ON 5 October 2016, the International Court of Justice handed down its decision in the three parallel proceedings involving the Marshall Islands (as applicant) and India, Pakistan and the UK (as respondents): Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v India). The Marshall Islands claimed that the respondent states had failed to meet their obligation to negotiate the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament in good faith, either under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (claim against the UK) and/or customary law (against all three respondents). All three respondents formulated objections to jurisdiction and admissibility. In all three cases, they objected that a “dispute” did not exist between them and the applicant. The Court, by a narrow majority (extremely narrow in the case against the UK: by the casting vote of the President), declined to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that no dispute existed between the parties.

In Khuja (formerly PNM) v Times Newspapers Ltd. [2017] UKSC 49; [2017] 3 W.L.R. 351, the appellant (A) failed to obtain an injunction restraining two newspapers from publishing information given about him in a criminal trial in which he had been a third party. The defendants were charged with serious sex offences involving children. A feared that the public would associate him with those offences if the information was published. He claimed that publication would interfere with his and his family's private and family life. As against this, the open justice principle means that, wherever possible, proceedings should be heard in public and that there should be fair reporting of the proceedings. This principle carries great weight in the common law.

FOLLOWING a referendum on 23 June 2016 in which 52% of voters (38% of the total electorate) had expressed a preference for the UK to leave the EU, the Government announced that it would start the process of withdrawal, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), by notifying the European Council of the UK's decision, exercising the Government's prerogative power to conduct foreign relations. A number of legal challenges were fast-tracked to the Supreme Court. In R. (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Birnie and others intervening) [2017] UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 after an expedited hearing, the Court decided two issues: (1) whether the Government could exercise its power under the royal prerogative to give notice, or needed an Act of Parliament to authorise the giving of notice; and (2) whether the Government required the consent of devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales before giving notice or introducing to Parliament a Bill authorising the giving of notice. The Court sat unprecedentedly with all 11 serving members. On issue (1), the Court, by an 8–3 majority, held that an Act of Parliament would be required in order to authorise the giving of notice. On issue (2), the Court unanimously held that there was no legal requirement for consent by the devolved institutions.

Many women from Northern Ireland (NI) travel to England each year to pay for abortion services because of the limited availability of the service in NI. In R (on the application of A and B) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Health (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 41; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 2492, the Supreme Court was asked whether it was unlawful for the Secretary of State for Health to have failed to make provision for abortion services free of charge under the National Health Service in England to women who are UK citizens usually resident in NI. The majority answered “no” and, on delivering the judgment, Lord Wilson (for the majority) described the Court as “sharply divided” on both the public law and human rights arguments that had been before it.

IN the joined appeals of Belhaj v Straw and Rahmatullah (No 1) v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 3, the UK Supreme Court held that state immunity and the foreign act of state doctrine did not prevent claims against the British Government alleging complicity in human rights abuses and breaches of peremptory norms of international law.

WHEN the ambit of the criminal law is narrowed judicially, what impact should this have on convictions previously secured under the disavowed, broader rules? This question was considered by the Court of Appeal in Johnson and Others [2016] EWCA Crim 1613, [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. 12.

IT is trite law that good reasons must be given to justify infringements of fundamental rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. But what reasons can one count as good reasons? In Re Brewster's Application [2017] UKSC 8; [2017] 1 W.L.R. 519, the United Kingdom Supreme Court addressed the question of how much deference courts should afford to post hoc rationalisations of decisions challenged for non-compliance with the Convention. The answer given by Lord Kerr, with whom Lady Hale, Lord Wilson, Lord Reed and Lord Dyson agreed, is interesting in its own terms and may have implications outside the confines of the Convention.

IN Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, the High Court of Australia (HCA) declined to follow the Privy Council and UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in abolishing the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise, as PAL is known in South Australia. Under the Australian doctrine, liability for murder is imposed where an individual “is a party to an agreement to commit a crime and foresees that death or really serious bodily injury might be occasioned by a co-venturer acting with murderous intention and he or she, with that awareness, continues to participate in the agreed criminal enterprise” (at [1]). This reflects the very position that was abandoned in Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681 Ruddock v The Queen UKPC 7 as a “wrong turn” of the English common law.

In Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 1029, Mr. Gabriel lent £200,000 to a developer, Mr. Little. He had expected the money to be wholly employed by Mr. Little in developing a property. Mr. Little, however, used the advance to discharge borrowings secured on the property, and other liabilities. In the event, no development of any significance was carried out, the property was worthless and Mr. Gabriel's advance was lost.

All causes of action in tort, like all causes of action generally, are constituted by elements or ingredients. It is often the case that these elements are not crisply separated from each other. That is certainly so in relation to the cause of action in negligence, it having regularly been pointed out that none of its elements is self-contained. Denning L.J. took that view further than most. In Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 Q.B. 66, 86, he asserted: “you will find that the three questions, duty, causation, and remoteness, run continually into one another. It seems that they are simply three different ways of looking at one and the same problem.” More commonly it is accepted that although the various elements of the tort of negligence overlap, they nonetheless retain separate identities. Thus, determining whether the tort of negligence has been committed is not generally understood as requiring a single homogeneous enquiry but an analysis whereby one examines each element of the action seriatim in order to determine whether it is present. This conventional understanding was embraced by Lord Simons, delivering the advice of the Privy Council in Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. [1961] A.C. 388, 425, when he said: “It is, no doubt, proper when considering tortious liability for negligence to analyse its elements and to say that the plaintiff must prove a breach of duty owed by him to the defendant, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and consequent damage.”

The exercise of the Secretary of State's power to release from prison a murderer sentenced to a whole life order would be controversial and politically fraught. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR”) succinct summary of the offending leading to the whole life order imposed on the applicant in Hutchinson v United Kingdom (57592/08), Judgment of 17 January 2017, demonstrates quite why a Secretary of State would find exercising their compassionate release powers so politically unpalatable: “In October 1983, the applicant broke into a family home, where he stabbed to death a man, his wife and their adult son. He then repeatedly raped their 18-year-old daughter, having first dragged her past her father's body” (at [10]). Yet the power to release life sentence prisoners on compassionate grounds under s. 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 has become the fig leaf covering a more fundamental disagreement between the domestic courts and the ECtHR: whether it is possible to commit offences of such gravity that, for the purposes of retribution and deterrence, a person must forfeit their right to liberty for the duration of their life.

STUDENTS – and indeed judges – of the law of contract have been sorely tried by White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v McGregor [1962] A.C. 413. Mercifully, other propositions about the breach and discharge of contracts seem elementary.

Both interpretation and rectification continue to pose problems. Difficulties are compounded by blurring the boundary between the two. In Simic v New South Wales Land and Housing Corporation [2016] HCA 47, the High Court of Australia overturned the decisions of the lower courts which had held that performance bonds could be interpreted in a “loose” manner in order to correct a mistake. However, the documents could be rectified in order to reflect the actual intentions of the parties. This decision should be welcomed: the mistake was more appropriately corrected through the equitable jurisdiction than at common law. Significantly, the concurring judgments of French C.J. and Kiefel J. highlight that the law of rectification now seems to be different in Australia from the law in England. It is to be hoped that the English approach will soon be revisited (see further P. Davies, “Rectification versus Interpretation” [2016] C.L.J. 62).

PRODUCT liability law has struggled to develop a test for identifying when products are defective under the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (“CPA”). In Wilkes v Depuy International Ltd. [2016] EWHC 3096 (QB), Hickinbottom J. offered the most prolonged reflection on product defect since A v National Blood Authority [2001] EWHC 446 (QB), and rejected much of the framework of NBA. However, Wilkes provides little guidance regarding when products should be identified as being defective, reinforcing the need for a more deeply grounded approach.

IN Prince Alfred College Incorporated v ADC [2016] HCA 37, the High Court of Australia (HCA) has once again considered the appropriate test for establishing vicarious liability of employers for the wrongful acts of their employees. The decision will be of interest to tort lawyers in the common-law world for at least four reasons. First, the Court looked afresh at the test for vicarious liability in the context of intentional wrongdoing and has accordingly clarified the confusion arising from its earlier decision in New South Wales v Lepore [2003] HCA 4; (2003) 212 C.L.R. 511. Secondly, the Court expressed very strong disagreement with the decision of the UK Supreme Court handed down just months earlier in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc [2016] UKSC 11; [2016] A.C. 677. The Court apparently regarded Mohamud as having in effect abandoned the Lister qualification that mere opportunity was not enough to satisfy the close connection test (Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd. [2001] UKHL 22; [2002] 1 A.C. 215). Thirdly, the Court appears to have interpreted the relevant English authorities as espousing a Caparo-like criterion of fairness and justice as a separate stage of the close connection test (Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605). That interpretation is questionable. Finally, the Court has articulated a new test in Australian law for vicarious liability reasoning based on whether the employment provided the “occasion” for the wrongdoing to be committed. This prompts a reflection on the difference between “occasion” and “opportunity”, and how this new test is to be applied in practice.

LORD Hoffmann's famous “restatement” of the principles of contractual interpretation in Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 W.L.R. 896, 912–13, was heralded as a “quiet revolution” (McLauchlan (2000) 19 N.Z.U.L.R. 147, at 148) in that it appeared to overthrow the legalistic approach of the past. That approach, often associated with the “plain meaning rule” (Bank of New Zealand v Simpson [1990] A.C. 182 (PC), 189) involved giving effect to the expressed meaning of the text, which (limited exceptions aside) could not be contradicted by the relevant background (or matrix of fact). By contrast, the approach in ICS mandated the Court to search for the apparently intended meaning by consulting the relevant and admissible background in all cases. The ICS approach rapidly became dominant, and indeed orthodox, across multiple jurisdictions. However, in a series of judgments commencing with Re Sigma Finance Corporation [2009] UKSC 2; [2010] 1 All E.R. 571, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has gradually moved away from the approach in ICS (albeit without expressly overruling it) and emphasised the importance of giving effect to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, in combination with other factors (see especially Marley v Rawlings [2014] UKSC 2; [2014] 2 W.L.R. 213, at [18]–[19]; Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; [2015] A.C. 1619, at [14]–[23]). This return to a more traditional approach to interpretation vindicates sustained criticism of the validity of the ICS approach in principle and practice (see e.g. Staughton [1999] C.L.J. 303; Berg (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 354; Buxton [2010] C.L.J. 253).

SUPPOSE a trustee misapplies trust funds to purchase property for his own benefit. If the acquired property increases in value, what is the nature of the beneficiaries’ claim in respect of those gains? This was recently considered by the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Tang v Tang [2017] HKCFA 3. In 2003 the administrator of an estate (the defendant) purchased property (the “Property”). The purchase was partly funded by the unauthorised use of HK $11.48 m from the estate. Shortly afterwards, the defendant executed a declaration of trust over the Property in favour of his corporate vehicle, Tri-Strong Investment Ltd. The Property was subsequently transferred to this company. Seven months after acquiring the Property, the defendant paid the estate the full amount that had been withdrawn together with interest. In 2005 the estate beneficiaries discovered the defendant's misuse of estate money and commenced proceedings alleging breach of fiduciary duty. By the time the matter was heard, the Property had increased significantly in value.

IN the Court of Appeal in Patel v Mirza [2014] EWCA Civ 1047; [2015] Ch. 271, Gloster L.J., in sympathy with the “hapless law student”, said of the illegality concept “it is almost impossible to ascertain … principled rules from the authorities relating to the recovery of money or other assets paid or transferred under illegal contracts” (at [47]). The Supreme Court ([2016] UKSC 42; [2016] 3 W.L.R. 399) has clarified the law in many respects. In other respects, it may have created some new uncertainties and no diminution in work for inventive lawyers and some of their more dubious clients.

A customer purchases services from a supplier to which VAT at the applicable rate is added but VAT was not actually due. Is the customer able to recover these payments by bringing an unjust enrichment claim against the Revenue and Customs Commissioners? “Yes”, answered the Court of Appeal, on the basis that as a matter of “economic reality” the Commissioners were enriched at the expense of the customers, and that such an enrichment was unjust because VAT was not actually due. Lord Reed, giving the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court, reversed that decision: Investment Trust Companies (In Liquidation) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 29; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 1200. The customers did not have an unjust enrichment claim against the Commissioners because their enrichment was not “at the expense of” the customers.

IN AMT Futures Ltd. v Marzillier [2017] UKSC 13; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 853, the Supreme Court had to decide where a “harmful event” occurred in order to determine whether the English court had jurisdiction over the defendant, Marzillier, a German lawyer. AMT brought an action in England against Marzillier for inducing breaches of contracts made between AMT and their European clients. Although the client contracts contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English courts, Marzillier had encouraged the clients to bring actions against AMT in Germany. The claims were made under German law of delict alleging that AMT were accessory to the bad investment advice given by the clients’ brokers. The brokers were insolvent. The German claims were brought directly against AMT and AMT settled. It had lost on the jurisdiction question in Germany because the exclusive jurisdiction clause did not bind the clients. They were consumers. Additionally, the actions were in tort and therefore did not fall within the scope of the clause. AMT brought this action in England after paying over £2m in settlement and costs in Germany. AMT argued that Marzillier had deprived AMT of the benefit of the contractual exclusive jurisdiction agreement by inducing the clients to sue in Germany. Marzillier, a defendant domiciled in Germany, could only be sued in England if the harmful event occurred here. Lord Hodge J.S.C., giving a beautifully clear judgment, held that the case could not be heard in England. England was not the place where the harm occurred, despite payment out of an account in England and the alleged breach of the exclusive English jurisdiction agreement. He held that Germany was the place where the harm occurred under what is now Article 7(2) (ex Article 5(3)) of the Brussels I Regulation Recast (Regulation EC No 1215/2012).