducing the clients to sue in Germany. Marzillier, a defendant domiciled in Germany, could only be sued in England if the harmful event occurred here. Lord Hodge J.S.C., giving a beautifully clear judgment, held that the case could not be heard in England. England was not the place where the harm occurred, despite payment out of an account in England and the alleged breach of the exclusive English jurisdiction agreement. He held that Germany was the place where the harm occurred under what is now Article 7(2) (ex Article 5(3)) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast (Regulation EC No 1215/2012).

OPPOSITE-SEX couples are prohibited from forming a civil partnership. Following the introduction of same-sex marriage, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was not extended to opposite-sex couples, resulting in the unusual position that English law permits same-sex couples access to two relationship forms (marriage and civil partnership) yet limits opposite-sex couples to one (marriage). This discrimination was recently challenged in the courts by an opposite-sex couple, Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan, who wish to enter a civil partnership owing to their deeply-rooted ideological opposition to marriage. Rejecting marriage as a patriarchal institution and believing that a civil partnership would offer a more egalitarian public expression of their relationship, the couple argued that the current ban constitutes a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

CASE C-157/15 Achbita v G4S Secure Solutions NV ECLI:EU:C:2017:203 and Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui v Micropole SA ECLI:EU:C:2017:204 concerned Muslim women who wanted to wear a headscarf at work. In both cases the women were ultimately dismissed from their employment. In Achbita the employer, G4S, initially had an unwritten rule, which was converted into a written rule, prohibiting the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical and religious beliefs. Ms Achbita refused to comply and was dismissed. In Bougnaoui it was not wholly clear whether the employer, Micropole, had a general rule requiring visually neutral clothing. Nevertheless Ms Bougnaoui was asked not to wear her headscarf while working at a customer's site and was dismissed for misconduct when she refused.

IS the mass collection of communications metadata legally equivalent to surveillance of the content of those communications? If so, does EU fundamental rights law have any bearing on its application? If it does, what is the appropriate relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union and Member States’ courts in balancing in the competing interests at stake? These questions came before a Grand Chamber of the CJEU in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others ECLI:EU:C:2016:970 (Watson).

TAXPAYER confidentiality has a long history of protection in the UK. It is a fundamental part of the tax system. It has been considered invaluable by the executive for the efficient collection of taxation, protected by Parliament since the Income Tax Act 1799 and recognised by the courts as a “vital element in the working of the system” (Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617, 633, per Lord Wilberforce).

In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the Supreme Court of the UK (1) held that the UK Government had no prerogative power to initiate the formal process whereby the UK will withdraw from the EU and (2) declined to recognise any requirement that the devolved legislatures’ consent be obtained in respect of legislation authorising the Government to commence the withdrawal process. This article critically examines Miller, arguing that the majority's analysis veers between unwarranted muscularity in relation to the prerogative issue and unnecessary conservatism as regards the devolution issue. The article goes on to argue that while the majority judgment's restrictive approach to the prerogative may be viewed as a progressive victory for constitutional principle, such an evaluation can be sustained only if a set of relatively traditional constitutional premises are adopted to begin with. The article also contends that the general approach adopted by the majority is problematic, given its willingness to invoke arguments of constitutional principle without adequately engaging with questions about what the pertinent principles are, and argues that such an intellectually lackadaisical mode of constitutional adjudication is to be deprecated.

According to the standard theory of administrative unlawfulness an act that is public law unlawful is, for that reason, invalid and of no effect in law. In this article I suggest that the theory ought to be rejected. I begin by outlining the standard theory as well as noting its endorsement by the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed (no. 2). Having in the main part of the paper criticised the theory, I move to lay out an alternative: that unlawfulness signals not the invalidity of an administrative act but a duty on the part of the court to invalidate it. Noting that the alternative rests upon what appears to be a paradox – that unlawful administrative action may nonetheless have legal effect – I try to show why it is more apparent than real. Finally, I return to the decision in Ahmed (no. 2).

Where criminal offences such as attempt and conspiracy require a defendant (D) to intend future conduct, D's intention will always be conditional. D's intention may be explicitly conditional (e.g. D intends to rob the shop, but only if unable to pay her rent), or implicitly conditional (e.g. D intends to rob the shop, but if asked, would not do so if she found it surrounded by police). Rather than interpreting and defining conditional intention as synonymous with all future conduct intention, however, courts and commentators have too often approached it as unique, separate and problematic. This has led to problems of inconsistency in application, and simple incoherence. This article sets out and defends a model of conditional intention as future conduct intention, and as the key to understanding and applying ulterior mens rea.

This article considers prescription as a customary standard of legal validity which enables judges to identify certain customs as law even though the status of those customs as law cannot be ascribed to a law-making authority. Although claims as to customs having prescribed are often bound up with claims as to the quality (as opposed to the validity) of custom as law, prescribed custom is properly conceived to be a feature of the rule of recognition – a criterion by which a court can identify, and declare, a custom as already existing law as distinct from both custom without the force of law and custom turned into positive law.

Toby Milsom was the most original English legal historian of the twentieth century. This paper gives a preliminary assessment of the importance of his work. charting the ways in which it has changed our thinking about the subject.

Administrative officials are permitted to have policies as to the exercise of their discretionary powers, but those policies must be flexible, not rigid. The “flexibility rule”, as I call it here, is nearly a century old. Over time, it has become part of the furniture of judicial review: often used, rarely examined. That neglect has led to confusion, on display in recent cases. In this article I try to put the flexibility rule back on a sound footing. I argue, first, that the flexibility rule requires authorities to treat policies merely as rules of thumb. Second, the primary justification for the flexibility rule is neither legislative intent (as courts have said), nor the avoidance of error (as commentators tend to assume); it is the value of participation. Third, and as a result, the flexibility rule ought to apply to policies governing the use of prerogative and other non-statutory powers, as well as to policies governing the use of statutory powers.

This article argues that claims to recover trust property from third parties arise in response to a trustee's duty to preserve identifiable property, and that unjust enrichment is incompatible with such claims. First, unjust enrichment can only assist with the recovery of abstract wealth and so it does not assist in the recovery of specific property. Second, it is difficult to identify a convincing justification for introducing unjust enrichment. Third, it will work to the detriment of innocent recipients. The article goes on to show how Re Diplock supports this analysis, by demonstrating that no duty of preservation had been breached and that a proprietary claim should not have been available in that case. The simple conclusion is that claims to recover specific property and claims for unjust enrichment should be seen as mutually exclusive.