When, during a recent visit at Harvard University, I called upon my friend Mrs. James Barr Ames, in her Cambridge home, she most generously gave me the originals of some letters which had been written to her husband by Mait-land, Brunner, and other legal scholars. On examining the letters, I found that the bundle contained six letters written to Ames by Maitland, and also the original of one long letter which Ames had written to Maitland, a letter which for some reason, possibly the refreshing of memory, appears to have been returned to the writer.

When Blackstone, a hundred and sixty years ago, made the first modern summary of the laws of England, the constitutional relations of Great Britain to the rest of the Empire were perfectly clear and perfectly simple. The King in Parliament was supreme. “Ireland”, Blackstone writes, “is a dependent subordinate Kingdom” (I. 98); “Our American plantations are dependent dominions; they are subject to the control of the Parliament (though like Ireland … they are not bound by any Acts of Parliament unless particularly mentioned)”. In thus writing, Blackstone correctly expressed not only the legal doctrine as accepted in forensic theory by all jurists, but also the constitutional doctrine, as accepted in working practice by all statesmen.

Having completed our review of the historical relations, we are now in a position to inquire how nearly the self-governing Dominions have already approached in actual fact to their theoretical equality with the mother-country. I prefer, for distinctness sake to add the epithet “Self-governing”; for they form only a part of the King's “Dominions” in the wide older sense of that word. The Imperial Conference of 1907 introduced a new and narrower sense, in which it is now limited to such Dominions as have Responsible Government. (Canada in 1867 desired to be called a “Kingdom,” but it was feared that the United States would resent it.)

It is a very difficult matter for me to deliver any remarks whatever to so learned an audience. I had not myself the advantage of a University education, and most of the people whom I had to address during my judicial career were at the same disadvantage as myself. But I did, somehow or another, pass a considerable time either in prosecuting people, all of whom were guilty, or in defending people, nearly all of whom were guilty—I say that as one who really knew. So when I was asked if I would speak to you this evening I thought I would not speak in Greek or Latin, to which you are so thoroughly accustomed, but that I would speak to you about something which if I do not understand better than all of you do, it is, at all events, my own fault. So I thought I would speak on criminal cases, on how to prosecute and how to defend.

The foundation of the Société de Législation Comparée, whose jubilee we are now celebrating, preceded by a few years, as it happened, the opening of a new epoch in' the history of English law.

Instead of dealing with technical matters, I shall take a different path to-night, because you may like to hear from a judge something of the reality of his everyday life, the actual decisions that he has to make and the actual problems that he has to face. Will you, therefore, go with me upon one of the circuits? As you know, the whole country is divided into seven circuits, and the one that I should like to choose for the purpose of this evening is the North Eastern circuit—Newcastle, Durham, York and Leeds.

The object of this paper is to present a brief outline of the rules of Law applicable to the solution of disputes which involve some foreign element. This body of rules is commonly called “Private International Law”; although this designation is a misnomer, as the rules in question are not concerned with disputes between States, but between individuals.

In his Introduction to the Handbook of Palestine, which appeared last year, the High Commissioner, the Eight Hon. Sir Herbert Samuel, wrote: “If I were called upon to express in a single word the distinguishing characteristic of Palestine, I should say ‘diversity.’” What is true of the physical characteristics, the climate, the religions, the peoples, and the civilizations of that little country is equally true of its laws and its judicial systems.

Thirty men decide to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling bicycles. They procure the formation, under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, of the X Bicycle Company, Limited. In the memorandum of association the objects of the company are stated to be: “The manufacture and sale of bicycles.” The associates supply that legal unit with funds through payment of subscriptions to its stock, and the company proceeds to manufacture and sell bicycles. But the company loses money, and, on the recommendation of the directors and with the approval of all the shareholders, the manufacture, of bicycles is stopped, and the funds of the company are employed in maintaining a motor omnibus service between two towns. The driver of one of these omnibuses, while acting within the scope of his employment as prescribed by the directors of the company, by his negligence runs into A, who was at the time in the exercise of due care, and breaks A's leg. The driver is financially irresponsible. A sues the X Bicycle Company, Limited, and that company defends on the ground that maintaining the omnibus service was ultra vires. Should this defence be successful?

The Book of Assizes, as we call it shortly, has two more formal and descriptive names. In the earliest printed edition it is called Liber Asssisarum et Placitorum Corone. On the title pages of later editions this is turned into French and expanded into Le Liver des Assises et Plees del Corone Moues et dependauntz deuaunt les Justices sibien en lour circuits come aylour en temps le Roy Edwarde le tierce. Why reports of Assizes and of Pleas of the Crown, two quite different things with no apparent connection, should be mixed up together may be considered later on. It will be best to begin with a word or two of definition. We still to-day talk somewhat loosely of Assizes, though in fact there have been no assizes, in the original sense of the word at any rate, since the last day of 1834, full ninety years ago, when they were abolished by the statute 3 & 4 William IV, c. 27. What were Assizes when the book which we are considering was compiled? Up to some time in Henry II's reign, the only way of settling which of two claimants to a landed estate, large or small, was actually entitled to hold it was a duel with cudgels between them, or, as more' usually happened, between “champions,” as they were called, representing them. The victor in these duels established, by the mere fact of his victory, his principal's absolute right to hold the land in dispute. There was no sort of appeal from a decision so obtained.

So far as the present writer is aware very little has been written upon Civil Procedure of a critical or analytical character since the days of JBentham. This deficiency appears to he observable even in the legal literature of the Continent, which is so much richer than our own in the application to legal problems of critical methods.

The subject upon which I have the honour to address you is so wide that within thetime at my disposal I can only hope to touch upon elementals. My task will be less onerous if I limit myself to the system of public control of industrial relations in South Australia. Each State of the Commonwealth has its own system. There is also a Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration for the purpose of the settlement of industrial disputes which extend beyond the limits of a single State. This dual system of control by Courts of co-ordinate control has led to much conflict in the past. I can only say, speaking of time present, that practical necessities tend towards a co-ordination of the principles which underlie the decisions of Commonwealth and State Courts.

‘Reprisals’ is a mediaeval term which is first met with in the thirteenth century. Lawyers, who wrote in Latin, knew it as repraesaliae or repressaliae an almost exact rendering of the French représailles and the Italian ripresaglie. They tried hard to identify the usages it represented with practices they knew in the civil law. Especially did they try to identify it with the Roman pigneratio. It was not till the early eighteenth century that the essential uniqueness of reprisals was categorically asserted by Bynkershoek in such forceful terms as “operam ludunt qui rem apud Romanos incognitam Latino vocabulo conantur exprimere.”

The question whether a statutory corporation should be held liable for torts committed in the course of an ultra vires undertaking is one of particular interest to the student of law for two reasons. First, the principle of ultra vires emphasises most clearly what Dr. C. T. Carr-calls “the incidents of corporateness.” “Perhaps, indeed,” as Mr. Brice has written, “the Law of Corporations may be considered for most practical purposes as in reality only the application and development of the doctrine of ultra vires.” Secondly, owing to the fact that there are only a limited number of cases dealing with this question, and that even these are but of doubtful authority, a writer is free to suggest his own solution. This lack of precedent does not, however, mean that the problem is devoid of practical importance, for, with the rapid increase in the number of business companies, it is probablethat the courts will have to deal with it in the near future. THE CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL was, therefore, fortunate when it was able to publish Professor Edward H.Warren's article “Torts by Corporations in Ultra Vires Undertakings,” in the 1925 number. This article is of such interest that the writer of the present paper may be excused for discussing at considerable length some of the points raised by it. Professor Warren quotes Sir John Salmond, and, as the latter's view that a statutory corporation ought to be held liable for torts committed in the course of an ultra vires undertaking is familiar to most English students, it will be convenient to consider Salmond's position first.

The Law of Property Act, 1922, to a very considerable extent assimilates the law of real and personal property, except so far as their physical natures render this impossible or undesirable. But the assimilation is not carried out, as some reformers wished, by making the law of real property correspond to the law of goods. That would have been too great a change. It would have upset the well-recognised method of settling land by means of life estates followed by successive estates tail. The plan was therefore adopted of permitting personalty also to be entailed. This will save much trouble when, as often happens, it is desired to settle the family pictures or heirlooms to go with the mansion house. The trusts now used to achieve this are complicated and, as numerous cases show, sometimes fail to bring about the result desired. Now in a deed, an estate tail can be created in three ways: by a grant (1) to A. and the heirs of his body, (2) to A. in tail, or (3) to A. for life with remainder to the heirs of his body. (These estates can be limited to heirs male or heirs of a particular class, such as the heirs of the body of two named persons.) Of the three forms of words: (1) is the old and correct form based on the Statute De Donis, 13 Ed. I., c. 1, which says that the will of the donor should be observed; (2) is possible as an alternative form by virtue of Section 51 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881; (3) is curious; it is due to the Rule in Shelley's Case, that if land is limited in remainder to the heir or heirs of the body of a person to whom a preceding estate of freehold is given, the words “heirs” or “heirs of the body” are words of limitation.