This article tackles questions relating to the interrelationship between the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as the roles of the two European courts charged with their interpretation and application, by way of two case studies. The cases chosen address two very different issues—surrogacy and the right to privacy and family life on the one hand, and religious freedom and the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace on the other. On the surrogacy issue the article refers to an Irish Supreme Court case as well as case law from the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts to illustrate how limits to the jurisdiction of the two European courts is, or is not, clearly articulated and the legal tools used when addressing sensitive legal questions of this nature. As regards the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace, the article concentrates on cases originating in the United Kingdom and France which have been examined by the Strasbourg court and highlights the similarities and differences between that case law and recent judgments of the Luxembourg court, called on, for the first time, to tackle questions of discrimination on grounds of religion with reference to EU anti-discrimination directives and the provisions of the Charter on both equality and religious freedom.

This article explores the influence of Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the development of EU equal treatment law, with emphasis on forms of discrimination precluded by Council Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, and Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. The author contends that although Articles 20 and 21 are primary measure of EU law, their impact in the development of case law elaborated pursuant to the Directives is relatively muted. This may have stunted the development of jurisprudence on the relationship between Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter, and rules contained in Title VI of the Charter governing its interpretation and application, such as Article 52(3) on the relationship between the Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights, and Article 52(1) on justified limitations. The author forewarns against the emergence of incoherence in the case law in this context, and with respect to the role of Articles 20 and 21 in disputes over the meaning of Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78 and calls for fuller reflection on Charter rules in disputes based on an allegation of discrimination.

The EU is making progress in reducing its carbon footprint. The creation of a High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance has supplemented recent market-led initiatives and provided some recommendations for future reform. This article argues that more remains to be achieved. In particular, in light of the fundamental structural uncertainties attached to climate change, precautionary approaches to the funding of GHG-intensive industries are worth contemplating. Such measures include raising the capital requirements on assets with ‘brown’ credentials. The high dependence on banks for external financing in the EU makes these reforms particularly appropriate for implementation within the bloc.

Through the lens of assessing the likely regulatory impact of the 2017 EU Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement and its amendments to the 2007 Directive on Shareholder Rights, this article considers the mythical voice and stewardship role attributed by the EU to shareholders as active corporate governance gatekeepers and drivers of its long-term sustainability agenda. It identifies limitations of the Directive itself and practical challenges concerning the provisions on shareholder identification, executive pay, related party transactions, proxy advisors and shareholder engagement policies. It is argued that there is a considerable normative gap between the EU narrative of engagement and the challenge of engaging shareholders away from self-interest and rational apathy to fulfil a stewardship role.

This article argues for the (re)construction of citizenship of the European Union as an autonomous status. As opposed to the current legal regime, whereby individuals with nationality of a Member State are automatically granted citizenship of the Union, under this proposal individuals would be free to choose whether or not to adopt the status of citizen of an incipient European polity. At present, the telos and essence of citizenship of the Union is contested. It may be argued that the status is partial or incomplete. This has informed competing normative perspectives. ‘Maximalist’ positions praise the judicial construction of Union citizenship as destined to be the ‘fundamental status’ for all Member State nationals. By contrast, ‘minimalist’ positions argue that the status should remain ‘additional to’ Member State nationality, and the rights created therein should remain supplementary to the status and rights derived from national citizenship. This article will argue for a new approach to the dilemma. By emancipating the condition for acquisition of EU citizenship from nationality of a Member State, and reconstructing it as an autonomous choice for individuals, it is tentatively suggested that a new constitutional settlement for Europe may be generated.

According to the main element of the legal admissibility test of the European Citizens’ Initiative (‘ECI’) set out in Regulation 211/2011, a proposed ECI cannot collect signatures of support if it ‘manifestly falls outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties’. This contribution argues that the interpretation and application of the ECI legal admissibility test has developed since the early years of the ECI’s operation, largely due to the CJEU’s intervention in ECI-cases. It analyses the procedural and substantive changes to the test in light of the relevant litigation and the ongoing reform of the ECI’s legal framework. It illustrates that certain contested procedural aspects of the ECI legal admissibility test have been resolved, while the scope of the ECI has been extended to allow Initiatives in the field of international agreements. The article explores the effects of these developments on current and future ECI practice, including the possibility to bring an ECI in the context of the EU-UK Brexit negotiations.

How to understand and deal with the principle of mutual trust, its emanations, interpretations, and imperatives has in recent years become one of the central and most critical issues in the development of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). Civil justice may be the dark horse with respect to mutual trust among the policy areas of the AFSJ in the sense that it may show useful but hitherto hidden possibilities and have an un-tipped winning strategy. In particular, the balancing safeguards in legislation, the importance of which have been confirmed in case law, are important to ensure the fundamental right to a fair trial. However, that does not mean that mutual trust does not pose challenges in the context of civil justice. Hence, it remains important to focus on how—normatively, and by which regulatory means—to support mutual trust as well as how to balance, and perhaps limit, its implementation in order to enhance its legitimacy. In addition, the recent pressures towards harmonisation need to be carefully analysed.

This article takes stock of legal pluralist thinking in European private law. In which ways have existing theories brought forward our understanding of lawmaking in European private law? Central to that debate are the competing rationalities of EU internal market law, on the one hand, and national, juridical systems of private law on the other hand. An analysis of norms, processes, and actors involved in lawmaking in European private law reveals a field that has matured, but that is now at the threshold of a re-evaluation and potentially a transformation in lawmaking from ordered to strong legal pluralism, with a greater role for private regulation.

While there has been much talk of the role of parliaments and courts in the Brexit process, far less—indeed very little—has been said about the challenges facing the largest part of the UK government: the administrative branch. Whatever results from the UK’s negotiations with the EU, Brexit will likely necessitate wide-ranging and fast-paced administrative reform in the UK. In this article, we use a detailed case study of a particular part of administration—the Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’)—to highlight the nature and extent of the challenges facing administrative agencies. This case study is demonstrative as, while there is an extant UK competition administration structure, competition law and its enforcement are highly Europeanised. We propose that the challenges facing administrative bodies in the UK—including the CMA—can be understood as possessing three key dimensions: internal organisation issues; external coordination issues; and substantive legal issues. We argue that, in many instances, these three dimensions will be in tension which each other. That is to say, the reality of reforming administration post-Brexit will involve trade-offs between questions of internal organisation, external coordination, and substantive law.

In recent years, the Schengen Area—and the suppression within its territory of border controls—has become a strong focus of attention. This article focuses on another region of Europe where such controls have been suppressed: the Common Travel Area (‘CTA’). Historically, both Ireland and the United Kingdom have rejected membership of the Schengen system—albeit securing certain ‘opt-in’ rights—and instead maintained the CTA between their respective jurisdictions. The CTA has, however, garnered relatively little public attention until recently, when concerns as to the implications of Brexit for the maintenance of an open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland have gained ground, and threatened to be a deal breaker in the negotiations under Article 50 TEU on UK exit from the EU (‘Brexit’). This article examines the background to the CTA, exploring its surprisingly fluid legal framework; its development in the legal systems of Ireland and the United Kingdom; and subsequently, how it was exempted from what is now EU law as the Schengen arrangements were integrated into the Union. The recent introduction of the British-Irish Visa Scheme, which formalises some visa rules regarding citizens of third states, and which tends in the direction of consolidating CTA arrangements, is also examined. The article further explores the challenges that confront the CTA in coping with the outcome of the June 2016 Brexit referendum, which should result in the UK leaving the European Union in March 2019, and the implications of Brexit for the CTA. Finally, it seeks to identify some key characteristics of the CTA in light of experience to date.